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This Diplomatic Profile Series is intended to provide brief and readable overviews of former Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, starting with the late Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj.

Tunku Abdul Rahman was not only our first Prime Minister but also concurrently Minister of External Affairs and, unknown to many, the main architect of our nascent foreign policy from 1957 onwards. Although he had an avid interest in international affairs, and felt strongly about his pet likes such as greater regional cooperation in Southeast Asia for the common good of its people in economic and social terms, it must never be forgotten that he was well served by a relatively small but effective team at the Ministry. From the Permanent Secretary (as the post was known then) of the Ministry and his young and enthusiastic staff to the notable Malaysians who were appointed as the nation’s first Heads of Missions, one could not have wished for a more dedicated and highly capable group of individuals to further our national interests.

On the personal level, the Tunku made the ideal Foreign Minister when it came to cultivating the friendship of foreign dignitaries which he did with great aplomb at his private parties as well as on the golf course.
However, he was also a shrewd observer of the politics of high diplomacy and knew instinctively how to anticipate and pre-empt developments in regional and international affairs that would directly impinge on Malaysia's stand on important issues. This profile of his time as Malaysia's first Foreign Minister shows not only his many achievements on the regional and international stage but also touches on a hitherto somewhat neglected aspect of his career—the cut and thrust of parliamentary debates in the Dewan Rakyat. In this latter role, too, the Tunku demonstrated both a highly principled defence of Malaysian foreign policy initiatives as well as a more light-hearted response to Opposition parties which took things too seriously, in his mind.

I welcome the publication of this Diplomatic Profile Series which allows us, in one small way, to pay tribute to our former Foreign Ministers, for the roles played and sacrifices made, in the name of King and Country.

_Tan Sri Rastam Mohd Isa_
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj
*Foreign Minister of Malaysia*
1957-1959 and 1960-1970

*Tunku’s Early Interest in International Relations*
It is not generally known that our first Prime Minister also took on the portfolio of External Affairs (which was the original name of the Ministry). One inescapable conclusion from the survey of Malaysian diplomatic history over the past fifty-one years is that the Prime Minister of the day was inevitably the chief architect of the nation’s foreign policy right from the days of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra himself. His successor, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, continued the practice of being directly responsible for Malaysia’s external relations. During their time in office between 1957 and 1976 the Ministry enjoyed a very close and influential working relationship with the Prime Minister’s Office, much to the envy of other branches of the administrative hierarchy. The Tunku’s passion for world affairs most likely had its origins since his university days in England when he got to know many of his fellow undergraduates from other countries, mostly those from the Commonwealth. It is equally possible that his later dealings with the British colonial administration both here in the Federation as well as in Whitehall had imbued in him an almost instinctive feel for some of the cloak-and-dagger character of diplomatic life. Added to this was, of course, his determined opposition to communism which, during those worrisome days of the Cold War,
was undeniably the primary security threat to an independent Federation of Malaya especially because of the ongoing armed insurrection of the Communist Party of Malaya since 1948.

Writing in 1975, he remembers the visit of the Indian nationalist leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, to Malaya in 1934 in which he became an involved party through his Penang friends. These were a leading lawyer, Mr G.H. Goh and his sister-in-law, Mrs B.H. Oon, another member of the legal profession, who both called him up in Sungei Patani where he was then District Officer, aged only 31. They said that, as Mr Nehru was to be their guest during his stay in Penang, they would very much like to have the Tunku come over to meet the famous head of the Congress Party of India. A Reception Committee comprising, Mr N. Raghavan as Chairman and Mr Goh, Mrs Oon and Dr N.K. Menon had been formed and they invited him to be a member, as well as “they had not been able to get a Malay on the Committee as yet.” Tunku’s reaction to the telephone call from Goh was that he “naturally … jumped at the idea, although I knew it would mean throwing away any chances for further promotion.” According to the Tunku, “the British feared Nehru” but “young aspiring politicians [apparently referring to himself] very much regarded Nehru as a most desirable pillar of strength.” Interestingly, he says that it was not until he had published his article in *The Star* newspaper that Mrs Oon wrote to the Editor in 1976 to say that the reason she had been fretting about her guest in her house was that, unknown to the Tunku, Indira Gandhi, the great man’s daughter, had taken ill and was being tended to in a room upstairs. But Tunku’s feelings about the British were quite obvious even in those days as he also recounted a story told to him by Mrs Oon. It seems that, during the ferry crossing to Butterworth, where Nehru was to address a large public gathering, the ferry superintendent, a Captain Shipwright, had ordered that Nehru should get out of the car and stand around like the other passengers. When Mrs Oon and her party had asked that he be allowed the privilege
to remain seated, the British officer had turned them down and it was only when the ferry crew (presumably Indians) turned hostile that Shipwright relented.¹

In the light of the more or less unquestioned conclusion of most books on Malaysian foreign policy that the Tunku was regarded as being staunchly ‘pro-British’, it is useful in historical hindsight to remember his early interest in international affairs. One incident that throws some light on his thinking about such matters when he was still a relatively junior officer in the Kedah Civil Service was the Nehru visit to Penang of 1934 mentioned above. It is quite revealing about his deep-seated resentment of the colonial government and, especially, its officials. Later, when India was well on its way to independence and Nehru paid another visit, this time to Alor Star, in 1946, the Tunku noted that the same British colonial officials were extremely polite and courteous to him. Tunku organised the formal reception and has recorded the spontaneous show of admiration for and loyalty to Nehru by the Indian community which kept chanting the words ‘Jai Hind’—India victorious. It can be understood that in those immediate post-War years, people like Tunku had not turned their minds yet to the potential of an independent Malaya where the Indians who had opted to take up residence in their country of adoption would also become its citizens. But it is his deep convictions regarding the theme of the ‘winds of change’ that Nehru spoke about at length that, more or less, reflected his own sense of nationalism that was to become one of the hallmarks of Malaysian foreign policy.²

The Making of a Malaysian Foreign Policy Apparatus

In the days immediately prior to and at the time of independence on 31 August 1957 there is little doubt that the newly independent nation’s future foreign policy was a subject that would have been discussed within the inner circles of the Alliance Party and the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO). There is, however, hardly any information about what had been going on among the top leaders due to the lack of written sources. It was recently revealed that a sort of ‘external affairs section’ was originally formed in the office of the then Chief Minister—Tunku Abdul Rahman—after the 1955 Federal elections, and that it was under the care of the colonial government, possibly being supervised personally by the Chief Secretary, Sir Donald Watherston. It can be reasonably assumed that the Tunku most likely took the lead in this matter due to his pre-eminent role as one of the prime movers for early independence. Moreover, his close dealings with the British authorities during the constitutional talks since 1955 had, no doubt, made him acutely aware of their predisposition to protect London’s interests both in independent Malaya and in the region during the post-independence period.

Nevertheless, as Chief Minister in 1956, the Tunku had taken the trouble to spell out some of his thinking about the likely direction of the nation’s foreign policy when it became fully independent on 31 August 1957. Writing in The Straits Times Annual of 1957, he stated that “close and friendly relations with our neighbours in South-East Asia must be one of the foremost aims of the Alliance Government.” He went on: “It goes without saying that this applies particularly to Singapore, with whom we have such close ties.” As for the “possibility of the political unification of the Federation [of Malaya] and Singapore after independence”, the Tunku said that he considered it “rather remote, because conditions in the two territories are quite different.” Next, he turned to the Commonwealth membership of which he felt would “be to the benefit of the Federation” as it comprised other “nations of many races and creeds, but with common concepts of democratic government, administration and justice.” Given the regional political context of uncertainty after the Geneva Accords of 1954 for the settlement of the ideological confrontation in Indochina, the Tunku emphasised that “one of our great tasks is to complete the defeat of Communist terrorism.” At the same time, he was
equally concerned about “Communist-inspired organisations [within the
country] which are seeking to disrupt the Government by stirring up
labour unrest” while he also cautioned against the activities of “sections
of the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalists), which … have made their
presence felt.” From such sentiments it can be reasonably assumed that
the Tunku was extremely wary of the potential external threat posed by
Communism in the region. It was also remarkably prescient of him to
have anticipated future problems with Singapore even though the
Alliance Party’s initial disinclination to envisage any kind of unification
between the two territories was to give way by 1960 to the prospect of a
larger Federation comprising the island and the Borneo states.

Given the keen awareness of the Alliance Party leaders as to the
external policies of an independent Malaya, there was obviously a great
deal of motivation for them to begin the process of having qualified
personnel to undertake the task of implementing the Government’s
future foreign policy. Among the several budding young officers of the
fledgling Malayan Civil Service (MCS), both the Tunku and his trusted
partner, Dato’ (before he was bestowed the title of Tun) Abdul Razak
Hussein, had already identified those who were ear-marked for the soon-
to-be-established Foreign Service. Of these, the most outstanding, and
indeed, the most flamboyant was Muhd Ghazali Shafie who had been
selected to undergo preparatory training and familiarisation with the
nuts and bolts of diplomatic life in England and India. Ghazali (or ‘King
Ghaz’ as he came to be known within the Ministry) was an enterprising
civil servant with a penchant for world affairs and he was soon to become
the third Permanent Secretary of the Ministry in 1961. Any independent
observer of the policy-making process at that time cannot help but come
away with the firm conviction that men like Ghazali were, indeed, at
the centre of the Ministry’s role as advisers to the Government. On the
other hand, it is on record by none other than Ghazali himself that
Alliance Party leaders such as the Tunku and Abdul Razak had started
planning the staffing of a future Foreign Service as early as 1953. They were fortunate that there was a small coterie of senior Malay civil servants with the appropriate inclinations to be tapped as the ‘founding fathers’ of the new Ministry of External Affairs. They included, interestingly enough, a number of political figures and officials whom the Government turned to as a request for ‘national service’ in the newly-born nation’s hour of need. One of the most prominent ones among them was Dato’ (later Tan Sri) Nik Ahmad Kamil bin Nik Mahmood of the Kelantan aristocracy who had served as the youngest Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of that state and had also, for a brief spell, actually been in the opposition to the UMNO leadership of the Tunku. He took over from the first Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, Dato’ Othman Mohamed, for just over a year before he was prevailed upon by the Tunku to succeed the Ambassador to the United States, Dato’ Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman, another high-ranking UMNO leader from Johor, in 1959. Nik Ahmad Kamil had been the country’s first High Commissioner to the United Kingdom on the nation’s independence in 1957.

In the appointment of Heads of Missions, there is very clear evidence that it was the Tunku who had been personally responsible in handpicking the individuals who shared many common interests with him, although it was obvious that he worked closely with his deputy, Razak, in the selection process. They were both primarily responsible in convincing [then] Dato’ Dr Ismail to take up the Washington, D.C. appointment as the Alliance Party regarded it as its top priority to cultivate the Americans in the war against armed communism while at the same time expecting the United States to aid both in its economic development plans and in building up the fledgling defence forces. It is instructive to delve into the background of the seven pioneering ambassadorial appointments made by the Alliance Party government as they were clearly personal nominations by the Tunku himself. Each of them personified the principle of selecting only persons of exemplary
personal and professional conduct and experience. Two of them—Tunku Ya’acob⁸ and Syed Sheh⁹—were family members, while Dr Lee Tiang Keng was his close Penang Turf Club friend.¹⁰ Senu Abdul Rahman, who had been active in the nationalist Saberkas movement in Kedah, had travelled widely, gained an American university degree, and was UMNO Secretary-General in 1955 to 1957. The others came from a mixed background of very senior administrative and political service such as an established legal practitioner like S. Chelvasingam-MacIntyre¹¹ and a noted corporate figure in the person of the Oxford-educated, Gunn Lay Teik.¹² It could be safely said that none of these early appointees would have been found the least wanting in being able to hold themselves in high society wherever they were posted—absolutely essential qualities for the country’s Heads of Missions overseas.

_Tunku’s Foreign Policy Style_

Even though the Tunku had sportingly offered Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman the portfolio of External Affairs when he was due to return from Washington, D.C. in 1959, the Tunku could not resist having a say in foreign policy. He more or less gave the game away shortly after Dr Ismail had taken over as the new Minister of External Affairs in 1959 when he stunned everyone by saying that perhaps it was appropriate to recognise the People’s Republic of China. The prelude to this had been his discussions with General De Gaulle in Paris earlier on when the French President had obviously impressed upon him that it was better to be realistic about it. As the Minister responsible for foreign policy then, Dr Ismail has recorded: “Without consulting me and the cabinet, Tunku on his arrival in Kuala Lumpur announced a sudden change in our policy towards communist China. At that time, we had refused to recognise either China or Russia. When cabinet met I told the cabinet that I could not accept the new policy towards communist China and that I proposed to resign.”¹³ Fortunately for everyone, Ismail was persuaded by his brother and other close colleagues to take some time off and accept the portfolio
of Internal Security but many years later the Tunku pleaded rather weakly that it was only “a slight departure from policy.” Writing about the incident in later years, partly in jest, he said that he had to literally go into ‘hiding’ at his Residency home when Ismail called on him several times to hand in his resignation letter.14

Despite this small misunderstanding, both of them got along extremely well and one of the subjects on which they regularly exchanged ideas was with regard to the proper priorities in Malaysian foreign policy. This is well borne out in their personal correspondence especially during the time when Ismail was in the United States. They both also shared a great love for the game of golf and this led to their regular meetings with various foreign dignitaries, whether resident Ambassadors or overseas visitors, on the golf course when matters of diplomacy were often discussed in private. The Tunku, especially, was in the habit of raising vital policy matters with individual Ambassadors in Kuala Lumpur, almost always on the golf course. Thus, the diplomatic set had no choice but to adjust to this style of Tunku’s diplomacy and many important decisions are believed to have been made during a round of golf, invariably in the early morning.15

Being an avid sportsman from young, the Tunku also took a great interest in his other loves, namely, football (or soccer) and horseracing. He inaugurated the Merdeka Football Tournament in 1957 which was a great success with many Asian countries sending their teams to participate in it at the Merdeka Stadium venue in Kuala Lumpur. However, when he was President of the Asian Football Confederation in 1974, he found himself in the midst of a potential diplomatic row when Kuwait objected to the Israeli team being admitted to the Asian Games in Teheran. The Tunku had stood firmly against the politicisation of international sports but, having been viciously attacked and failing to have the backing of his own Malaysian delegates, he gave up his Presidency. The Tunku’s passion
for horseracing had been nurtured by his father, Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah, and he had learnt to ride as early as when he was a boy. One of his greatest triumphs in the sport was the victory of his horse, *Think Big*, at the internationally famous Melbourne Cup in 1975. Although out of office by then, it cannot be denied that the Turf Club ‘connection’ had, no doubt, served him well in his dealings with leaders of foreign countries who appreciated this, the ‘Sport of Kings’.

There were, of course, minor differences in nuance between the two men, as would be expected, such as Dr Ismail’s regret at the Tunku’s not having been able to attend the United Nations General Assembly in 1957 because he was “so busy.”¹⁶ Ismail also warned the Tunku of the potentially subversive role of the Bank of China’s branch in Kuala Lumpur as he had learnt of the experiences of Burma and Indonesia through their diplomats in Washington, D.C. and New York, recommending that the Government close it down. The Tunku, however, could not get the Cabinet to approve this due to the opposition of his colleagues, “in particular the Little Minister Lee Hau-Shik”, and suggested instead that Dr Ismail take it up himself on his return to Kuala Lumpur.¹⁷ Dr Ismail also differed with the Tunku occasionally on Ambassadorial appointments, such as that of Senu Abdul Rahman, a staunch UMNO stalwart from Kedah, whom the Tunku had ‘rewarded’ with the senior post in Jakarta.

Thus, Senu’s letters to the new Minister of External Affairs from 1959 to 1960 urging action on Malaya’s part over the West Irian issue were routinely tossed into the trash basket because Dr Ismail strongly believed that the case should be decided through the United Nations. As he subsequently wrote in his unpublished memoirs, when the Tunku took up the matter on his return to the Ministry, it resulted in “the foundation of our strained relationship with Indonesia.”¹⁸ The Tunku, on the other hand, had stoutly defended himself in the *Dewan Rakyat* when he was severely
attacked by the Opposition for having virtually been led up the garden path in his "peace mission" to get the Indonesians and the Dutch to reach a negotiated settlement under the aegis of the United Nations. He was bitterly critical of the Socialist Front MPs (Members of Parliament) in particular for having chosen to side with the accusers in the Indonesian Press instead of showing their patriotism by supporting the Government's external policy. But, it is questionable if even some of his own colleagues such as Dr Ismail, as mentioned above, were convinced that he was on solid grounds in his role as 'a good Samaritan', as he referred to himself, in pursuing the West Irian issue.

**Earliest Foreign Policy Goals**

From the earliest studies of Malaysian foreign policy up to and including more recent works, scholars, journalists and others have often attempted to trace its origins and evolution by analysing the subject according to who the incumbent Prime Minister was at a specific time. Some, like Saravanamuttu, adopted a chronological approach, providing each phase with a thematic emphasis, while others like Abdullah Ahmad regarded the formation of Malaysia as the vital turning point, which curiously enough is in line with Ghazali Shafie's own thinking. Interestingly, Peter Boyce, in the first publication of documentary sources on Malaysian foreign policy, notes that as early as May 1956 the Tunku had promised UMNO that it would be "free from any influence" and "guided by the spirit of Bandung and Geneva."

Similarly, the terms 'independent' and 'non-aligned' were used quite freely to describe Malaysia's foreign policy orientation after 1957, although the King's first Royal Address to the Federal Legislative Council on 3 September 1957 (Parliament only came into being after the 1959 General Election) unequivocally states that "My Government … does not propose to dissipate the resources of the country by building up an elaborate foreign service or very large armed forces." Even more
intriguing was the statement that there will be “no startling policy in the field of external affairs” other than being “on the most friendly terms with all countries in the world.” These were unusually banal platitudes that appear to have been deliberately couched in such general terms, and one wonders if this was yet another of the Tunku’s tactics, namely, not to show his hand too much to the British with whom he was already playing a sort of cat-and-mouse game.

Since people often wonder how Malaysia conducted its external relations in the immediate aftermath of independence, it is instructive to know that Ghazali Shafie himself had conceded that the Government opted for a ‘low profile’ mode of conduct. On the first anniversary of independence, in fact, he spoke of “our own humble and modest ways” in taking “an independent line in our attitude towards international relations.” “When we agreed with our friends we applauded them,” he wrote, “but when we felt unhappy with the things they did we told them so frankly, and if necessary, we refused our support when such support was solicited.” The bottom line was that “towards the maintenance of international peace and security the Federation Government is pledged to uphold the Charter of [the] United Nations.” The central position of its membership in the United Nations was emphatically demonstrated by the decision to send none other than Dr Ismail bin Abdul Rahman, one of the highest ranking Alliance Party leaders, to be Malaya’s first Ambassador to the United States of America while concurrently serving as its Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York.

As for Malaya’s defence pact with the United Kingdom, Ghazali contended that it in no way adversely affected national sovereignty as “every major move is subject to consultation and agreement” and “we could abrogate it at any time we desire.” However, his admission, in the same breath, that “we have made mistakes” in entering into treaties that had a negative impact on the national interest is somewhat inexplicable.
By May 1957, the British Commissioner-General’s office in Singapore predicted confidently that, although the Tunku had “made no direct statement on foreign policy”, he had “accepted the idea that the Federation should remain with the Commonwealth after independence, … agreed to conclude a Defence Agreement with the United Kingdom and has decided that the Federation should remain a member of the sterling area and abide by its rules of self-denial in dollar expenditure.”

Nevertheless, it is still regarded as the Tunku’s own personal desire to be generally pro-British (or pro-West) in his international dealings, especially insofar as they involved international communism, whereas at the United Nations, the policy was firmly in favour of national self-determination and decolonisation as well as support of western economic principles. In terms of diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, Dr Ismail categorically stated in October 1958 that his Government would recognize neither the People’s Republic of China (PRC) nor Taiwan. And, as for the United Nations, its relatively small scale as contrasted with the highly volatile and unstable geo-strategic environment ensured that Malaysia would embrace the concept of maintaining an equal voice with other states by playing an active part in United Nations deliberations. But it has been noted that its foreign policy positions were, on the whole, aligned with those of the United States. Despite the Tunku’s strong opposition to communism, Malaysia did not favour anti-communist regional alliances and much preferred to explore preliminary ideas of non-military cooperation like the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) with close neighbours like Thailand and the Philippines.

Regional Cooperation and United Nations Activism

Neither the ASA initiative nor its immediate predecessor, the proposal for a Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) was well received by Malaya’s largest neighbour, Indonesia, purportedly due to the defence treaty links that other members such as Thailand and the
Philippines had with the United States through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Based on the Tunku’s continuing interest to encourage various forms of regional cooperation, it has been argued that his primary purpose was to establish a grouping of Southeast Asian states that would focus on social and economic development without exacerbating existing ideological divisions in the region. The Alliance Party devoted special attention to foreign affairs in its campaign manifesto for the first national Parliamentary elections of 1959, when, under the heading ‘Foreign Policy’, it spelled out its ‘cardinal principles’ as follows:

“(a) to uphold the Charter of the United Nations
(b) to help subject nations to freedom and full sovereignty
(c) to be on good terms with all friendly countries without sparing any effort in establishing and strengthening economic and cultural ties with them
(d) to maintain close co-operation with all friendly countries and
(e) to contribute to the fullest possible [extent] towards the promotion and maintenance of world peace and prosperity.”

Despite the openly pro-West stance of Tunku’s foreign policy, Malaya did strive to make its own views heard on a number of international issues, especially within the Commonwealth, where it publicly criticised the apartheid policy of South Africa. While it was also against the Australian Government’s unfavourable attitude toward Asian immigration, the Tunku would not hear of suggestions of a ‘boycott’ of Australia by the Opposition in the Dewan Rakyat (Lower House of Parliament) in 1959. He argued strongly that he “would be guilty of ingratitude to that country” as it was “entirely a domestic affair which concerns Australia.” Malaya benefited greatly from educational opportunities for its students in Australia, and he no doubt had at the back of his mind the role Australian troops played in Malaya’s own fight against the communist insurgency. Dr Ismail, too, explained that Malaya had its own “attitudes towards specific international problems…”
The year 1959 can arguably be viewed as a benchmark in the evolutionary process of Malaysian foreign policy because, barely two years into its United Nations membership, its delegation tabled a formal resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for "respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life." Nik Ahmad Kamil, the head of delegation, reiterated what the Minister of External Affairs had stated previously that year when he condemned mainland China's repression of the Tibetan revolt in March 1959. Ireland came forward to co-sponsor the resolution, stating that it was especially impressed by the Malayan delegation's reference to the Bandung Declaration of 1954 in which the People's Republic of China had specifically undertaken to abide by the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. New Zealand, Pakistan and Cuba also spoke in support of the Malayan resolution, while Indonesia notably disagreed with even having the debate as the PRC was not represented in the General Assembly at the time. It was adopted as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1353 (XIV) by a vote of 45 to 9 with 26 abstentions. This was unarguably a defining moment for the country on the international stage.

Malaya had taken a fairly moderate stand on most international issues at the United Nations since its admission as a member in 1957, for example, over the question of the future independence of Algeria from France, and had, on the whole, gone along with the spirit of the Afro-Asian group. But its policy was quite uncompromising on the threat posed by mainland China and its potential for subverting the Chinese population of the Federation. It invoked the Banking Ordinance of 1958 specifically to prohibit the Bank of China from operating in the country, even though a branch of the bank continued to function in Singapore...
under the British. On the subject of the People's Republic of China's admission into the United Nations, the Government contended that the proposal had "been defeated in the United Nations because the arguments against the entry of the said Government have been more forcefully put and had appealed to the free nations than those advocated by the others." All the more reason why, therefore, one wonders about the rationale to table the resolution on Tibet with such apparent audacity in late 1959, when it was immediately and strongly attacked by the Soviets and other members of the Communist camp.

One explanation was the clear fact that it was keenly aware that other, much larger countries were constrained from raising the issue at the United Nations General Assembly for fear of being accused of further aggravating Cold War tensions, an accusation that would hardly make sense if directed at a patently small nation like Malaya with no vested interest in great power rivalries. The opportunity to demonstrate its individual manoeuvrability in high diplomacy at the United Nations was also tempting to Malayan policymakers in order to further distance themselves from the general suspicion among the Afro-Asian group (viz. leading lights like India) that Malaya would all-too-readily dance to the tune of its former colonial master, the United Kingdom. In fact, the likelihood of an independent streak in a soon-to-be-independent Malaya had been presciently noticed by the British Foreign Office as early as January 1956, when it advised at a high-level inter-departmental meeting in London that it would be "undesirable to broach directly in the [forthcoming Merdeka] talks the question of [Malaya's] membership of SEATO."

In much the same way, the Tunku seems to have favoured overseas diplomatic representation along preferential lines: first, selected Commonwealth capitals and the United States, and then second, Malaya's neighbours in the region. It was the advent of Indonesia's
Confrontation in 1964 that wrought a sea change in the country’s foreign diplomatic stance with a flurry of activity at the United Nations, initially among the Afro-Asian bloc and eventually at the level of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Perhaps the most cogent conclusion regarding the Tunku’s foreign policy is that he rarely had to contend with opposing views and differing perceptions of his primary lines of thought, other than individual approaches that his immediate colleagues might have tried to advance. In fact, when an old-time resident of Kuala Lumpur wrote to him in 1958 to say that it was a “momentous decision not to have anything to do with the SEATO”, the Tunku immediately replied that he was “really glad to learn that you agree with my views that the Federation of Malaya should not be committed to joining the S.E.A.T.O.” There were, however, some younger UMNO leaders who were quite critical of his decisions on external affairs although, for the most part, there appear to have been no major differences of opinion within his Cabinet. The only person who may have looked askance at some of his rather individualistic initiatives (such as his courting of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam) might have been the totally independent-thinking Dr Ismail.

Another important event directly related to Malaysian foreign policy in this early era was the sending of a Malayan military contingent to support United Nations forces in the Congo Republic in 1960. This was the first time the Malaysian Government had formally accepted its obligations as a member of the United Nations. It was the sixteenth member invited to serve under the blue banner in an attempt to bring order to the post-colonial civil war in that African state (subsequently renamed Zaire in 1971, it is known as the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Congo-Kinshasa, today). Even though Malaya was still fighting a communist insurrection of its own since 1948, it felt committed to the principle of international peacekeeping by organising a Malayan Special Force that comprised the toughest regiments from its
fledgling Army. United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC) involved more than 3,000 Malayan army personnel who served from October 1960 to April 1963. It was undoubtedly the Tunku’s firm belief, with the support of his Cabinet colleagues, that the new nation should visibly demonstrate its faith in the United Nations by responding positively to its peacekeeping role that had brought about such a major undertaking. The rapidly deteriorating situation in the Congo did lead to an Opposition MP tabling a motion in the Dewan Rakyat on 10 February 1961 for the withdrawal of Malayan troops serving under the United Nations. Both the Tunku and Dr Ismail welcomed the opportunity to clearly state their case for Malaya’s continued commitment to the principle of United Nations peacekeeping which, as a small country, they felt it should practise what it believed in, namely, the United Nations Charter.

Either wittingly or otherwise, the appearance of a Malayan military force comprising Malays, Chinese, Indians, Eurasians and others in the Congo must have earned the country a new international image among the multinational forces then serving there under the United Nations flag. For the officers and soldiers themselves, it was something of an adventure to have to sail all the way to the African West Coast and experience, for the first time, military life in that continent in collaboration with the armed forces of other nations. The only Malayan newspaper correspondent who had covered the Congo stint of the Malayan Army was to write about their service in glowing terms with a special tribute to the Tunku and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India: “If Nehru and the Tunku had not decided to stand by the United Nations the way they did, all would have been lost.” He added that “when the history of Malaya is being written, a decade or even a century from now, the feats of the Malayan Special Force in the Congo will deserve honourable mention” as it had “done a fine job.” Tunku Abdul Rahman himself was to reveal in Parliament in December 1962 what had
hitherto been a secret known only to his Cabinet, that when, many of the non-aligned or ‘neutral’ countries had decided to pull out their troops from the Congo, he had made a personal appeal to Prime Minister Nehru to send Indian reinforcements. As he said, “I will never forget the spirit which prompted India to rally to our call.”

Formation of the Federation of Malaysia

Nevertheless, the Tunku’s foreign policy was not without its staunch critics both within and outside official Government circles, the key issue being the pronounced and undisguised leaning to the West. At a seminar in Singapore in 1971, Dr Mahathir Mohamad openly likened this “British influenced foreign policy” to “an ‘apron-string complex’.” He went on to say that AMDA, the presence of Australian and New Zealand troops in the country “without the formality of an agreement”, the Commonwealth link and the monetary policy of sticking with the sterling area, “are manifestations of this complex.” He even went as far as to say that “although suppressed, there is no doubt that Tunku Abdul Rahman did not quite see eye to eye with Tun Ismail and Tun Abdul Razak” on “certain matters” of which foreign policy was “certainly one of them.”

Mahathir had just lost his Parliamentary seat in the ill-fated 1969 general elections and had been expelled from UMNO following his attack on the Tunku in the wake of the 13 May racial riots. Such views have, of course, been countered by quite cogent arguments that pointed to the untenable regional security dilemma that an independent Malaya faced in the late 1950s, with active communist subversion domestically and armed insurgency in Thailand and the Philippines.

However, it was in the Dewan Rakyat or the Lower House of the Malaysian Parliament that the Tunku faced the brunt of the criticisms of the nation’s foreign policy directions. It must be remembered that for most of the first decade and a half or so after independence, the Opposition benches were very much under the influence of radical MPs
both from the Socialist Front and the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party or PMIP (later to be known as PAS). Not only were these individuals openly against the strong links the country was perceived as having with the West and the British, in particular, they were at the same time ardent campaigners for the rights of the ‘underdogs’ in international affairs. Thus, the Tunku’s commitment to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia on an economic, social and cultural basis when he came up with his original proposal for SEAFET in 1959 did not at all go down well with them. When the idea had been first floated among Indonesia, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines, V. David, the Socialist Front MP for Bangsar, alleged that it had received “a cold reception.” Finally, when the idea took the form of ASA with only Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines as its members, David alleged that “Indonesia and other countries considered the ASA as the misguided military bloc, as a camouflage for SEATO.”45 SEATO was, of course, the American-led anti-communist military alliance that had been forged in Manila in 1954 with the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan as its signatories.

It can be said that from the time the proposal for the formation of a new Federation of Malaysia comprising the existing Federation of Malaya (made up of the nine Malay sultanates and the two former British colonies of Penang and Malacca), Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei was made publicly known, the Government came under sustained attack in Parliament as well as in the media for purportedly serving the ‘neo-colonial’ and strategic military interests of the West. At about the same time, the Kuala Lumpur authorities had a hard time in attempting to defend their position vis-à-vis such questions as the contentious dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the future of West Irian. Although the Tunku officially declared Malaya’s stand on the matter as being ‘neutral’, this was later reversed when he tried his hand at being an honest broker and ended up further stoking the hostility of the Sukarno
government. As pointed out earlier, this was one of the foreign policy issues on which Dr Ismail had taken strong exception and wholly rejected the pleadings of the Ambassador in Jakarta, Senu Abdul Rahman for a more pro-active role. Interestingly, Tunku had initially defended his policy of being neutral on the grounds that, being a newly-independent country, it could not undertake such major diplomatic initiatives. He had also argued that that there was a severe shortage of well-trained personnel at his Ministry and that the Government was facing great difficulty in even being able to find qualified Heads for its new overseas missions.46

The Tunku, sometimes, did appear to be contradicting himself when he spoke on the subject of neutrality and an independent foreign policy. In his own words: “Malaya’s stand is on the side of democracy and it is sheer hypocrisy to suggest that when democracy is attacked we should remain silent and consider ourselves at peace with the aggressors. Small as we are, we are no cowards. We are no hypocrites.”47

During the days after Malaysia had been formally proclaimed and especially at the time of Indonesian Confrontation, involving armed incursions into Malaysian territory and military engagements, the Government was once again under pressure from its critics for allegedly mishandling its regional and international diplomacy. As Minister of External Affairs, the Tunku had to squarely face the tremendous challenges to his diplomatic skills and it was in many ways fortunate for him that he had people of the calibre of Ghazali Shafie with him in staging a relentless fight against his opponents both within and without the country. When newly-elected MPs such as Dr Tan Chee Khoon48 of the Socialist Front chided him in Parliament for not having been flexible enough in his negotiations with Indonesia and the Philippines by going along with the proposal for an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, the Tunku was quite firm in his reply. He said that, while he had given his agreement to the idea during the Tokyo Summit between the three leaders, that is, himself, President Soekarno and President Macapagal, “in
principle … we should never lose sight of the fact that talks could not be carried out with the gun pointing at our heads.” He further asserted that it was not “consonant with our status as a free and independent sovereign state” while Indonesian troops, “regulars as well as irregulars”, were on Malaysian soil and “President Soekarno has no right by any pretext to violate this right.”49 Later, Dr Ismail, the Minister of Internal Security, who had also headed Malaysia’s delegation to the United Nations Security Council to present its case against Indonesian military aggression, spoke on behalf of the Tunku on the same issue. He scolded the Opposition MPs for having “distorted the intention” of the United Nations resolution on the proposed Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission “by toeing the Indonesian line” and declared: “Let us not hear any more of this nonsense of going to talk with the Indonesians without any pre-conditions.”50

In the formulation and implementation of Malaysian foreign policy, the Tunku had a very clear mind as to the duties and responsibilities of the political leadership as opposed to the role of officials in the Ministry of External Affairs. Thus, he complained in 1962 at a Parliamentary session that “year in and year out, the Opposition would stand up and say that the Government had been inconsistent in its foreign policy and would suggest that the Ministers and myself had been wrongly advised by officials of the Ministry of External Affairs.” In order to “expose to the House the gross lack of understanding and the ignorance” of the Opposition MPs, he reiterated that “I am the Minister of External Affairs and it is for me and Members of the Cabinet, my colleagues, to decide on the policy.” “Never have we asked the Government officers to decide on the policy…[whose]…duties and responsibilities … are to manage the day-to-day administrative machinery of the Government but never to interfere with the Government’s policy … It is only when they do not get going [in implementing policy] that we pounce upon them – but never have we been influenced by them in regard to policy matters,
except on certain occasions we ask for their advice, and it is up to the
Government to accept such advice or not. The policy must remain the
Government’s responsibility and if it went wrong, the Ministers stood
to be condemned and blamed, but not the Government
servants…[whose]…principal function … is only to execute the policies
of the Government.”51

Despite the seriousness of the Parliamentary debates during that
period, the Tunku never lost his inherent sense of humour such as was
demonstrated when Dr Tan of the Opposition questioned him as to the
‘purpose’ of a recent visit by the Foreign Minister of Taiwan. He
particularly quoted ‘press reports’ to the effect that ”Taiwan was offering
facilities to train Malaysians in guerrilla warfare” to which the Tunku
jokingly replied that Dr Tan should not rely on newspaper sources as he
himself had just recently written to the Prime Minister on behalf of his
Party saying that ”something [presumably about the Socialist Front’s
stand on some issue] appearing in the press is not correct.” On the other
hand, he was quite candid in revealing that there had been considerable
contacts between Malaysians and the Taiwanese ranging from farmers
here going on study tours in Taiwan in batches to ”very many visits … by
our businessmen, our officials, and our Ministers.” ”Therefore, I think, the
least we can do, when a Minister from Taiwan indicated that he wanted
to visit this country, is to extend to him all facilities in reciprocation of all
the help that has been given to our people.” This was ”purely a goodwill
visit and a social call”, according to the Tunku and he saw no political or
diplomatic implications in it.52 Later that year, when questions were asked
in the Dewan Rakyat about the newly set up Taiwan consular office in
Kuala Lumpur, the Tunku rather disarmingly replied that its business was
primarily to process visas for those who wanted to go there. He went on
to say that he had heard of its ”many, many attractions” due to which
”those who have gone there once always indicated their desire to go
there a hundred more times.” Indeed, he made fun of the members of
the Opposition Bench by urging them "also [to] take advantage of this visit to Formosa: I am sure they will enjoy themselves" to much laughter in the august House.\footnote{53}

\textit{Tunku’s Approach to Regional Security Issues}

One of the perennial embarrassments that the Alliance Government had to endure since independence in 1957 was its defence treaty with Britain known as the Anglo-Malaysian (later Malaysian) Defence Agreement or AMDA for short. Indonesia, in particular, under Soekarno and the Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI waged an all-out propaganda campaign against the formation of Malaysia primarily on the basis that AMDA’s existence was a denial of Malaysia’s neutrality. The Tunku, consequently, had to constantly put up his defence of the need for external military assistance given the wholly inadequate nature of Malaysia’s own defence preparedness. One of the great concerns of the Government was that its application to attend the second non-aligned conference to be held in Cairo in October 1964 would be undermined by the Indonesian campaign. The Tunku explained at length in Parliament that the Deputy Prime Minister, Razak, had been sent to call on the heads of government in the Middle East and North Africa specifically to seek their support. He absolutely denied an Opposition criticism that “it was only after we had been confronted by Indonesia that we, all of a sudden, started to make [a] move to win over the African countries” citing the fact that “we were the only country, perhaps, in the whole wide world that took up the question of the apartheid in [South] Africa.” Moreover, he stressed that the Government had been unable to open diplomatic missions in those African countries “for the simple reason that we have not the means, nor the men, to man” them.\footnote{54}

As to Malaysia’s policy of peaceful coexistence, the Tunku flatly rejected a proposal by one of the Government backbenchers to organise a “Conference of Anti-Communist Nations.” Malaysia, he said, believed
in mutual respect for each other’s independence and sovereignty and would not be party to such an idea as each nation has the sole right to believe in its own ideology which was why while Israel’s membership of the United Nations was recognised the Government would not accept the Government of that state. On another occasion, when a PAS MP alleged that the Government, in its efforts to be accepted at the next non-aligned conference to be held in Algeria, hardly provided any financial assistance to other Islamic countries, the Tunku revealed full details of Malaysian aid that had been donated to them. Apparently in anger at the accusation, he stated that not only had Malaysia provided financial and other forms of aid to the Palestinian refugees, but it had also helped others in Tunisia and Algeria besides providing funds for the construction of mosques by Muslims in Seoul, Korea and Manila. On the question of diplomatic relations with the African states, the Tunku had indicated that, although the matter was under active consideration, for reasons of diplomatic protocol, he could not name the countries. In May 1965, however, he informed the House that a Representative with the rank of an Ambassador had been established in Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the person would also be concurrently accredited to other states in East Africa.

Inevitably, the Government was often asked some piercing questions by the Opposition MPs about its links to the Vietnam War through its cordial relations with the South Vietnamese Government. The Tunku only provided rather vague answers as to the supply of military weapons and equipment to Saigon but Dr Tan Chee Khoon insisted that “no number of embassies that we open in Africa or in Asia, no amount of junketing on specially chartered … planes, will help us to draw closer to Afro-Asia” if this sort of thing continued to be done by Malaysia. The Tunku’s somewhat unconvincing retort to the Socialist Front MP was that it was Soekarno who had divided them into the NEFO (New Emerging Forces) and the OLDEFO (Old Expiring Forces) but he
was convinced that “we are in a much happier position than those in the NEFO.” Therefore, “what those countries in … NEFO think about us is immaterial.”

The Tunku had been personally responsible for Malaya’s partisan support of the South Vietnamese regime in its fight against the Vietcong and, in reply to a Parliamentary question on 6 February 1962, he had listed all the used weapons and equipment of the Royal Malaya Police given to Saigon. These included a total of 45,707 single-barrel shotguns, 611 armoured cars and smaller numbers of carbines and pistols. Writing in 1975, he revealed that “we had clandestinely been giving ‘aid’ to Vietnam since early 1958.”

Published American archival sources now reveal that the actual Malaysian contributions to the war effort in Vietnam included the following: “over 5,000 Vietnamese officers trained in Malaysia; training of 150 U.S. soldiers in handling Tracker Dogs; a rather impressive list of military equipment and weapons given to Viet-Nam after the end of the Malaysian insurgency (for example, 641 armored personnel carriers, 56,000 shotguns); and a creditable amount of civil assistance (transportation equipment, cholera vaccine, and flood relief).” It is undeniable that the Government’s policy of supporting the South Vietnamese regime with arms, equipment and training was regarded by some quarters, especially the Opposition parties, as a form of interfering in the internal affairs of that country and the Tunku’s valiant efforts to defend it were not convincing enough, from a purely foreign policy standpoint.

Confrontation’s Impact on Malaysian Foreign Policy
One of the greatest impacts of the Indonesian Confrontation on Malaysian foreign policy was unarguably the urgency for the country to become a full-fledged member of the Afro-Asian world while at last beginning to explore the potential of establishing diplomatic relations with selected communist countries. By early 1965 journalists from the Soviet Union were being allowed to freely visit and travel around the country and the prospect of a formal exchange of ambassadors with that
country and also with Yugoslavia was expected by 1966. Dr Tan Chee Khoon, who was an avid follower of international affairs and, especially military history, declared in Parliament that all this "means the dawn of a new era in our foreign policy" but Tunku thought that "goes a little bit too far." To him, "a nation's foreign policy can never stagnate, but it must continue to meet changing world situations." Nevertheless, Chee Khoon pressed on with his argument that "agitation is going on within UMNO itself for a more liberal attitude towards communist countries."62 This was with reference to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, Malaysia that had been set up within the Alliance Party's framework by some forward thinking members such as Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Abdullah Ahmad (Razak's then Political Secretary), Musa Hitam (who later became Deputy Prime Minister from 1981 to 1986), Lee San Choon (later President of the Malaysian Chinese Association or MCA and a ranking Cabinet member), the late A. Samad Ismail (radical political activist from Singapore who was to become Editorial Adviser to the New Straits Times) and the late James Puthucheary (one of the founder members of the People's Action Party of Singapore and a prominent lawyer in Kuala Lumpur in later years). Apparently, in those early months of 1965, before Singapore's separation from Malaysia, Devan Nair, the MP for Bangsar who was to later become President of Singapore, and his colleague from the People's Action Party of Singapore, Professor Wong Lin Ken, were also founding members of this group of young and dynamic men who were clearly unhappy with the Tunku's tardy approach to the need for a major reconsideration of traditional priorities in Malaysian foreign policy.

They actually sent a delegation to participate in the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation Conference in Winneba, Ghana in May 1965 "without the Tengku's approval or knowledge (approval was given by Tun Razak)."63 The Tunku's unfavourable sentiments regarding the pressure for change in his foreign policy are best expressed in his own words when he replied to Dr Tan by stating that "as I said just now,
regarding our foreign policy, we do not stick by hard and fast rules...[and]...we do not propose to stagnate."64 It was fairly obvious by then that the Tunku had, willy nilly, become extremely defensive of his continued hold over the formulation of Malaysian foreign policy and that even those who were close to him such as his own Deputy, Razak, had broken ranks over the issue of change. The Tunku’s continued defiance of the pro-Afro-Asian lobbyists within his own party was possibly due to being irritated by the nitpicking way in which Opposition MPs tried to expose the deepening divide between himself and the more progressive voices of the Government backbenchers. Thus, when Chee Khoon challenged him over his reported remark that it was “immaterial” whether Malaysia was invited to the next non-aligned nations’ conference to be held in Algiers, the Tunku replied somewhat haughtily that Malaysia “will not go on her bended knees to beg for admission” as her participation was “a matter of right, and not of privilege.”65

While the Tunku was often at his best in articulating Malaysia’s external interests and how they were being managed by his Ministry during question time in Parliament, he was sometimes caught out by the Opposition because of his casual and loosely worded answers. On one such occasion he was being grilled over the latest visit of a South Vietnamese leader, the somewhat flamboyant Prime Minister, Nguyen Cao Ky, whom Dr Tan described as “the present pistol packing Prime Minister.” In his reply, the Tunku inadvertently blurted out that “as between Vietnam and ourselves there has been a very, very close and cordial relationship” and “I, myself, have been very warmly welcomed, very well received when I went there twice.” Therefore, there was no “question of deriving an international advantage” from the recent visit of Ky.66 The Opposition naturally took this convenient opportunity to declare that such visits would only “drive us further away from the main stream of Afro-Asia” while a PAS MP demanded to know if this was how
the Government decided on vital matters of policy, that is, at the whims and fancies of the Tunku. It can be easily understood how both his Cabinet colleagues like Razak and Dr Ismail as well as the ‘young Turks’ among the Government backbenchers must have been appalled by the Tunku’s habit of taking such liberties as Minister of External Affairs. His courtship of the regime of the despotical President Ngo Dinh Diem had already brought much embarrassment to the Ministry when he was ignominiously assassinated at the hands of the South Vietnamese generals aided and abetted by the American CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).

Tunku’s moment of truth, so to speak, was reached when Dr Tan proposed an amendment to the newly tabled Budget proposal in December 1965 for a token cut of $1 from the salary of the Minister of External Affairs as a mark of dissatisfaction. It was to be the occasion when the Tunku launched into a comprehensive defence of Malaysia’s role in international affairs although his language was not always consistent with his real thoughts. For one thing, he argued that there was no need for a Parliamentary White Paper as “we have not formulated a hard and fast rule by which we are guarded [guided?] in our foreign policy.” He also defended certain members of the Kedah royal family being appointed as Ambassadors because “we feel that they could rightly represent us abroad and could do it very well” and he had asked Tun Razak to give the official reply in Parliament the year before as he was “rather shy to reply” himself. It is quite revealing that, as far as he was concerned, “the Opposition and the Government … cannot be expected to see eye to eye with one another either on matters at home … or, less still, on foreign policy.” As for the token pay cut, he simply said that it “does not affect me very much indeed, because I am not paid,…to be Minister of External Affairs.” More importantly, the Tunku asserted without any equanimity that even if someone else was the Minister in charge of foreign policy, “whatever I say is the most important thing.” On the opening up to the communist bloc, he was quite emphatic that this
was always possible if they were genuinely friendly but “we are not one that would crawl on our knees in order to beg them to be friendly with us.”68 In fact, by the middle of 1967, he sounded extremely positive about opening up relations with communist countries, especially for trading and commercial purposes, the only problem being that “we are very short of staff” to man the new missions.69

The Revival of Southeast Asian Regional Cooperation

It cannot be denied that Tunku Abdul Rahman played an immense part in the evolution of Malaysia’s external image especially in winning over the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States of America. When William Bundy, the American Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, dropped in for tea at the Residency on 9 March 1966, for example, the Tunku on the spur of the moment decided to take Bundy and his party on a personally guided tour of the National Mosque, once he heard that the visitor had not visited the newly completed building.70 His other pet project, ASA (Association of Southeast Asia comprising Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), was also reactivated with a meeting in Bangkok in March 1966 as it had been ‘in a state of hibernation’ since 1963 due to the problems with Indonesia and the Philippines.71 This was followed by a meeting of the joint working party of ASA in April 1966 in Kuala Lumpur, where the Malaysian delegation was led by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Raja Mohar bin Raja Badiozman, signalling a focus by the group on economic cooperation.72

While it is not the place in this somewhat abbreviated account of the Tunku’s part in the events that led to the political decision at the highest levels of the Alliance Party and Government to institute the Separation Agreement with Singapore, mention must be made of how closely he had followed the ever-increasing hostility between the two parties from about the middle of 1964. He fully understood the serious
implications for Malaysia’s external image and its international linkages if the continued clashes between the leaders in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore were to result in the break-up of the Federation. The Tunku did have a premonition of the inevitable fate of his great dream since 1960 during his extended hospitalisation in London from June to August 1965 due to a bad attack of shingles. Having kept in close touch with his senior-most colleagues during that period, it was a fait accompli by the time of his return to Malaysia on 6 August and Parliament convened on 9 August to pass the Separation Bill that brought into being a sovereign, independent Republic of Singapore. Despite his personal efforts to achieve some sort of modus vivendi during the ensuing years when he continued to lead the nation and its foreign policy, it must be said that the acrimonious relations between the two states went on endlessly. While very few on the Malaysian side, including the Tunku himself, ever wrote at any length about the circumstances that had led to the rupture, the chief protagonist on the other side, Lee Kuan Yew, has left his record of the events of that time in various writings. As would be expected, scholars have vainly tried to get down to the bottom of the facts, especially in assigning responsibility, but the Tunku, it must be stated, has rarely been held to task for the ultimate outcome which was unquestionably not in keeping with his political style and diplomatic behaviour.73

The high point of 1966 was unarguably the successful conclusion of negotiations between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta for the formal termination of Konfrontasi and the subsequent re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines in June.74 It was in this mood of a long-awaited euphoria that Dr Ismail was prescient enough to propose that ASA should be expanded at the earliest possible moment so that it would ultimately become “a regional association embracing Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.”75 Throughout 1966 the central role of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or MFA, as it had come to be known from then on) in promoting Malaysia’s name in international circles became more and more evident to a populace that was largely rather parochial in its outlook. Thus, when President Lyndon Johnson made a short two-day visit to the country after attending the SEATO conference in Manila on 30 October, it really marked the coming of age of the new nation.

In a memorandum to the President that Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, prepared prior to the visit, he wrote: “Malaysia has become something of an economic and political showpiece in Southeast Asia, despite the drag of its troubles with Indonesia.” He also drew attention to the three areas in which Tun Abdul Razak had previously indicated to the United States as Malaysia’s immediate priorities in their bilateral relations: “(1) military assistance (2) support for Malaysia’s five-year development plan; and (3) restraint in United States Government rubber and tin stockpile disposal programs.” It was, therefore, specifically recommended “that, prior to the Manila Conference, the United States Government should announce that for 1967 disposals from the United States Government rubber stockpile will be at an annual rate of 120,000 tons.”

However, despite these promising developments in the public American attitude toward Malaysia, the Malaysians were to find out that, in reality, the United States would not be a substitute for a reduction in British and Commonwealth aid to the country. Although, no doubt, they “felt proud, honored (and somewhat surprised) that [the] President of [the] U.S., [a] country which had not previously paid special attention to Malaysia, included Kuala Lumpur on [his] Far Eastern itinerary which otherwise embraced only U.S. allies”, the reality was that the Americans would, at best, only show some favours in military sales and selected sectors of economic and commercial support. On a more practical level, it was a real test of the organisational and professional capacity of the MFA to handle such a major event that included even a quick visit by
Johnson and his entourage to a FELDA (Federal Land Development Agency) scheme close to the capital. As Ghazali would say in an interview, the experience of Konfrontasi had “imposed a severe strain on Malaysia’s small foreign service” but it had “benefited from its baptism of fire” and emerged as “a well-knit team, capable of taking on the heavy tasks of the future.”

Another notable event in 1966 was the official opening of the Ministry’s new headquarters at what was then known as Hose Drive, and the various divisions began their big move to the $2 million complex in August. It was opened by the Tunku in October and formally christened Wisma Putra because, as Ghazali explained, the Tunku had lived in an old government quarters next to the site of the new building while he was Chief Minister in 1955. Although that house had been subsequently demolished, it was considered fitting that the Ministry’s premises should be named after the Tunku as the main architect of Malaysia’s foreign policy. Ghazali also generously admitted that “Malaysia’s foreign policy can truthfully be said to be a personal triumph of her Prime Minister to the extent he personally is deeply committed to a positive philosophy and approach to national and international problems.” “His insistence on building a ‘happy’ Malaysia implies a strong dedication to individual and national freedom as well as to rapid economic development.” Indeed, to him the formation of ASA was “one of his major achievements.”

As the outbreak of 1969 post-General Elections racial riots in Kuala Lumpur was to spell the beginning of the Tunku’s decline as the hitherto undisputed national leader, it is interesting that he chose to attend the United Nations General Assembly that year, for the first time in his twelve years in office. In his address as the Head of the Malaysian Delegation, the Tunku spoke at some length on the 13 May incident focussing mainly on the “misrepresentation, distortion of facts and corruption of truth” perpetrated by foreign correspondents who had
"turned out in droves in the troubled areas" of Kuala Lumpur. This was, of course, a necessary exercise as Malaysia’s overseas missions, especially in the West and in Australia and New Zealand, had borne the brunt of the virulent negative portrayal of the situation in the country although the Government had successfully nipped the problem in the bud within the first three days. He also referred rather deprecatingly to the continued Philippines insistence of pressing its claim to Sabah despite the "incontrovertible fact that the people of Sabah have, by democratic processes, decided to be in Malaysia." The Tunku returned to the newspaper reporting of the 13 May incident in some ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member countries which, “instead of sympathising with us in our hour of stress and strain,…gloated over our difficulties.” This was at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Cameron Highlands on 16 December 1969 when, in front of the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand he openly admitted that the "matter has given me much pain."

The fading away of the Tunku from the Premiership of the country was greatly mollified by the resurrection of his earlier efforts to forge greater unity among Muslims internationally. One of his keenest admirers, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, during an official visit to Malaysia in June 1970, formally invited the Tunku to take up the appointment of Secretary-General of the soon-to-be-established Islamic Secretariat. His official biographer, Mubin Sheppard, wrote that the Tunku responded to the King by saying that he might not be the most ideal choice for the post as "he was a man who enjoyed good company, horseracing and an occasional game of cards." To this the King is reported to have said: “I am not asking you to be the imam, I only invite you to help to organise Muslim unity”, whereupon the Tunku accepted the offer. During his final months in office, he kept himself busy with foreign visitors such as United States Vice President Spiro Agnew and the German Foreign Minister besides himself paying official calls on the Prime Ministers of
Japan and Thailand in July and September 1970. In Tokyo he intimated to his Japanese host that he would be heavily engaged with his new duties as Secretary-General of the Islamic Secretariat in the coming months. But in a speech at an official dinner in Bangkok hosted by Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn, he formally announced that it was his "last official visit overseas as Prime Minister of Malaysia...[as]... next week ... I shall be relinquishing my post ... and my Deputy ... Tun Abdul Razak shall take my place."83

An Appraisal

In recent times, as more and more of the archives of the former colonial and major powers which had an active role in Southeast Asia during the second half of the twentieth century have become accessible to scholars and the interested public, there is much revisionism in progress about past events. The Tunku’s term of office as the source of Malaysia’s earliest foreign initiatives and the staunch defender of its vital national interests has received some close scrutiny among academic writers. These efforts to better understand the nature of the political and strategic context in which Malaya and later Malaysia found itself should be encouraged so that the true history of our early years in international relations can be better understood. Unquestionably, one cannot but be truly impressed by Tunku Abdul Rahman’s almost instinctive feel for the world of what is known as la haute diplomatique, especially his almost nonchalant approach to quite sensitive and potentially threatening external developments. It can be safely said that this examination of some of the central issues of Malaysian foreign policy during his period in office demonstrates how much he depended on a sort of uncanny intuition in many of the decisions that were made vis-à-vis Malaysia’s vital national interests. For the most part, his leadership of Wisma Putra established a benchmark in our diplomatic history largely owing to the remarkable team that had been put together by dedicated professionals from the 1950s to the 1970s.
Needless to say, the Tunku was also very fortunate in having had the right man in the right place for most of the time that he was in charge of Malaysia’s role in international affairs. At Wisma Putra, men like Ghazali Shafie were absolutely indispensable for his intellectual capacity and daring demeanour so much so that practically everyone in the foreign service who had served under him has nothing but the highest praise for his outstanding leadership. Even to this day, some of the younger ones remember Ghazali with much affection although they freely admit, now in their retired lives, how terrified they had been in serving him. The Tunku was also very well served by the political appointees who were made Heads of Malaysian Missions overseas not only in the initial years after independence but even in later times when some of them such as his MCA Cabinet member, Ong Yoke Lin, who held the fort in Washington, D.C. for a decade.\textsuperscript{84}

It is beyond question that the Prime Minister had a personable character and natural charm that was quite infectious especially at first meetings as was proven on numerous occasions when he entertained foreign guests. One such instance that he himself remembered was when Malaya hosted the meeting of the ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) in March 1958 and “representatives from all over the world attended, Communists and non-Communists alike.” When the Heads of Delegations were being entertained to dinner at the Residency one night the Tunku found that “the atmosphere seemed cold and very tense, and no one seemed to know what to say to each other.” However, after some drinks which he had personally invited them to partake with his Thai friend, Deputy Prime Minister Wichit, leading the way, “everyone became merry, friendly and talkative, and the party ended in much gaiety and fun.” Indeed, the Tunku struck up a special friendship with the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Nikolai Firubin, over drinks at that dinner and not only exchanged personal correspondence after that but the latter would “occasionally send … me caviare [sic] with a
note to say that he has not forgotten that night.”85 Ironically enough, one of the visiting Americans at that time was John D. Rockefeller III who had been invited to the dinner party at the Residency. On his return to the United States, he told the Malayan Ambassador, Dr Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, that he “was very impressed with the Prime Minister who … was very clear and firm in his stand.”86 It was to be little-known but refined gestures such as these that were to set apart the Tunku’s role as Malaysia’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs for a period of just over a decade.
The Tunku shaking hands with British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold MacMillan, on the steps of 10, Downing Street, London, Mr. MacMillan's official residence. He was in London for the ninth Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in December 1960. The symbol of mourning depicted by the white band on his songkok was for the demise of the second Yang Di Pertuan Agong, Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah, on 1 September 1960.

(By courtesy of the National Archives, Malaysia)
The Tunku shaking hands with Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Vice-President Zakir Hussain during his Official Visit to India, 27-30 October 1962.

(By courtesy of the Malaysian High Commission in New Delhi)
In this 1962 shot, the Tunku is seen putting with the New Zealand High Commissioner at the extreme right and the Thai Ambassador, Na Narong, in the centre, at the Royal Selangor Golf Club.

(From the New Straits Times)
The Philippines Presidential Envoy, Mr. Salvador P. Lopez, met the Tunku at the Residency, Kuala Lumpur on 23 May 1964 to receive the Malaysian Government’s decision regarding the proposed Summit Meeting between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. On the extreme left is [then] Dato Ong Yoke Lin, Minister without Portfolio and Ambassador to the United States while on the extreme right is Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.

(By courtesy of the National Archives, Malaysia)
The Tunku shaking hands with U. Thant, UN Secretary-General, at the UN Headquarters on 3 August 1964.

(By courtesy of the Department of Information, Malaysia)
The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy, called on the Tunku at the Residency, Kuala Lumpur, on 9 March 1966 during his two-day visit to Malaysia.

(By courtesy of the National Archives, Malaysia)
Endnotes


5 Born in 1922, he went to the Clifford School in Kuala Lipis, Pahang and then to Raffles College in Singapore, the University College of Wales at Aberystwyth and the London School of Economics. He was seconded from the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) to the fledgling foreign service in 1955 and was trained at first in the office of the British High Commissioner in New Delhi (1955-1956) before serving as the Malayan Commissioner in the Indian capital in 1957. He returned as deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs in August of that year and succeeded as Permanent Secretary in 1961. He was a member of the Cobbold Commission that preceded the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the National Operations Council (NOC) in 1969; and served in various Cabinet appointments during the premierships of Tun Abdul Razak, Tun Hussein Onn and Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad from 1970 to 1984.

6 Born in 1909, he was the son of the *Menteri Besar* (Chief Minister) of Kelantan, Dato Nik Mahmood bin Nik Ismail. He studied at the University of Bristol in 1926 and then read law at the Inns of Court in 1929. He joined the Kelantan civil service in 1931 and rose to become *Menteri Besar* himself in 1942. He was drawn into national politics during the protest movement against the Malayan Union after the War and was a founder member of UMNO. His diplomatic career lasted from 1956 to 1962 after which he became a corporate figure but he returned to public office when he was made Speaker of the *Dewan Rakyat* in 1974. He died of a heart attack in December 1977. See Khasnor Johan, “Trusted aide of Malay rulers”, The Star, 13 August 2007.

7 Ismail was to become one of the most powerful figures in UMNO and died prematurely of a heart attack in 1973 when he was Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. See Ooi Kee Beng, *The Reluctant Politician: Tun Dr Ismail and His Time*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006).

8 Tunku Ya’acob ibni Almarhum Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah (1899-1990) was educated at Cambridge in agriculture and served as the first Member for Agriculture and Forestry in the Federal Executive Council. He was also the first Keeper of the Ruler’s Seal. After serving in London he went on to become Ambassador to France. He was the Tunku’s half-brother.

9 Tun Syed Sheh Shahabudin (1910-1969) served in the Kedah Civil Service and was A.D.C. to Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Shah. He later became the second Governor of Penang.

10 Tan Sri Dr Lee Tiang Keng was born in Burma but brought up in Penang and studied medicine at Edinburgh University. He was the first Member for Health in the Federal Executive Council and was elected as President of the Penang Turf Club in 1955. Santhananaban, “Malaysia’s First Ambassadors”, pp. 25-26.

11 Tan Sri S. Chelvasingam-MacIntyre had a legal firm in Johore and was close to the Tunku since pre-independence days. On his return from New Delhi he was appointed a High Court judge. *Ibid.* p. 28.

12 Tan Sri Gunn Lay Teik had served in the Agriculture Department before moving into the corporate world.
13 Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman Papers (IAR). [Hereafter referred to as IAR], “My Memoirs”, IAR/Folio 12(a)/53. Courtesy of ISEAS Library, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore: Tun Dr Ismail A. Rahman Papers.

14 Tunku, Looking Back, p. 170. There is some confusion over the circumstances in which the Tunku had made his statement about China. He himself claimed that he had more or less responded to American reporters on the spur of the moment when he was being questioned by them during a visit to the United States in 1960. Ibid., p. 169. The author of Tun Dr Ismail's biography, Ooi Kee Beng, on the other hand, states that it was in the Netherlands in 1960. Ooi, The Reluctant Politician, p. 128. Tun Dr Ismail's own unpublished Memoirs have recorded the fact that it occurred in Kuala Lumpur when he was talking to local reporters after his return from overseas. See fn 13 above.

15 Rowland, John, Two Transitions: Indochina 1952-1955, Malaysia 1969-1972, Australia in Asia Series No. 8 (Nathan, Queensland: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, April 1992), pp. 42-46. Rowland, who was Australian High Commissioner to Malaysia (July 1969-1973), wrote that “golf continued to be important during my time in Malaysia”; see also “A Chat with the Tunku”, Berita Subang, January/February 1987, pp. 8-10. This was a summarized interview with the Tunku by the present author who was then a member of the Editorial Board of the magazine of the Kelab Golf Negara Subang.

16 Private letter from Tun Dr Ismail to Mr O.A. Spencer, Economic Adviser in the Prime Minister's Department, 18 December 1957, IAR/Folio 3(2)/52.

17 Private letter from the Tunku to Tun Dr Ismail, 22 September 1958, IAR/Folio 3(2)/63. Col. H. S. Lee of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was minister of finance and, being rather short in stature, was sometimes the butt of his colleagues' jokes.

18 “My Memoirs”, IAR/Folio 12(a)/52.


20 Ghazali’s fertile mind had started thinking about the future of Britain’s other possessions in Southeast Asia almost as soon as he realized that the independence of Malaya was just a matter of time. This is clearly brought out in his reminiscences of his student days in the United Kingdom and his preparation for a foreign service career. See Ghazali Shafie's Memoir on the Formation of Malaysia, (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2004 [Second Printing], pp. 15-23; Johan Saravanamutu, The Dilemma of Independence: Two Decades of Malaysian Foreign Policy, 1957-1977, (Penang: Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, 1983); Dato' Abdullah Ahmad, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malaysian Foreign Policy, 1963-1970, (Kuala Lumpur: Berita Publishing, 1985).


22 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

23 Something about this can be gleaned from a comment by G.W. Tory, the first British High Commissioner to Malaysia, in December 1957 that Stockwell refers to as “the Alliance government’s reluctance to take up attitudes on foreign policy questions and, despite its wish to cooperate closely with the United Kingdom, the fading prospect of Malaya joining SEATO.” British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B, Volume 3, Malaya, Part III, The Alliance Route to Independence, 1953-1957, (London, HMSO, 1995), p. 389, [Hereafter referred to as BD/III].

24 Selected Speeches, p. 6. He was speaking on behalf of the Government to the University of Malaya Students Union.

25 Ooi states unequivocally that “Ismail’s friends and relatives were appalled and saw the posting as a silently executed banishment.” Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence in support of such a strong assertion. Ooi, The Reluctant Politician, p. 86.


Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore, p. 37.

Ibid., p. 38. "... the Malayan position in international affairs has, generally, been one which supports the objectives and actions of the West, at least in broad principles." Milton Osborne, Singapore and Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, July 1954), Data Paper Number 53, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, p. 68. Osborne also noted Malaysia's "firm support to the Indian position in the Sino-Indian border dispute and to the Diem regime in South Vietnam."

He had discussed the ASA proposal with President Garcia of the Philippines in 1960 and the latter was apparently supportive of it but his successor, President Macapagal, dropped the whole idea in view of their claim to Sabah. Sheppard, Tunku: His Life and Times, pp. 119-120.


PD/DR, 30 November 1959, col. 659.

Ibid., cols. 668-680.


PD/DR, 3 December 1959, col. 956.

Doc 398, [Defence aspects of constitutional talks]: minutes (NDMS/M(56)1) by the Ministry of Defence of an inter-departmental meeting on 9 January 1956, BD/III, p. 250.

Mr Choo Kia Peng to the Tunku, 5 March 1958, MTARP/SM1293, Tunku Abdul Rahman Papers, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Memorial, Kuala Lumpur. Choo Kia Peng was 78 years old then and had built his fortune in tin mining.

Copy of letter from the Tunku to Mr Choo Kia Peng, 13 March 1958, MTARP/SM1294, op. cit.

See Tan Siew Soo, The Malayan Special Force. In the Heart of Africa, (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1989). Lt Col Tan, who was then a newly commissioned second lieutenant in the Federation Reconnaissance Regiment, was one of the officers sent with the Malayan Special Force which served with great distinction under the command of Lt Col Ungku Nazaruddin, later General and Chief of the Army.


He was Wee Kim Wee of The Straits Times. Wee (1915-2005) was later to become Singapore’s High Commissioner to Malaysia (1973-1980) and the fourth President of the Republic (1985-1993).


PD/DR, 4 December 1962, col. 2105. The Tunku was responding to Opposition criticism of his “Save Democracy Fund” to send relief aid to Indian refugees who had been affected by the Sino-Indian border clash earlier that year. Nehru accorded the Tunku an unusually friendly gesture when the latter was visiting New Delhi in 1962. The Indian Prime Minister drove over personally to the Tunku’s palatial guest house saying to him “What is protocol among friends.” Sheppard, Tunku: His Life and Times, p. 117.

45 PD/DR, 8 January 1962, cols. 2339-2340.


47 PD/DR, 4 December 1962, col. 2108.

48 Dr Tan Chee Khoon (1919-1996) served three terms in the Dewan Rakyat and was popularly known as ‘Mr Opposition’ as he was Leader of the Opposition from 1964 to 1978. Highly respected by both the Government and Opposition MPs, he was a rare recipient of the honorific title of “Tan Sri” from the King. See R.K. Vasil, *Tan Chee Khoon: An elder statesman*, (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1987); Tan Chee Khoon, *Tan Chee Khoon: From village boy to Mr. Opposition, an autobiography*, Petaling Jaya, Pelanduk Publications, 1991.


50 PD/DR, 15 October 1964, cols. 2343-2346.

51 PD/DR, 14 December 1962, cols. 3058-3059.

52 PD/DR, 14 October 1964, cols. 2175-2176.

53 PD/DR, 3 December 1964, cols. 3468-3469.

54 PD/DR, 3 December 1964, cols. 3450-3454, 3461-3464.


56 PD/DR, 11 December 1964, cols. 4249-4250. (In Malay)

57 PD/DR, 26 May 1965, col. 206. (In Malay)

58 PD/DR, 27 May 1965, cols. 518-520.

59 PD/DR, 6 February 1961, cols. 4939-4940.


61 No. 289, Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, Washington, D.C. November 1, 1967, Volume XXVI, *Foreign Relations 1964-1968 – Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, Philippines* [Editor: Edward C. Keefer; General Editor: David S. Patterson], Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2001). [Hereafter referred to as US/XXVI]. The variation in the original figures cited by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1961 is probably due to contributions that were made at a later date.

62 PD/DR, 10 November 1965, col. 1929.


64 PD/DR, 10 November 1965, col. 1929.

65 PD/DR, 10 November 1965, col. 2072.

66 PD/DR, 11 November 1965, cols. 2193-2194.
Despite the numerous accounts of the events that led to Singapore's expulsion from the Federation, it is worth noting that the only authorized biography of the Tunku by Mubin Sheppard does give what may be reasonably assumed to be his subject's version of the facts. See Sheppard, *Tunku: His Life and Times*, pp. 146-151.

These natural traits were much admired by the younger staff of Wisma Putra as was recently revealed by one of them, Tan Sri Zainal Abidin Sulong. 'I was told that the Tunku after prayer would turn at random to a few pages of the Koran and what he read would be his inspiration and guidance for the day. As regards Tunku's natural charm, he had really an immense capacity to put people at ease in his disarming ways either at a press conference, at the poker table or at his barbecue parties … At press conferences, the press corps often imposed a self-restraint or censorship without publishing many of Tunku's gaffes or unkind remarks.' Personal letter from Tan Sri Zainal Abidin Sulong, Chairman, Malaysian Industrial Development Authority to Tan Sri Hasmy Agam, Executive Chairman, Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 9 October 2008.


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