THE JOURNAL OF DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

Volume 15 Number 2 December 2015

CONTENTS

The *Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (JDFR)* is a foreign affairs periodical published by the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. Founded in 1999, the Journal brings together noted scholars and policymakers to address current themes in international studies, foreign relations, diplomacy, strategic and security affairs and development studies. Each issue presents a multidisciplinary perspective. Our readership consists of individuals in government, specifically from the foreign service, business, academia and education locally, regionally and internationally. It is a forum that provides room for multiple appraisals of and diverse intellectual discourses on international studies, foreign policy and diplomacy that both directly and indirectly influence Malaysian regional and international policy. The primary objective of the Journal is to enhance international understanding of international studies, foreign policy and diplomacy as an art and science within the context of Malaysia both in particular and in general.

The *JDFR* welcomes manuscripts by experts in the field of foreign policy, diplomacy, international relations, security and strategic studies throughout the world. Submissions should be of interest to parties who specialise in the above areas as currently or formerly serving practitioners in government service as well as academics, thinkers and scholars. Papers from all regions around the globe are encouraged, as long as they are concerned with Malaysia's interest in global strategic, security, diplomatic and foreign policy issues.

Manuscripts should meet the professional standards of academic journals, make a significant contribution in empirical fact or interpretation, and use unpublished and primary sources or a broad range of relevant literature. Manuscripts that have been published elsewhere or that are under consideration for publication will not be considered by the Editorial Board of the Journal.

The Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (JDFR) Guide to Contributors

SCOPE

JDFR is a journal committed to the advancement of scholarly knowledge by encouraging discussion among several branches of international studies, foreign relations, diplomacy, strategic and security studies and development studies. The primary objective of JDFR is to enhance international studies, foreign policy and diplomacy as an art and science within the context of Malaysia in particular and the world in general. Founded in 1999, the Journal publishes articles, book reviews and interviews whose content and approach are of interest to a wide range of scholars and policy makers. As such, readership consists of individuals in government, business, academia and education both locally and regionally as well as internationally. JDFR is published by an Editorial Board from the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Malaysia.

FORMAT AND STYLE

The editors invite submission of articles on subjects within the field of international studies, diplomacy, foreign relations, strategic and security studies and development studies. The length of a manuscript should be between 5000-7500 words (in Times New Roman, 12 points) for articles (exclusive of endnotes) and 1500 words for book reviews, which should contain full book details like the ISBN and total number of pages. Interviews should be up to 4000 words. All submissions should be double-spaced with one-inch margins (right margin unjustified) and conform to the latest edition of *The Chicago Manual of Style.* The citation method preferred is the social science rather than the humanities method; therefore, short author-date references should appear in the text and thus minimize the need for footnotes. Full bibliographical details, also in the social science style, should be provided at the end of the article. All articles must include an abstract of between 150-250 words describing its main points, followed by five keywords (separated

by commas) identifying the manuscript's content, for the purpose of retrieval systems. Authors of articles selected for publication and book reviews must provide a short paragraph of their respective profiles.

All illustrations, including figures, charts, graphs, maps and photographs must be labelled and supplied on pages separate from the text. Responsibility for securing permissions from copyright holders for reproduction of visual materials for JDFR lies with the author. Visual material should be drawn in permanent ink or photographed in sharp black and white or colour and reproduced in the form of high-contrast glossy prints or digital images and provided in camera-ready form.

SUBMISSION PROCEDURE

Manuscripts should be submitted in hard as well as soft copy (one copy each). JDFR does not accept manuscripts that have already been published or are being considered for publication elsewhere. Manuscripts will be edited for accuracy, organisation, clarity and consistency. Copy-edited manuscripts will be sent to the author for approval before a final proof is produced containing any final amendments before going to press. Further editions upon final proofs are strongly discouraged. All submissions should be addressed to:

Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia
Jalan Wisma Putra
50460 Kuala Lumpur
Tel: (603) 2149 1051
Fax: (603) 2144 3487
Email: journal@idfr.gov.my
Website: www.idfr.gov.my

Exchanges among Foreign Ministries on Diplomacy Methods: Some Thoughts

Kishan S Rana

Ambassador Kishan S Rana is a former ambassador and is an author and a teacher. He is also Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi. Ambassador Kishan S Rana can be contacted at kishanrana@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

In diplomatic studies, comparison of foreign ministries and their methods is a niche activity, which does not draw or attract academic scholars. Few books have been published in this field. Yet, for foreign ministries, large and small, mutual learning is useful. The fact that foreign ministries are typically closed institutions also complicate study and discussion. Yet, what are the trends in the working of foreign ministries that call for attention? Some thoughts are offered, covering comparable practices in bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomacy, and harvesting embedded knowledge, as a subset of knowledge management, and also human resource management.

Keywords: Foreign ministries, comparative studies, training, knowledge management, human resources

THE CURRENT SCENE

Within diplomatic studies, few specialists look at the diplomacy process in comparative terms, examining the functioning of foreign ministries and their professional diplomatic services. Some scholars have carried out pioneering work in this field, including Zara Steiner, Brian Hocking and Justin Robertson. The published works available are just about ten or so, mainly edited texts composed of essays by several authors. My book *Asian Diplomacy* (2007), which examined the working of the foreign ministries of China, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and India, was a modest effort in this direction, and is perhaps the only single author comparative work of this nature.

At present, regular information exchange and mutual learning among foreign ministries takes place in the EU (via periodic meetings of heads of MFA administration units), and within an informal cluster of Western foreign ministries, which began to meet around 2000, an initiative that originally came from Canada (in the shape of annual meetings at the level of heads of personnel or human resources). A few pairs of foreign ministries that enjoy particularly close ties also hold closed-door discussions on professional issues; one example is Austria and Switzerland. Some Western and developing countries' foreign ministries have carried out benchmarking actions, examining the working or several carefully selected foreign counterparts, but such studies are expensive to implement and the results are never published.

A few scholars have written about the manner in which different countries tackle multilateral issues, at the UN and elsewhere. In comparative studies, this is a kind of low-hanging fruit, because the positions that countries take, be it on disarmament or issues in the international economic dialogue, say at WTO or on climate change, is visible through their official statements and in the negotiations that are open and reported upon at international conferences. This can be documented in rigorous fashion. Beyond such published conference accounts, there exist the undocumented activities, behind the scene actions that reveal the way countries actually negotiate in working committees, caucuses and drafting groups. That kind of information is much more revealing than published data but it is available principally to the insiders, especially delegates taking part in these events. It is hard to pinpoint and reference such material with academic rigour, except possibly many years after the event, when the participants in such events publish their memoirs and oral history records.

Then there are occasional articles that offer wide-based, detailed comparison of the diplomacy process (e.g. Rana, 'Diplomacy Systems and Processes: Comparing India and China', *China Report*, Issue 50/4, October 2014). One academic said in a private comment that studies of this nature are not of much interest to scholars, as they do not produce theoretical insight. Perhaps but for diplomacy practitioners, and for those that examine the working of the institutions that engage in foreign affairs, it is the way countries deal with one another bilaterally, and at regional and global instances, is of real interest. One serious problem that all those carrying out comparative studies confront is paucity of published information, which compels them to rely on interviews and their own personal assessments and impressions.

However such studies are accomplished, for diplomacy professionals, such material is highly relevant to their work, especially the negotiation practices and the cultural traits of countries. In sum, raw material for comparative studies is difficult to locate and is seldom available in the formats preferred by academic scholars. There also exists another resource. Documentary evidence can sometimes be located through rigorous search of oral history records, but outside of the US and the UK, very few collections of such data exist, as noted below. There is similar paucity of published memoirs, outside of a few countries; China is one new source for such practitioner narratives, but these are available only in Chinese.

Around 2004-05, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade carried out a benchmarking exercise, with intensive questionnaire-based discussion at several foreign ministries. They promised to share the results of their survey with the participating countries, but what was delivered to them was an anodyne distillation of the collective result, not information on specific ministries. More recently, Kenya and Uganda have also carried out such comparison with foreign counterparts, and these results too are not shared with others. Is it too difficult to think of a regional organisation-driven survey, and at a minimum, sharing of results among member-states?

The only regular, open international platform for discussion among foreign ministries is the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT), established in 1972; its two co-chairs are the Director of the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna and the Director of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Washington DC.[1] It holds annual meetings, attended by most of the 70 training institutions that are members, with gradual accretion in its coverage and range of issues discussed. After attending some four IFDT meetings in the past 15 years, I have an impression that this forum could be more active in its discussion of shared challenges and experiences.

Training institutions also meet in regional groups. In 2006, I had the privilege of joining an annual meeting of heads of 'ASEAN Plus Three' training agencies held in Kuala Lumpur, as an invited expert. The discussion covered several issues in depth. I suggested to that group that they could easily extend coverage to include what at that point were three more countries of the slightly larger 'East Asia Summit', meaning Australia, India and New Zealand. That has

not happened. I am not sure if a similar group of African training academies meet regularly, but the practice is followed in Europe and Latin America.

POTENTIAL AREAS FOR EXPANDED COOPERATION

With a wider range of activity sectors to choose from, let us focus on four diplomacy themes that are especially amenable to dialogue among foreign ministries: the evolving forms of representation, regional diplomacy, training, and knowledge harvesting. We also address management of human resources, a major activity that does not always get the attention it deserves.

Representation forms: Malta and Switzerland have pioneered 'non-resident' representation. Slowly, this method of using non-resident ambassadors, i.e. envoys that live in the home country and travel as needed to the assignment country, is gaining traction. Some Scandinavian states and others are now experimenting with this, for representation in countries where full-time resident envoys are not viable for reason of cost, or because of local security issues, or need. Clearly, the proponents of this method find it superior to that of traditional form of 'concurrent accreditation', where one ambassador also wears a second hat as envoy to one or more countries. (I wonder if any foreign ministry has studied the cost-effectiveness of this latter practice; is it efficient in terms of value delivered at the concurrent charge, and the cost in terms of distraction caused at the place of primary responsibility? For an embassy actively engaged in its bilateral tasks, this is seldom worth the cost and distraction.)

The other low-cost and 'minimal representation' method is the use of honorary consuls. They give the designating country a limited presence, and a means for local help, say when its businessmen or others visit that jurisdiction. We note an uptick in its usage, and in the extension of subsidiary practices like holding periodic conference of such consuls, to inform and motivate them to perform better. Countries that are probably daunted from appointing more such 'non-state representatives' would especially benefit from experience-sharing that covers the methods used to select such appointees, which is a significant point of anxiety for many small countries that wonder if they can trust those that seek to be designated as honorary consuls in far-flung locations. The activities of agents that market such appointments (visible via advertisements in international journals) also bring the process into disrepute. But handled well, such appointments are of much value.

Another variation on diplomatic representation surfaced recently, visible in a report published in The Hague, *Modernizing Dutch Diplomacy: Progress Report; Final Report*, 2015.[2] The Netherlands seems to have decided to embark on an experiment, with a 'hub-and-spoke' method, under which senior ambassadors might act as regional supervisors, in relation to neighbouring missions headed by those junior to them. It is an old idea that has been considered by a few countries in the past; some may question it in terms of practicality. Again, experience-sharing seems worthwhile.

Regional diplomacy: A common requirement in many countries is to mobilize actions across different branches of the government, also reaching out to non-state actors, in support of activities to which member-countries commit themselves at regional instances. Too often, such actions are viewed as foreign ministry issues, with little ownership from the other domestic official and non-official actors. Small countries have much to gain from the experience of those from their own region, and others, that are the effective practitioners of regional cooperation.

Most countries now accept that developing one's own think tanks and research institutes that work on international affairs has many advantages, notably in providing inputs into the foreign policy process, and being able to engage foreign country counterpart institutions. ASEAN has achieved significant result in developing a network of international affairs institutes in member countries that initially did not possess such agencies. This has relevance in small countries in other regions where such non-state actors are scarce on the ground.

In the field, regional clusters of countries increasingly work together through their embassies that carry out joint activities in the assignment country. These embassies exchange information through lunch and dinner gatherings, and jointly visit different parts of the countries where they are located, for economic, culture, tourism and other promotional outreach. Here too, mutual learning is possible in terms of the methods employed. Through this, embassies can improve local impact, and also engage in public diplomacy that would be of benefit to individual countries and to the region as a whole.

Training: About fifteen years back, Canada was an early mover in developing distance learning at its Foreign Service Institute, experimenting with self-paced modules that furnished basic information in different activity areas, including bilateral, multilateral and consular affairs. The British FCO's Diplomacy Academy established in early 2015 has carried this forward with an innovative approach. Neatly dividing training into three levels; foundation, practitioner and expert, it says: 'There will be relatively little use of face-to-face classroom teaching at the Academy. Instead, instruction in the eight modules will employ a blend of techniques, including e-learning. It will also introduce to a wider FCO audience the idea of learning groups...The modules are designed so that individuals can work through them alone... We are putting the responsibility on individuals to make sure that they get involved in a group and work through the curriculum with fellow members'.[3] In what may be a first, this Academy has also targeted locally employed staff overseas as a key user, which acknowledges their rising importance as contributors to diplomatic activities. Mexico's 'Instituto Matías Romero' is another entity that blends traditional and e-learning methods.

Might these trends, especially UK's approach that shifts to training users the responsibility for steering their own skill acquisition, impact on the many institutions that rely on traditional methods? Potentially, this is the most exciting new approach, getting away from cookie cutter courses, and treating the individual as the best judge of the skills that are needed, viewed against elevated awareness of what is available, via the academy's resource offering and what is on offer on the internet; all that is needed is guidance on how to go about accessing this. Similar fresh approaches are also emerging among business enterprises. In essence they treat the individual as a good judge of own needs, capable of the needed motivation to gain new competencies, often working with others engaged in similar learning.

Knowledge management: In this wide field, let me focus on a single theme. The US pioneered the method of recording 'oral histories' of diplomats that end their career and feel free to speak of their experiences in voice recorded interviews, which are transcribed as texts, posted on a website. This serves multiple objectives: it is an act of transparency, giving public access to information on the manner in which the country's foreign policy is delivered and executed; it provides researchers and scholars with first-hand material

for study and collation; it indirectly encourages young citizens to consider the diplomatic service as a career option, especially important in the context that the general public has but a vague, superficial understanding of the nature of foreign ministry work; and it also gives officials that end their career at different levels an opportunity to tell their story in a format that is easier than writing a full memoir. Established in 1986, through an initiative by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST), a non-profit independent entity, some 1700 of these US records are available in digital format at the Library of Congress.[4] The British FCO has followed this method commencing in 1995, and its collection of about 200 records is at the Churchill Archives, Cambridge.[5] The latter are indexed, but unlike the US records, they are not digitally searchable through keywords. The US National Security Archive also holds some 20 plus records pertaining to interviews conducted with Japanese and US diplomats, available in both English and Japanese versions.[6] India has embarked on an oral history project since 2010, but has made slow headway in placing these online; just two were online in November 2015, but several more should be out shortly, and another 15 are in the pipeline.[7]

Such oral history projects are not a monopoly of large countries; any country can marshal the relatively modest resources that such a project requires, mainly for the transcription of the voice recordings to text, edited by both professionals and the interview subject. One may also note an alternative method used by the Kenya Foreign Service Institute, through organising a conference in September 2009 on its 'Early Diplomacy, 1963-93', inviting all its surviving pioneer diplomats. This Institute captured the full proceedings of this two-day event in a published record that was available on its website, titled 'Reminisces on Kenya's Early Diplomacy: 1963-1993: Symposium on Kenya's Early Diplomacy'. It was produced through cooperation with its association of retired ambassadors, and produced an authentic narrative of rare quality. That also is worthy of emulation.

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Foreign ministries are essentially collections of professionals that are trained and work in a specialised field, mostly spending an entire working career at the ministry and at embassies and consulates located abroad. Managing them, from a human resource (HR) perspective is a vital task. This entails, besides training: the organisation of their work career; rotation between different

assignments 'in the field' and 'at Headquarters'; placement for short periods on work assignments outside the diplomatic system, and parallel intake of outside officials to work in the diplomatic system; a method for assessing performance (usually through annual reports), accompanied by steps to encourage better performance; and a system to promote officials to higher ranks. While all these are comparable with HR methods in other organisations, given that public services increasingly borrow techniques from the business and corporate sector, diplomatic services have one special feature: typically half or more of their staff are at embassy assignments abroad. These overseas offices are typically small outposts (often consisting of just six or eight home-based officials); they operate in foreign environments that vary greatly, in comfort, security and facilities, to say nothing of social amenities. All these factors produce challenges that have no parallel with other branches of public services, but are shared in common with most other diplomatic services. It is a wonder that foreign ministries do not do more to reach out to one another to share these experiences and learn from one another.

At present, the only regular forum for HR experts to meet, mentioned above, brings together about 15 Western countries. Even ASEAN and CARICOM, two regional organisations that have been ahead of the curve in bringing member-states together on a host of subjects, have not so far turned attention to this small niche, for mutual learning on HR practices.

RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT
Finally, let us consider one of the core international affairs challenges that different countries face, in their own specific ways rooted in their geopolitical situation. I refer to the perennial question of how to handle fraught relationships, in ways that protect one's own vital interests, but also try to identify shared interests among contending states. In East Asia, a resurgent China rubs against Japan, with positions that are rooted in a blend of realpolitik, historical memory and contemporary challenges. That volatile region is home to another powerful state actor, the Republic of Korea, which also has its complex ties with its two great neighbours. In recent years, we have witnessed among these three countries, an established dialogue, and a new regional entity, a 'Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat' installed in Seoul in 2011, following the first 2008 summit between the leaders of these countries. It offers a model that has validity for other regions that face comparable schism.

In a different way, ASEAN is a long-standing exemplar. The 'ASEAN Way' and its attitude of mutual accommodation among neighbours, implicit in the notion of 'comfort zones' that countries ought to consider and respect, has wide relevance. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as a regional plus dialogue mechanism among states, and CSCAP as a track two process for wider exchanges among the think tanks of some 20 countries are familiar to the global community. Their structures and methods could be relevant to other parts of the world.

In 2006, DiploFoundation held a two-day conference in Geneva at which foreign ministries were invited to discuss themes related to the practice of diplomacy, including the ways in which they had used the internet in their work. As conference hosts, we were gratified that representatives of 30 foreign ministries attended; the papers presented there are available in a book that emerged a year later.[8] In 2007, a second conference was held in Bangkok, hosted by the Thailand Foreign Ministry, with active participation by Diplo, a larger event with a different cluster of 30 plus foreign ministries represented. Diplo has also organised smaller conferences, mainly in Malta, on narrow focus themes that have included: Information Technology and Diplomacy (1997); Modern Diplomacy (1998); Knowledge and Diplomacy (1999 and 2000); Language and Diplomacy (2001); Web-Management in Diplomacy (2001 and 2002); Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy (2003); Organisational and Professional Cultures and Diplomacy (2004); Multistakeholder Diplomacy (2005); and Internet Governance: The Way Forward (2006).[9] This has been a stretch for a small, underfunded non-profit NGO. There remains a persisting need for some agency to take the lead in organising more events of this nature, drawing even wider participation, especially from the developing world that needs exposure to new trends.

A WAY FORWARD
By their nature, foreign ministries are sensitive silos, seldom open to public scrutiny. But practices evolve. The UK's FCO brings in officials from NGOs and private enterprises to work alongside its staff, and sends out British diplomats on similar secondment. In the past five years, India's Ministry of External Affairs has brought in officials from other ministries and the open market, to work on contract assignments in several of its units, most notably the Development Partnership Administration created three years back to handle

Indian outbound aid activities. More importantly, a reinvigorated 'Policy Planning and Research Division' in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is in the process of hiring a fresh crop of perhaps a dozen researchers that will for the first time – since the 1950s, but now in an entirely altered context – work in this and other MEA units. Some may even find assignments in embassies, which would borrow a leaf from the Chinese practice of installing in all major embassies at least one academic researcher for a three-year term. Such field exposure also becomes one method of improving understanding between academics and practitioners.

NAFTA now swaps officials between its three members – Canada, Mexico and the US, to work in each other's foreign ministries, which is a significant leap across working cultures, especially for a country such as Mexico, which straddles the divide between rich states and the developing world. Austria and Switzerland have long practised such personnel exchanges as part of their sharing arrangements as Europe's fellow-neutrals. EU members have taken this to the next level by exchanging even officials among their embassies located in major capitals; these embassies also write joint reports on political issues. But among developing countries of the Global South, even in regions where extensive cooperation has taken root, it may take a while for foreign ministries to even begin to consider such personnel swaps.

In informal discussions in the past ten years, at the headquarters of a well-known regional organisation, and at two foreign ministries that are members of another significant regional entity, I made soundings on the utility of sharing experiences in foreign ministry management, but found no takers. Old habits of aloofness die hard, but change could emerge, perhaps driven by a desire to understand how others function, and a need to stretch resources for maximum value at times when all public service budgets are under pressure.

It is possible that practice-oriented diplomatic studies will gain traction in the years ahead. Witness the recent appointment of several professors in the US to chairs that for the first time include in their title words such as 'practice of diplomacy' and 'practice of international affairs'. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some study courses now focus on the practical end of diplomacy. One hopes this may contribute to narrowing that long-persisting gulf between working diplomats and academic theorists, though for now a few swallows on the horizon do not make summer.

ENDNOTES

[1]See: http://forum.diplomacy.edu/

[2]This 2015 document is available on the website of the Dutch Foreign Ministry (not to be confused with the 'Interim Report' published in 2013).

[3]Jon Davies, Director of the British Diplomatic Academy, in an article published in *Foreign Service Journal*, July/August 2015

[4]See: http://www.loc.gov/collection/foreign-affairs-oral-history/about-this-collection/

[5]See: https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/bdohp/

[6]See: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/japan/ohpage.htm

[7]I have played a small role on this project in the conception, and have conducted four interviews. See: http://www.icwa.in/oralhistory.html

[8]See: Kishan S Rana and Jovan Kurbalija, eds. *Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Delivering Value*, (DiploFoundation, Malta and Geneva, 2007).

[9]Reports on most of these are at: http://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/books

Negotiation and Warfare[1]

Paul Meerts

Professor Paul Meerts is a Senior Research Associate at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' in The Hague, Netherlands. He served the institute as Director of its Academy (1983-1990), Deputy General Director (1990-2006) and Special Advisor to the Director (2006-2011). He wrote his doctorate dissertation (2011-2014) on <u>Diplomatic Negotiation, Essence and Evolution</u>. He is Doctor Honoris Causa of the National University of Mongolia (2001). He was a member and rapporteur of the International Forum on Diplomatic Training (1985-2012). Paul Meerts is a member of the Steering Committee of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program and of the Advisory Board to the Journal of International Negotiation. He has been training at IDFR in Malaysia and in a hundred other countries around the world.

ABSTRACT

War and negotiation are closely connected. They have a lot of differences and similarities, and they are both instruments in conflict management and resolution. Strategies and tactics in war and negotiation are quite alike, though their application is completely different. This article analyses the utility of war and negotiation, their historical background, things they have in common, divergences and synergies. A few paragraphs are devoted to mediation and the question of when mediation can be regarded as being useful in preventing conflicts and bridging the abyss between war and words. The article concludes by observing that – in our time – the number of conflicts ended by negotiations is much higher than the number of conflicts ended through victories. This is – among other factors – a consequence of regime building over the centuries, culminating in institutions like the United Nations, ASEAN, and the European Union.

Keywords: war, negotiation, mediation, strategy, tactics, regimes, institutions, evolution

INTRODUCTION

Warfare and negotiation are two sides of the same coin and, for this reason, negotiation may be described as 'war by peaceful means' (Meerts 2014b: 4).

---

[1]This article is based on Chapter V of the doctoral dissertation of the author: 'Diplomatic Negotiation, Essence and Evolution, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, November 2014.

They are the most important instruments in managing conflicts between and inside states. The question is: which is the most effective? It is often easier to start a war than to negotiate a conflict. Still, negotiating a conflict is more effective, as it avoids personal and material casualties, while the costs are negligible. Casualties not only weigh heavily on the present, but also constrain the future. Traumas created by warfare do not easily fade away. It might – and often does – take centuries before these traumas are overcome. We do not need to go to the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa or East Asia to find traces of wars still impacting upon the present. For example, when Englishmen meet the French, they sometimes show them their right hand as if it draws a bow: a remembrance of the victory of the Black Prince over the French King in the 14th century. While negotiation is more effective in the long run, it does not mean that it is the best tool in the short term.

While we might prefer peace over war as a more effective way of running the society of mankind, it does not necessarily mean that war is the exception and that peace is normality:

> From the point of view of evolutionary psychology, if war is so universal and ubiquitous as has been claimed by advocates of the Universal Human Belligerence theorem, the mere fact [of] peace constitutes a problem, and we would have to develop a theory of peace as an abnormal, anomalous condition (Dennen, 1994: 498).

However, we should keep in mind 'Kant's principle that no one should do anything in war that will make reconciliation impossible' (Randle, 1973: 501). One way to create ripeness for reconciliation is diplomacy. 'Diplomacy, like war, can be seen as a perennial institution, influencing relations between polities throughout history' (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 34). According to Jönsson and Aggestam, diplomatic norms and practices can facilitate conflict resolution through coexistence and reciprocity, open communication channels and shared language, commitment to peace, diplomatic immunities and *pacta sund servanda* (agreements will have to be kept) (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 36-40). They also notice, however, that diplomatic norms and practices could complicate conflict resolution because of problems of precedence and recognition, too much openness, constructive ambiguity and complexity in multilateral and polylateral negotiations (Jönsson and Aggestam, 2009: 40-

46). Furthermore, as Iklé has argued, negotiation can also be used to gain time in order to prepare for war, or to stop the other party from going to war until that war is no longer an attractive option (Iklé, 1964: 51). Likewise, negotiation can be used to avoid any outcome, following the reasoning that the time is not ripe for conclusion as long as the negotiation process is in place – in short, negotiation as deception.

THE UTILITY OF WAR AND WORDS

The title of this section on war and words has been inspired by General Sir Rupert Smith's fascinating book *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (Smith, 2005). The following question comes to the fore: what about the utility of that non-overpowering tool that we call 'negotiation', or in a more narrow sense 'bargaining', in relationship to warfare in risky situations, with bargaining here being part of the much more encompassing process of – in this case international – negotiation? The other author of interest here is the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz, with his saying 'that war is the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means' (Holsti, 1991).

The idea behind this article is to compare warfare and negotiation in the framework of inter-state relationships. The article therefore looks at the role of the state as actor in both the use of violence against other states, as well as peaceful give and take, because 'Clausewitz regarded the growth of the modern state as the most significant process in history' (Paret, 1976: 3). If we are in agreement with Clausewitz's opinion, we might add that one of the main issues with which states have to deal are internal and external conflicts. The more advanced – in other words 'modern' – states are, the more sophisticated their conflict mechanisms will have to be. Negotiation processes are probably the most frequently used tool of conflict management, and are peaceful, a characteristic that they share with facilitation, mediation and adjudication. 'Negotiating in warfare can be used in different ways. An alternative way of reading Clausewitz would be: negotiating is the continuation of war with non-violent means' (Van Es, 1996: 105).

As a mode for conflict prevention, management and resolution, negotiation has to compete with – or go hand-in-hand with – the use of force, whether for defence, containment, repression or conquest. What can we say about negotiation and warfare? Are the two connected? How did they develop in

history, how do they relate to each other, and did this connectedness change? What do they have in common, and to what extent do they differ? Are they equally effective in dealing with risky situations, or is there more risk involved in using one or the other?

This article starts with a short review of the evolution of inter-state ('diplomatic') negotiation and the use of force ('warfare'). In the second part, the nature and characteristics of both conflict mechanisms will be analysed: what is their commonality? The third part focuses on the differences between negotiation and warfare. Which situations are more apt for warfare and which for negotiation? What are the consequences of these? The fourth part deals with the synergy between the two phenomena: whether they go together and if so, when? In the fifth part, some conclusions are drawn about the utility of negotiation and warfare in dangerous international relations.

While the application of military means in conflict situations has been the object of study for thousands of years, for example by Sun Tzu (Chung, 1991; Handel, 1992; Hanzhang, 1993), the analysis of negotiation processes is a more recent phenomenon (Hemmer, Garb, Phillips and Graham, 2006: 129-162). Yet both negotiation and warfare are among the oldest professions in the world (although perhaps not the oldest), not only connected as a means of conflict management, but also as a means of economic and imperialistic expansion. Trade (*negotie* in ancient Dutch) and war have been twins for ages of human history. It is interesting to note that the leisured class of the Roman Empire, the patricians, had two main activities in life: warfare; and negotiation, in the sense of trading.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
States settled their conflicts first of all through violent means. City-states fought over resources, as did nomadic tribes whose political structures could be defined as 'mobile states'. 'If anything, war was more central to the politics of the Amarna period than it has been in modern times' (David, 2000: 62). The 'Amarna period' or 'Amarna age' is named after the Amarna archive (14th century BCE), documenting the diplomatic and military relationships of five major powers in the ancient Middle East: Pharaonic Egypt of Ramses II; Hittitian Hatti of Muwatalli; and Mesopotamian Babylonia, Assyria and Mittani. Although diplomacy – and thereby inter-state negotiation – played a

role, it was merely a side-effect of military strength, a tool to serve successful military policies. In an age of naked power, diplomacy played the role of the loincloth, and the power of states was translated in soldiers, not in diplomats. This does not mean that diplomacy was overlooked in ancient times. For Sun Tzu, it was a very useful tool in warfare. 'He [Sun Tzu] used to make alliances with forces in order to fight against a common enemy' (Hanzhang, 1993: 27).

Yet, as far as diplomacy and inter-state negotiation had a role to play, it was subordinate to the military effort. It is interesting to note here that in some societies this is even true today, because the state has the tendency to define a crisis in the context of its means to deal with the problems at hand. If the state is powerful, it will use the means available. A strong and technologically advanced army is there to be used. '*Si vis pacem para bellum*' (if you want peace, prepare for war) might in theory lead to the prevention of war, as the other side will refrain from an attack, but in practice, the temptation to use the tools you have is often stronger than the wisdom to refrain from action even though Sun Tzu thought 'it best to subdue the enemy's army without fighting' (Hanzhang, 1993: 21), and rulers through the ages have used peaceful means to implement their aggressive objectives. Examples include Louis XIV of France, fighting for the expansion of his kingdom in the 17th and 18th centuries, who used peace talks to divide his enemies, but resorted to war again as soon as their coalition faltered; and Adolf Hitler in 1938 in Munich, who used the mere threat of his army to occupy Czechoslovakia, and later Denmark, without a shot being fired.

There is more to be said, however, about the dynamics obstructing the use of peaceful means. One element is the security dilemma of risk-taking. '*Si vis pacem para bellum*' expresses the fear of being surprised by the other party, of being unprepared for war. It is better not to take the risk of having to rely on peaceful means like negotiation. Having a strong army, however, means a higher risk of using it. One step further, it implies the preventive use of force in order to prevent the risk of losing your dynastic possessions. In the absence of effective diplomatic relations, cooperation could not be sustained, could not perform as a sufficient guarantee against the 'evil empires'. As words can only function in the framework of diplomatic cooperation, they could not hope for an equal footing with war. Negotiation could therefore not function as risk insurance; its basis was too feeble, trust was lacking, and treason lurked

around the corner. In order to prevent the risk of being overtaken, preparation for violence was the only means available, with negotiations in a supportive role.

Many cultures in our modern world still regard the offer to negotiate as a sign of weakness instead of wisdom (Schecter, 1998). Decisions are often made to fight, even if the advantages of dialogue are obvious. The state's face is at risk if hands are reached out to the opposite side, which might undermine the country's credibility, thereby weakening its overall position in the region and in the world. Negotiators are sometimes unwilling to make a trade-off, even if it is more than obvious that they will gain more in return than they will sacrifice, because the loss is more difficult to digest than the fruitfulness of obtaining a concession from their opponents. Moreover, if the other side concedes, there must be something strange about the situation, so how can we be confident that they are not gaining something in secret? It might be a gambit, a bait to catch a bigger fish, or a short-term loss for long-term gains. The psychological mechanism is entrapment. According to prospect theory, people – and thus negotiators – will take more risks if they are threatened with losing something than if they expected a profit. This will result in tying negotiators to downward spirals and investing more and more in situations from which they should, rationally speaking, withdraw. Emotions steer rationality and the actor, fearing loss of face, works against his or her own interests. The more powerful states have more face to protect, and are thus more prone to entrapment cycles than smaller states. Entrapment can therefore be used as a tactical device by weaker powers, both in negotiation and in warfare.

Over the course of the centuries, war became an extremely costly affair and a severe risk for a state's treasury. The relative importance of negotiation as a cost-effective means of settling conflicts therefore slowly came to the fore. One of the first diplomats to understand this was the famous and notorious French ambassador Talleyrand. Confronted with the defeat of Napoleon and having to rescue France from oblivion, Talleyrand used the Congress of Vienna negotiations in 1814-1815 to strengthen the French position through coalition-building, meanwhile introducing true multilateralism into the negotiation process. Later, the disastrous 20th century with its ravaging two world wars showed the ineffectiveness of large-scale warfare in settling international conflicts. It became seen that negotiation often creates options for win-win

outcomes. Wars in the past led to win-lose solutions, but modern technology and mass participation created so much devastation that statesmen increasingly preferred negotiation over warfare. The world saw a shift from negotiation as a tool in warfare towards warfare as a tool in negotiation.

One more factor in diminishing the effectiveness of war in conflicts is the growing complexity of states, which became so institutionalized that it is nearly impossible to overthrow them and subdue them on a permanent basis. However, states might be held hostage through nuclear threats. The chance today of being completely overrun is much less imminent than in ancient and medieval times. Add to this the strength of ideology and religion, the interconnectedness of the world through television and the internet, as well as the availability of modern technology to guerrilla and terrorist forces. In short, leaders started to acknowledge the necessity of channelling, strengthening and protecting negotiation processes as a major tool in international relations. As a consequence, international regimes were created, both on global and regional levels, which were meant to streamline and fortify inter-state negotiation. Regime-building has the important function of diminishing risk through cooperation. Regimes can help to press their member states in living up to the agreements made. Trust and risk have always been a major problem in settling conflicts through give-and-take. Ambassadors were beheaded, or had their beards shaved off if they were lucky, for the sake of showing strength and contempt to the other ruler, thus, in turn, provoking war (Frey and Frey, 1999).

COMMONALITIES

War and negotiation share a number of characteristics, while they differ at the same time. This section focuses on their commonality and asks to what extent common features are applicable to both, looking at the relationship between one of the main formats in which negotiations take place – trade – and one of the main systems in which the use of force plays a dominant role – war. As said before, they often go together in history. Wars opened trade routes or blocked them. Profitable trade links were often created by force and force was needed to sustain them. Yet the trade itself was done by bargaining. Negotiations were the focus; force supported the negotiations. This was an interesting pairing, which conceals another phenomenon: the contradiction between trade (and therefore an important component of negotiation: commercial bargaining); and warfare. They often went together, but like twins it does not mean that

they were always identical. In fact, trade and warfare have their own character and characteristics.

Trade and warfare can also be opposed to each other. War diminishes net profits. War puts profit margins at risk, so peace was the preferred option. While violence was often the preferred option in opening trade links and creating monopolies, in order to sustain the monopoly, war should be avoided if possible. This is why colonies in the 17th century were mere trading posts, controlling areas around them through indirect rule. It was only in the 19th century, the age of imperialism, that European powers substantially expanded the overseas territories under their direct control into full colonies. Portugal and the Netherlands were cases in point.

Using war and negotiation in order to handle contentious issues is, as said before, their main common characteristic. In that sense, they are tools used by other strata in society. Negotiation/warfare is the servant of politicians, civil and military servants, financers, and some religious groups. In other words, it is not an end in itself. Negotiation/warfare is a path, a route, a pathway in dealing with conflict, and this road is walked by negotiators – diplomats, civil servants and merchants – and soldiers, on foot or horseback, boats or planes, tanks or offices. Negotiators and soldiers share the task of dealing with conflicts, being dependent on others in society and judging the circumstances.

What are the best ways to deal with a conflict in a given situation? In order to deal with the context in which they find themselves, both negotiators and military men and women deploy strategies and tactics. They are closely connected to risk. '[T]here is more than one kind of risk in a peace agreement and […] the type of risk will, to some extent, determine the kinds of negotiation tactics and resolving formula' (Hampson, 2006). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states that '[t]actics teach the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of war' (Luttwak, 1987: 239). It seems that this statement is directly applicable to negotiation: tactics teach us the use of bargaining – in the sense of give and take – in the encompassing diplomatic negotiation process; while strategy teaches us the use of negotiation for the object of an agreement. The next few paragraphs focus on strategy in order to look for the commonality and divergence of war and negotiation.

One way to approach strategies is to use the aforementioned Thomas and Kilmann approach (Thomas and Kilmann, 1974). Five modes figure in one model: *competition* (domination); *collaboration* (integration); *compromise* (sharing); *avoidance* (neglect); and *accommodation* (appeasement). The order of the strategies here is intentionally in accordance with the Thomas and Kilmann approach, as used to score participants in a self-assessment exercise that they developed alongside the model. This exercise is, of course, only applicable in table-top gaming (simulation exercises) and not in field operations.

To start with: *competition*. When will parties compete with the other side, risking total failure? In both warfare and negotiation, a dominant strategy will be effective and realistic if the stakes are high, while enough power is available to push the other party into agreement. This minimizes the risk of failure and maximizes the chance to harvest as much profit as possible. In negotiation, parties can do this by maximizing their profits in such a way that the other party will – still – not walk out because of future benefits from the dossier under negotiation, or from other dossiers that are of more importance to them. To remain within the realm of negotiation, the other party should not be overwhelmed completely. If one of the parties is brought fully to the mercy of its opponent, the process can still be defined as warfare, but no longer as a negotiation process.

If the opposing parties are bullied into an outcome that is unacceptable to them, the negotiation framework will break down. Negotiation is, after all, a process in which both parties come to an agreement in a more or less voluntary way. Negotiation is a bi- or multilateral, more or less balanced, and fair process, while war can be unilateral. One of the parties can just be forced to cede, while the common understanding of negotiation is to give something in order to get something. In cases of high priority of interest and low structural power – that is, not enough power resources – negotiators and military officers will have to build up strength during the process itself. Negotiators, as well as soldiers, can do this by having more and stronger allies than the other party, better organisation and more efficient leadership than the other side, employing more effective strategies and tactics, having more skilled negotiators or fighters, and collecting more and better information, in short by changing the situation in such a way that it will be ready for their victory. Both negotiation and warfare are highly situational.

Collaboration stands for value-added behaviour. In this strategy, parties will cooperate if they perceive this to be a lesser evil than confrontation. Through collaboration, negotiators and soldiers create a more favourable situation than in a non-cooperative mode. For negotiators, collaboration means integrative negotiation processes: diagnosing a problem as a common problem and not just as a cake that should be divided. The outcome might be a win-win situation: all of the parties involved will get more out of the process than they put into it. In other words, collaboration is possible, even if the parties are opponents, as long as they perceive the object of bargaining as a matter of common concern. They should be willing to go for an optimal outcome, not simply maximizing their profits in the short term, but expecting benefits from long-term cooperation. In view of future developments, they should be prepared to sacrifice part of their profits now, in order to create sustained positive margins in the future.

If countries are equally powerful, war will be difficult, the outcome will be uncertain and the costs will be high. Both sides will have to understand that a fight is not yet in their interest. The consequence of this collaboration is a status quo, a situation of peaceful coexistence, but not a solution for the problem. However, a status quo can create the circumstances under which negotiations can be used to move in the direction of a solution. This will only happen, however, if the status quo is seen as inferior to a possible solution, or, if the parties involved perceive their 'relationship' as being a 'mutual hurting stalemate' (MHS) while they also have a vision of a 'mutual enticing opportunity' (MEO) to change their circumstances (Zartman, 2005: 1-3). Yet collaboration between allies is, of course, a military option, and enemies can turn into allies and vice versa. The ally of today might be the enemy of tomorrow.

Compromise is a half-way solution, accepted by both parties, while they might do better by going for collaboration. In a way, the parties are half-hearted: they want to avoid both the risks of confrontation and collaboration. There is trust, but not enough to take the risk of being exposed. However, in many cases of negotiation, the pie can only be divided and not be enlarged. Effective negotiators will normally try to move from 'distributive bargaining' (win-lose) to 'integrative bargaining' (win-win), whereby we should be aware of the fact that even in a win-win outcome, one side might win much more than the other. Circumstances (time, for example) will not always allow for this, and a division of profits in a linear way might be the only solution (Saner, 2005).

In warfare, a compromise will normally be an unplanned outcome of a battle, a stalemate in which both sides are unable to be victorious. There are some exceptions, however, to this outcome. For example, army leaders during the European Renaissance sometimes decided to call it a day after a symbolic fight, as they preferred this compromise over the risk of losing too many of their expensive mercenaries. In ancient times and during the Middle Ages, battles were sometimes decided through a compromise, with each side nominating a strong and brave fighter and agreeing to accept defeat if their champion lost. One problem of solving conflicts through compromise is its sustainability. Compromise is often an unsatisfactory solution for all the parties involved. It is of a backward-looking nature. To build a regime on the foundations of compromise is not an easy task, and time might quite easily undermine the settlement, after which it collapses.

Avoidance – or shying away from a risky situation – can be a useful strategy in both negotiation and warfare if one of the parties sees that it will be outmatched, while it perceives possibilities for stalling the confrontation until the context has changed in such a way that negotiation or battle might deliver a positive outcome. This can be taken literally: parties refuse to negotiate or to fight. Negotiators might feel that a fake process of bargaining will be more beneficial than a real one – for example, a process going in the direction of a solution, or an outcome. In the 1970s, the former USSR and the United States negotiated on arms reduction in Geneva over many years, not with the aim of really reducing the level and quality of their armaments, but in order to be in contact with each other and perhaps to exchange information. Communication can thus be an important confidence-building measure and collecting information can be very useful for both sides. Stalling might also function as a means to wait for a more favourable situation. Finally, the USSR-US talks were a good excuse for neither disarming nor raising the level of armed forces, especially if the talks ultimately ended in failure. This might have been in the interest of some politicians on both sides, who were strengthening their internal positions, and perhaps also for the military men with an interest in not fighting, but in collecting as many arms as possible. Diplomats were, perhaps, less happy with this, and tough internal discussions therefore followed suit.

In Renaissance times, *condottieri* (leaders of the professional mercenary forces) often preferred manoeuvring over fighting, thereby keeping each other

in the saddle instead of destroying one or both sides. They might have had a common interest in avoiding battle, much to the sorrow of their monarchs. But who was dependent on whom? It was often the prince who was dependent on his general. Often the soldiers themselves refused to fight, for all that they wanted was to be able to profit from their payments instead of dying on the battlefield, which was one of the reasons that induced Machiavelli to be critical about mercenary armies over conscript armies (Skinner, 1981).

The most obvious example of avoidance strategy, however, is guerrilla warfare. As the enemy is too strong to be confronted directly, avoidance will be combined with selected small-scale actions. Guerrilla forces will use the terrain where they have a situational power advantage over their structurally more powerful opponent. As the situation changes to the advantage of the weaker party, open warfare will again become an option, as we have seen in China in the late 1940s with Mao Zedong's guerrilla tactics against the Kuomintang, and during the Vietnam War by the Viet Cong. NATO's involvement in Kosovo in 1999 and its out-of-area wars at the beginning of the 21st century are tragic examples of the effectiveness of avoidance strategies by the weaker party, and the failure of the 'dominant' power to be successful in its competitive strategy. The paradox in Afghanistan (but in a way in Iraq as well) is that the United States and its Northern coalition, in crushing the Taliban (and Iraqi) regular forces, created a situation ripe for guerrilla warfare. The conventional means that are needed to be successful in a head-on clash are not apt for winning an indirect confrontation.

Accommodation, or appeasement, is the policy of not putting the relationship with the other side at risk. It is a strategy to be used if the relationship with the opponent is more important than the actual outcome of the negotiation or the battle. The Munich Agreement of 1938 is again the stereotypical example of negotiations in which one side decides to have the opponent gaining much more than one's own party – or even everything. However, accommodation is quite a normal process in the European Union, although in this case it is not a question of giving in to an overwhelming power, but to the necessity of solving collective problems. The strategy hinges on the question of priorities, as different countries have different priorities. While the political and security situation in the Mediterranean is of great concern to the Union's southern countries, the northern member states might have their

worries about the Baltic Sea, or the western countries about the Atlantic, while the new members in Central Europe have a special concern about the Union's relationship with the Russian Federation and – for other reasons – with Ukraine and Belarus. Negotiations on an issue are not of equal importance to all parties, which might therefore decide to accommodate the parties that have a vested interest in a crisis where they do not see major stakes for themselves. Of course, they equally expect other countries to appease them in cases when a dossier deals with issues of vital importance to their country.

It should be noted that the most involved, but also most vulnerable countries might accommodate opponents in order not to disrupt relationships. During the Cold War, for example, the Federal Republic of Germany showed more willingness to accommodate the Soviet Union than the United Kingdom and the United States. The Germans could be blackmailed after all, as many of their compatriots lived in the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany itself would be among the first victims of Soviet troops attacking Western Europe. Meanwhile, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and – perhaps despite a lot of rhetoric – Syria have to be more prudent with the state of Israel than the Islamic Republic of Iran. He who is close to the fire can burn his hands. Thus South Korea has to be more accommodating in dealing with North Korea than Japan, and Japan has to be more sophisticated in handling the issue than the United States. For armies, accommodation can be a strategy if one is outnumbered, as one might decide to give in without a fight, or after a symbolic battle.

Alternatively, armies might even join the enemy. Especially in the history of the nomadic people, we see an ease in joining the stronger party and even adopting its identity. In Central Asia, many Turkic tribes adopted the enemy's name as if they had always been allied with them. Yet the reverse has happened as well. The Turkic tribe of the Bulgars gave its name to (Danube) Bulgaria, and the Thracian and Slavic tribes in the region became known as Bulgarians as well, but the original Bulgars lost their identity and accommodated the language of the people they once conquered. Equally, the Serbs and Croats – originally Alans and thereby Iranian nomadic tribes – became Slavonic as they moved deeper into Central and later into Southern Europe (Ascherson, 1995: 242); and the Franks adopted the language of the Romanized Celts whom they conquered. On the other hand, however, most of the people from Asia Minor accommodated the language of their Turkish overlords. It can go either way.

DIVERGENCES

The processes of negotiation and warfare share many characteristics and ways to handle risky matters. Their objective is often identical, but the tools that they use are very different. It is time to turn to the differences between negotiation and violence in order to be able to conclude about the questions: how are they connected and to what extent can we see them as being identical or at least complementary? Differences between warfare and negotiation already came to the fore in the paragraphs on commonality, in which common characteristics were stressed, as expressed in the use of strategies for example. Yet there are also differences, and the final question will be to decide whether these disparities should be seen as being more important to our understanding of the two phenomena than the elements that they share.

There are differences in the behaviour of actors, the character of their needs, the implementation of available tools and the consequences of the outcomes. Concerning the behaviour of actors, the obvious differences between soldiers and diplomats come to the fore (Sjöstedt, 2003). While discipline and flexibility are important for professionals from both strata, it is clear that discipline is of more importance for military people than diplomatic staff, and flexibility for diplomats. Their tools are, of course, completely different. For military officers, technology dominates the scene. Without knowledge of – and insight in – advanced weapons technology, the armed forces cannot be effective. This goes along with the soldier's dependence on material tools for defensive and offensive purposes. The inter-state negotiator will also lean on high-tech tools, but his or her main modes are the spoken and written language, networking, analysis of behaviour or other negotiators, cultural and character understanding, skilful use of procedures and processes, in-depth knowledge and understanding of the balance of interest, and – more than with soldiers – political empathy. For the negotiator, immaterial needs are of more importance, while for soldiers material support is vital. This is, of course, a bold statement, as morale is vital for warriors while diplomats in multilateral conferences cannot do without language equipment. Still, warriors are more vulnerable without technological means, and diplomats are more helpless if the political and bureaucratic climate is working against them. The military seems to be more dependent on hardware, while diplomacy is by nature more a matter of software – software of the human mind. Negotiation is human interaction and bridge-building, while warfare is human struggle and bridge-blowing.

As military men and women need more hardware than civil men and woman who have to solve problems in a non-violent way, the costs of military action are clearly far higher than those of diplomacy. As civil society will have to pay for the costs of military action, the burden on mankind is much more substantial than the expenses to be made for diplomatic action. However, this does not mean that it is easier to get money for peaceful means, including war prevention and peace-building, than for military devices. The process of collecting money for the build-up of strong forces is much smoother than that of collecting money for conflict prevention and peace-building.

A lost military battle is a more serious issue than a lost diplomatic battle. The threat to survival is more serious with a lost military battle, and therefore the willingness to invest more heavily. We can even see this in the fight against terrorism. Terrorist activities are, of course, a major threat to nation-states, but in comparison to large-scale conventional and nuclear threats, terrorism is still perceived as less damaging to the survival of state structures, so less money is therefore allotted to those units fighting terrorism. This also has to do with the fact that conventional and nuclear means are more costly than the weapons needed to fight insurgents, but the fact remains that less energy seems to be needed to collect money for regular arms build-up than for means to ward off terror. This might change over time, but we cannot expect an easy race for diplomacy here. One should add that this issue is linked to overall power: if you have a hammer, you are inclined to see your problem as a nail; if you have a carrot, you will define your problem as a rabbit. Your tool defines your action.

Military action and diplomatic overtures are dramatically different in their consequences. It is obvious that a successful military campaign assures more control over the other party in the short run, while a positive negotiation outcome does not assure too much as far as the probability of implementation is concerned. But how should we diagnose the mid- and long-term consequences? They are different as well, but are perhaps more to the advantage of diplomacy than to the military. A lost war creates huge risks of enormous collective remembrance, but this is much less so if a negotiation's outcome is more favourable to the opponent than to one's own country. The first is more traumatic than the other and will therefore throw a shadow over future relationships. One might postulate that an outcome by military means

assures short-term security but long-term insecurity, while in diplomacy a victory through negotiation will not result in much short-term stability, but will probably assure a more stable relationship over the years to come. A crisis can be handled effectively and immediately through the use of force, but the risk of a renewed crisis emerging on the same issue is enormous.

Diplomatic means are often insufficient in handling serious crises, but it is possible that the crises will no longer arise after agreement has been reached, or the risk of flaring up will be less (Bercovitch, 2011). This might be true for present times, when technological tools create much more destruction – and often a more equal power balance on the ground – than in the past. As war was less destructive in the past – in general at least – and nations and societies were less rooted in their own identity, problems could be solved by war without having the boomerang effects that we see today. There are many unresolved conflicts from the past lingering on today, but not – with some notable exceptions – in a violent way. In sum, the decision to use military or diplomatic means has grave future consequences, but the choice to use either one will shape the future in completely different ways. Military and diplomatic tools can, of course, also be used in concurrence and in one way or another they are often not to be separated, like Siamese twins with different characters and therefore different consequences.

SYNERGIES
Negotiation and the use of force often in practice go together, run parallel, or interchange. Wars might start after diplomatic negotiations have failed, or diplomacy steps in after one military force has been more successful than the other – or has failed to achieve its goals and therefore negotiations have to break the stalemate. It is clear that in negotiations, after the defeat of one of the parties, the victor will most of the time follow a dominant negotiation strategy, while the other side has to accommodate. In that sense, we can ask the question of to what extent these negotiations can really be labelled as such. If a negotiation process is a voluntary exchange between more or less autonomous parties, how can we use the label of 'bargaining' for a situation with an extreme asymmetrical balance of power? Perhaps this should instead be seen as a dictate, as the Germans – or at least Adolf Hitler – perceived the Versailles conference to be after Germany's First World War defeat.

These kinds of negotiation will not easily lead to a truly peaceful situation. They require extra measures to be taken. The victor should avoid taking measures that are too draconic and should also create conditions that will foster peaceful development in the foreseeable future. The mistakes of the post-First World War negotiations were not repeated after the Second, which was concluded with a conciliatory peace settlement, be it almost 50 years after the end of the war, in 1990 with the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Justice must be done, but this is easier said than done. The crooks are not ready to conclude peace if they know that justice will be done at their expense. Still, for reconciliation purposes (Anstey, 2011: 24-29; Anstey and Rosoux, 2011: 31-33), 'some' justice should indeed be done, but the victims of this are often those who played a relatively minor role in any atrocities. The leaders, those who held final responsibility for the conflict, find – and are often offered – their way to safe havens before it is too late. Peace and justice alone are not sufficient, however, and should be followed with long-term cooperation. A common project for the future (as with the Arab League, or European Union) will take the problems to another level, thereby solving – or at least diluting – them. Negotiations rolling out of an undecided war have a much more balanced character than those where victors and victims are sitting around the table, although the skilful way in which Talleyrand operated on behalf of the defeated France during the Vienna Conference of 1814-1815 clearly showed that circumstances can sometimes be changed by skilled and effective negotiators.

Besides negotiations being used in pre- and post-war situations, there are processes of conflict management in which negotiation and warfare are used as parallel tools, where they go hand-in-hand. There will not always, of course, be equilibrium. During this process, war or negotiation might be dominant according to the developments at hand, changing parties' positions and strengths, and shifts in interests and emotions. Emotions will play a decisive part in this. Atrocities can lead to an abrupt end of hostilities and the upgrading of negotiations as parallel to the war theatre. It is often supposed that outbreaks of war will put a hold on negotiation processes, but this is doubtful. Parties always have need for communication, be it over temporary cease-fires like on the Western Front during the First World War, exchange of prisoners, or attempts to put an end to the fighting when both sides suffer serious losses. Havoc can inspire new talks. These negotiations will not be

visible, but will go through 'back channels'. Back-channel negotiations can be extremely helpful in restraining the warring parties, and in devising formulas for the future. Just as negotiations can be pushed forward by the threat or use of force, they can also be disrupted by this. The risk exists, however, that spoilers might discover the back-channel talks and publicize them, thereby derailing the process (Wannis-St John, 2006).

There are many examples of 'coercive diplomacy' pushing the negotiation process in a positive direction, although the question can again be asked of to what extent these talks can still be seen as genuine bargaining. We have many examples of fruitful negotiation processes being destroyed by violent acts, which are often aimed at the destruction of the peaceful attempts to end the crisis. For example, the implementation of the Oslo peace process in the first half of the 1990s was eradicated by the violence of extremists who did not want the moderates to be successful. As a case in point, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin was killed by one of his own countrymen. The downward spiral initiated by this destructive behaviour could hardly be bent in a positive direction, and indeed this has not yet been the case. The problem is that violated trust is even more difficult to handle than lack of trust, which is a problem that we often face within the negotiation process, where violation of trust creates an atmosphere of more severe distrust than before the start of negotiations, as people's positive emotions relapse into negative ones.

In the case of the Oslo peace process, one of the main problems was the inability of the parties to sell the outcome to their populations. The political leaders took the risk of signing an agreement, while they could not be sure of its implementation. One notices the same development in South Caucasus since the successful negotiations between the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in the first half of the 1990s. (Then) Defence Minister Vazgen Sargysyan took the risk of settling the issues with Azerbaijan, but was later shot and killed when he was Prime Minister in the Armenian Parliament in 1999, while Armenia's first President Levon Ter-Petrosyan had to resign in 1998 in favour of one of the staunch opponents against the deal: the 'President' of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert Kocharyan, who then became the President of Armenia, ending the peace process, and the Minsk group is still unsuccessful in its attempts to repair the 'crisis'. Is this a crisis, or is it non-peaceful coexistence? The term 'smouldering crisis' seems

to be appropriate here. The negotiations continue without any visible process, while the Azerbaijanis can one day use their oil revenues to reopen the war that 'ended' over 12 years ago, incidents left aside. However, it is to be hoped that Azerbaijan will refrain from doing so, as it has been quite clear since the Georgian-Russian war that Russia will side with its Armenian ally.

It should be added here that – although public support is vital for successful negotiation – it is even more important in cases of warfare (De Wijk, 2005: 257). A war that lacks public support will be shipwrecked sooner than a bargaining process.

In sum, the interaction between negotiation and warfare as parallel tools in conflict management is an uneasy one. Depending on the circumstances, the mix can be successful or disastrous. No prescription can be given, apart from a tentative one. An approach through negotiations 'supported' by the threat of viable – and if possible legitimate – warfare seems to be a more or less balanced pairing between the phenomena of negotiation and warfare. Abiding by international law and the legitimate use of force – for example, sanctioned by a UN Security Council mandate – is of utmost importance in avoiding a never-ending collective remembrance by the losing party, and negotiations will also have to play their part in preparing for 'just' warfare. This combination of negotiating and trying to work within international law is not always successful, as we saw in the run-up to the War in Iraq in 2003. It depends on the actors and their interests. The dilemma is that by voting against the resolution, opponents to the war could not prevent the Iraq War from breaking out, while at the same time they blocked the option of a war waged in a legitimate way.

Between warfare and negotiation we have coercive diplomacy (George, 1991). Coercive diplomacy can be seen as a tool to be used if negotiations do not work, while it is still too early to apply warfare. Coercive diplomacy can be regarded as a tool between negotiation and warfare, for it tries to prevent the risk of stand-alone negotiations and stand-alone warfare. How effective is it to threaten the other side, supposing that the victim will perceive the threats as credible? Looking at warfare, one might postulate that a threat can be a useful means in getting the enemy to surrender without a fight, as happened in the case of Denmark's surrender to Germany in the Second World War.

Terror has exactly that significance: threatening the opponent, in this case by using limited but focused force, without unleashing a full-scale war. However, by threatening the other side, surprise is gone. This could become a major obstacle to success, as the opponent can also now prepare for war.

MEDIATION

If negotiation does not help in managing a conflict and war looms around the corner, mediation might be the tool to prevent warfare and save the negotiation process as an instrument. With *Herding Cats*, Crocker, Hampson and Aall edited a book on mediation that acted as a milestone in mediation research (Crocker *et al.,* 2001). It gave rise to much more work, for example in the *Journal of International Negotiation.* From thereon, Jacob Bercovitch's contributions helped to further the understanding of international mediation as an instrument in international negotiation. Bercovitch's book *Theory and Practice of International Mediation* is his legacy to academics and practitioners in the field, and a very valuable one (Bercovitch, 2011). This article will now discuss Bercovitch's views on mediation in connection with Kyle Beardsley's book *The Mediation Dilemma*, which is a valuable extension of, and critique on, Bercovitch's writings (Beardsley, 2011). According to Beardsley, mediation is often counterproductive in the longer run. Mediation might be useful in managing a conflict in the first few years but after about four-and-a-half years, the mediation effort loses its impact and the conflict will resurface. Beardsley argues that mediation has often put the lid on the can without solving the underlying issues. As a consequence, the recurrent conflict might be even more violent.

How to study and do research on mediation is the opening chapter of Bercovitch's book. He gives us a definition by enumerating nine characteristics of the phenomenon, describing it as an extension and continuation of peaceful conflict management. He then introduces the elements of mediation to us: the parties in conflict; the issues and their nature; identity and characteristics of the mediator – the context of it all. In doing this, he arrives at a contingency framework where context, process and outcome are linked.

In the first part of the book, Bercovitch connects context and mediation. To him, mediation is an appropriate method for dealing with international conflict, when a conflict is long, complex, or intractable, when the parties

themselves proved unable to break the impasse and there is a 'mutual hurting stalemate', as well as a 'mutual enticing opportunity' for cooperation to end the cycle of conflict. In other words, Bercovitch defines mediation as a decisive factor in negotiation processes that cannot be managed by the contending parties. He then poses four questions for research: why do parties and the mediator decide to enter into mediation; who may mediate; how do the mediators behave; and what are the conditions for success? On the last issue, he does not really draw substantial conclusions. This is obviously outside his reach, which is problematic, as both practitioners and researchers will look for these conditions in order to judge whether a mediation process will be effective or worthwhile to study.

The second part of the book deals with two case studies in the context of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking: Camp David; and Oslo. Bercovitch puts them in an interesting sequential framework and distinguishes 'antecedent', 'concurrent' and 'consequent' phases. Within that flow, he shows us the interrelationship of goals, personal factors, role factors, interactional factors, situational factors, and the outcome of the process. He then gives the reader a prescription for the actions that the mediator should take in order to be successful. He enlightens us on at least one condition for an effective mediation process: how the third party should behave. He adds a prerequisite: 'international mediation is a form of conflict intervention that requires the prior acceptance and cooperation of the parties' (Bercovitch, 2011: 129).

The third part of the book deals with quantitative studies in mediation, starting with the question of choice between mediation and negotiation. On two different occasions, Bercovitch shows that mediation is an important means in conflict management. According to the data used, mediation comes first in something like 60 per cent of the cases of peaceful conflict resolution, in 309 conflicts between 1945 and 1995. Negotiation comes only second, in almost 40 per cent of the instances of peaceful conflict management. Although based on the same dataset, the percentages differ slightly in the tables presented to us. It is in this part that Bercovitch discusses three strategies for mediation, concluding that mediation is a diverse and complex process of social interaction, a conclusion already drawn by the reader before he or she started reading the book, presumably.

'Current Issues in Mediation Research' is the title of Part IV. Four mediation issues are dealt with: 1) internationalized ethnic conflict; 2) culture in mediation; 3) intractable international conflicts; and 4) the contribution of international mediation to the prevention of deadly conflict. On the first issue, Bercovitch proves the usefulness of mediation in dealing with ethnic conflict. On the second, he concludes that culture has a major impact on mediated negotiation processes. This is why he stresses the necessity of selecting culturally sensitive mediators. On issue three, he presents his finding that mediation has little impact in intractable conflict situations, but he does not offer a solution for the problem. On the final issue, Bercovitch recommends institutionalization of mediation, in the sense that the international community should create a mediation system like the system of international negotiation, a system that is ready to respond quickly whenever mediation is needed to prevent (more) casualties.

Kyle Beardsley's *The Mediation Dilemma* is more consistent than Bercovitch's 'reader', but at the same time, it lacks its richness and helicopter view. To Beardsley, '[m]ediation is the inclusion in a peace process of a third party with mutual consent of the parties involved without binding authority or the use of violent coercion' (Beardsley, 2011: 43). The author thereby limits himself to mediation in violent conflict situations, excluding mediation in more peaceful processes such as the European Union and United Nations, etc. His main conclusion is that by solving short-term problems through mediation, long-term stability might not be accomplished. In other words, mediation will often allow conflicts to linger on, and might therefore be questioned as a tool in managing internal and external conflicts. This is quite the contrary to Bercovitch's approach.

Beardsley presents five chapters on the questions of 'Negotiating Mediation': the Issue of Accepting Mediation as a Tool in Conflict Resolution; the 'Short-Term Benefits of Mediation'; the 'Struggle for Self-Enforcing Peace'; as well as 'Mediation in Intra-state Conflicts'. The final chapter is on 'Implications, Applications and Conclusions'. Beardsley's 'Policy-Relevant Recommendations' are:

First, mediation should be used sparingly when there are major vulnerabilities to failed implementation, [...] Second, third parties should be aware of issues related to legitimacy, [...] Third, outside

actors should intervene more carefully when the disputants could benefit from using mediation for ends other than peace, [...] Fourth, potential third parties should hesitate to become involved in a peace process when coordination and implementation is likely to prove difficult [...] Fifth, the use of leverage itself is not actually a source of long-term instability; it is the attenuation over time of that leverage that increases the propensity for re-negotiation (Beardsley, 2011: 183–187).

Beardsley's study has been based on an analysis of international crises since 1918. He finds that nearly half of those conflicts ended with some sort of agreement, but that 52 per cent of them recurred, while 50 per cent of the crises that did not end with an agreement also recurred. In the first ten years of the new millennium, 34 per cent of the mediated conflicts relapsed, against 21 per cent of the unmediated ones. Mediation, then, creates less stable peace. He notes the catch-22 that under the UN system, countries have an obligation to defend human security, which then might lead to more problems instead of fewer. He continues by testing his hypotheses on several inter-state cases: Jimmy Carter in the Middle East when they mediated the Camp David Accords in 1978; Carter in North Korea in the 1990s mediating the Agreed Framework; and Teddy Roosevelt at Portsmouth, mediating the end of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. He then tests the hypotheses on intra-state cases: Rwanda; Haiti; Sri Lanka; and Aceh; as well as 'Oslo' as a hybrid between intra-state and inter-state. 'Beardsly's research shows to us that in addition to considering dynamic properties in the supply side and demand side factors that produce mediation, we must also consider the dynamic properties of the conflicts they are designed to resolve' (Mitchell, 2014: 199).

While Bercovitch values mediation highly as one of the few tools – with shortcomings for sure – to deal with conflicts in a peaceful manner, Beardsley modifies this statement by proving that mediation is useful in the short run, but often counter-productive in the long term. Beardsley concludes with five recommendations for policy-makers: (1) use it sparingly; (2) be aware of issues related to legitimacy; and (3) of disputants using the mediation efforts to prolong the conflict; (4) coordinated implementation must be feasible; and (5) attenuation of leverage over time might increase the propensity for renegotiation.

In conclusion, the two books help us to get to grips with the positive and negative consequences of mediated negotiations. While mediation is often an international obligation, it does not always help to solve the problems at hand; it might even be counter-productive. As the Buddhists say, not acting is sometimes more effective than taking action. This seems to be valuable advice to the political systems of our world, foremost to the most powerful on Earth.

On multi-party mediation, Sinisa Vukovic's doctoral dissertation *Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes* discusses cooperation and coordination, exogenous geopolitical shifts, changes in conflict dynamics, the way to negotiate for cooperation, the strategic interests involved and their legitimacy, and achievement of coordination (Vukovic, 2013). He launches a game-theoretical model (Vukovic, 2013: 57), which is essentially a prisoner's dilemma. Vukovic's study concurs (Vukovic, 2013: 10) with William Zartman's hypothesis that 'if a number of conciliators are available to the parties themselves and if a number of friends of the conflicting parties can coordinate their good office and pressure, the chances of success are improved' (Zartman, 1989: 276). This does not mean, however, that we know to what extent multi-party mediation will soften Kyle Beardsley's conclusions of mediation as a tool in actually solving conflicts, instead of postponing a renewed outbreak.

CONCLUSION
As analysed in this article, negotiation and warfare are intimately linked. They are meant to diminish the chance of unnecessarily yielding to the other side, they share a common goal and use the same strategies, but their tools are completely different. Words and regimes are negotiation's methods; violence and technology are warfare's instruments. Diplomacy is based on software; military is dependent on hardware. Their actors will therefore have to be of a different character. Creativity is important for diplomatic negotiators; discipline is vital for military officers. This does not mean that diplomats do not need hardware and discipline at all, or that military men or women can do without software and creativity. All of these skills will have to be applied, but the emphasis is different. Negotiation and warfare are closely connected, run parallel, or interchange constantly. Negotiation can often fail without the threat of war, and wars cannot be concluded without follow-up negotiations.

On the basis of common aims, common strategies and close connectedness, we could reach the conclusion that negotiation is indeed warfare by other

means and vice versa. The question is about which conflict phase we are in. In practically all circumstances, warfare will be followed by negotiation, and therefore this particular bargaining is bullying by other means. Negotiations will almost always preclude warfare, and in those cases war is wheeling and dealing by other means. Of course, both will often run in parallel: negotiations will take place during violent conflicts; while skirmishes often happen when serious peace talks are occurring. It is important to analyse the strategies used in warlike situations. According to James Ray, "bullying" strategies led to war in almost two-thirds of the crises (researched in recent history) [...] while reciprocating strategies achieved either diplomatic victory or a compromise nearly two-thirds of the time' (Ray, 1998: 147).

Using threat and force might help to manage a problem in the short term, but bargaining is the best tool for long-term problem-solving. By using force, you risk violence being used against you, but by only using words, you might give the other party time to build up strength. Conflict management can be done by using force, but negotiation is the most effective tool for conflict resolution, if the risk against doing so is perceived as being minimal. In that sense, the utility of negotiation is greater than that of warfare: to solve an inter-state conflict through violence is virtually impossible; to do so through international negotiation is very probable.

Not all conflicts are ripe for negotiation, and therefore the less utile tool of warfare is often seen as the only alternative. Even then, however, diplomats should try to keep the dialogue going, to negotiate as a form of communication in order to keep the option of real give-and-take open. The sooner that enforcement can give way to mutual understanding, the more valuable the final solution will be. And if the argument against negotiation is that warfare is a more effective tool as it will create more assured outcomes than bargaining, one might counter this by stating that war creates problems for the future because of the traumas involved. Add to that 'an undecided war creates a feeble peace' (Teitler, 2002: 59) and the conclusion that negotiation is more utile to politics than force comes to the forefront of one's mind.

One can brush aside the notion that peace established by outright enforced victory might be established in the short run, but will fail in the long run to create a sustainable non-violent situation. There are always exceptions

to these value judgements. In some cases, war is unavoidable and must be waged, but never without giving ample opportunities to negotiation processes to perform their peaceful duties for mankind's peace. Negotiation can then be a tool in conflict management or conflict resolution. In conflict management, the means of conflict can be demoted from violence to politics; in conflict resolution, the issues between the parties will be resolved. Whether it will be management or resolution depends very much on the nature of the conflict and the phase during which negotiation enters into the conflict situation. In some cases, conflict management can be transformed into conflict resolution.

Can negotiation cope with conflicts in an efficient and effective way? Kalevi Holsti identifies eight major prerequisites for peace: the negotiations should effectively deal with problems of governance; legitimacy; assimilation; deterrence; conflict resolution; war; peaceful change; and issues concerning the future (Holsti, 1991). Did the famous peace treaties tackle these issues? Holsti analysed five major international negotiations as turning points in recent European history: Westphalia (17th century); Utrecht (18th century); Vienna (19th century); Versailles (20th century); and the proclamation of the United Nations in San Francisco (20th century). Westphalia only coped with half of the conditions for enduring peace; Utrecht with one-quarter; Vienna and San Francisco with a slight majority of the prerequisites; and Versailles with only a minority of them. Holsti therefore identified Utrecht and Versailles as ineffective peace negotiations, and Vienna and San Francisco as successful regime-building attempts.

In other words, while Utrecht and Versailles were backward-looking outcomes, Vienna and San Francisco were forward-looking conferences. Westphalia then takes a balanced position, producing a forward- and backward-looking mix (Meerts, 2005b). This list does not suggest a substantial evolution in diplomatic negotiation becoming a viable alternative to warfare as centuries pass. However, Holsti does not include the 1949 Treaty of Washington and the 1957 Treaty of Rome in his overview. These treaties, which gave birth to NATO and the EU (ultimately), created strong regimes that in turn secured more substantial outcomes than previous negotiations could assure. According to Schelling, eight characteristics of negotiation processes will stimulate substantive outcomes (Schelling, 1963: 28–35). First, the use of bargaining agents; then the reputation of the bargaining parties; precedents

to which to refer; continuity of the process; simultaneous bargaining; options for compensation; the mechanics of the process; and its principles and commitments. All these factors are part and parcel of modern bargaining in the stronger regimes of our times. We therefore dare to conclude here that the negotiation process of the 21st century is gaining strength as an alternative to warfare, but this does not preclude warfare from happening.

War between countries seems to be diminishing. 'Violence has declined over long stretches of time, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era of our species' existence' (Pinker, 2011: xxi). The Conflict Barometer 2012 of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer, 2012: 2-3) observes that inter-state conflicts remained at the same level on average from 1945 to 2012. This was not the case for intra-state conflicts, which went up from around five to over 40 in 2010. Is the decline of inter-state violence the consequence of negotiation? We cannot be sure about this, but there might be some indication that this is indeed the case. 'In the new millennium, the number of conflicts ending in victory has declined, while the number ending in negotiated settlements has increased' (Mack *et al.*, 2007: 35). For example, while sixteen wars came to closure in the 1950s through the victory of one of the sides, only nine were dealt with through negotiation. Meanwhile, in the 1960s, the balance was 23 to 11; in the 1970s, 22 to 13; and in the 1980s, 20 versus eight. Then, in the 1990s, the balance switched in favour of negotiation: 23 to 41; while in the first five years of the new millennium, it was five to 17. In total, from 1950-2005 there were 104 conflicts settled through victories and 82 through negotiation (Mack *et al.*, 2007: 35). While more wars are ending through negotiation, the number of multilateral negotiations has been exploding: 'In the middle of the 19th century there were about three international conferences annually; today more than three thousand (Holsti, 2004: 191).

Nevertheless, one has to be cautious about linking the diminishing frequency of conflict to the frequency of international conferences. Jan Geert Siccama states that 'If wars are time-dependent, and earlier wars can be considered a cause of later wars, previous peace conferences may also determine the outbreak of subsequent wars (and the success of later peace settlements)' (Siccama, 1993: 125). The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 seems to be an example of such causality.

LITERATURE

Anstey, M. (2011), 'Understanding Evil … Some Insights for Negotiators and Conciliators'. *PINpoints Network*

Perspectives, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 37, 24-29.

Anstey, M. and Rosoux, V. (2011).'Reconciliation as Preventive Negotiation'. *PINpoint Network Perspectives*, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 37, 31-33.

Ascherson, N. (1995). *Black Sea.* New York, NY: Hill and Wang.

Beardsley, K. (2011). *The Mediation Dilemma.* Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press.

Bercovitch, J. (2011). *Theory and Practice of International Mediation.* London and New York, NY: Routledge.

Chung, T.C. (1991). *Sun Tzu: The Art of War.* Singapore: Asiapac Books and Educational Aids.

Conflict Barometer (2012). Heidelberg: Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, http://www.hiik.de/en/konflktbarometer/pdf/ ConflctBarometer_2012.pdf

Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O. and Aall, P. (eds) (2001). *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World.*

Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press.

David S.R. (2000). 'Realism, Constructivism, and the Amarna Letters'. In: Cohen, R. and Westbrook, R. (eds), *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations.* Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dennen, J.M.G. van der (1994). *The Origin of War, Vol. 2.* Origin Press.

Es, R. van (1996). *Negotiating Ethics.* Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon.

Frey, L. and Frey, M.L. (1999). *The History of Diplomatic Immunity.* Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 29.

George, A. (1991). *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War.* Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hampson, F.O. (2006). 'The Risk of Peace: Implications for International Mediation'. *Negotiation Journal*, 22:1.

Handel, M.I. (1992). *Masters of War: Sun Tzu. Clausewitz and Jomini.* London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass.

Hanzhang, T. (1993). *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*. New York, NY: Sterling Publishing.

Hemmer, B., Garb, P., Phillips, M. and Graham, J.L. (2006). 'Putting the "Up" in Bottom–Up Peacebuilding: Broadening the Concept of Peace Negotiations'. In: Strimling, A. and Nan, S.A. (eds), *Coordination in Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Perspectives from Scholars and Practitioners Involved with the Alliance for Peacebuilding. International Negotiation*, 11:1.

Holsti, K.J. (1991). *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holsti, K.J. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Iklé, F. (1964). *How Nations Negotiate*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Jönsson, C. and Aggestam, K. (2009). 'Diplomacy'. In: Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V. and Zartman, I.W. (eds), *Handbook on Conflict Resolution*. London: Sage.

Luttwak, E.N. (1987). *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Mack *et al.* (eds) (2007). *Human Security Brief: Featuring a Special Report*. Canada: Simon Fraser University.

Meerts, P.W. (2005b).'Turning Point Westphalia: Negotiation Processes Establishing a New Political and Legal Order in Europe'. In: Zartman, I.W. and Kremenyuk, V.A. (eds), *Peace versus Justice: Negotiating Forward- and Backward-Looking Outcomes*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefild, 11-33.

Meerts, P.W. (2006b).'Is Negotiation War by Other Means?. *PINpoints Network Newsletter,* Laxenburg: IIASA, 27, 13-15.

Meerts, P.W. (2013a). Book Review. *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 8:1, 82-85.

Meerts, P.W. (2014b).'Will Putin's Strategy on Ukraine Disintegrate the European Negotiation Web?' *PINpoints Network Newsletter*, 40, 4-6.

Mitchell, S. MacLaughlin (2014). 'Mediation in Interstate Disputes'. *International Negotiation*, 19:2, 191-200.

Paret, P. (1976). *Clausewitz and the State*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Pinker, S. (2011). *The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and its Courses*. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books.

Randle, R.F. (1973). *The Origins of Peace, A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements*. New York, NY: The Free Press; London: Collier-Macmillan.

Ray, J.L. (1998). *Global Politics*. Boston, MA and New York, NY: Houghton Miffln.

Saner, R. (2005). *The Expert Negotiator*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.

Schecter, J.L. (1998). *Russian Negotiation Behavior*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.

Schelling, T.C. (1963). *The Strategy of Conflict*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Siccama, J.G. (1993). 'Peace Conferences and the Long Wave'. In: Goudover, A.P. (ed.), *Great Peace Conferences in History 1648-1990*. Utrecht: University of Utrecht, Utrechtse Historische Cahiers, 14:2, 125-143.

Sjöstedt, G. (2003). *Professional Cultures in International Negotiation: Bridge or Rift?* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Skinner, Q. (1981). *Machiavelli*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, R. (2005). *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*. London: Allen Lane.

Teitler, G. (2002). 'Algemene Beschouwingen over Strategie'. In: Teitler, G., Bosch, J.M.J. and Klinkert, W. (eds), *Militaire Strategie*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt.

Thomas, K.W. and Kilmann, R.H. (1974). *The Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Survey*. Tuxedo, NY: Xicom.

Vukovic, S. (2013). *Analysis of Multiparty Mediation Processes*. Doctoral dissertation, University of Leiden.

Wannis-St John, A. (2006). 'Back-Channel Negotiation: International Bargaining in the Shadows'. *Negotiation Journal,* 22:2.

Wijk, R. de (2005). *The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West's Military Superiority Scarcely Matters*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt.

Zartman, I.W. (1989). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Zartman, I.W. (2005). 'Concepts: Mutual Enticing Opportunity (MEO)'. *PINpoints Network Newsletter*. Laxenburg: IIASA, 24, 1-4.

Taming the Dragon: Some Reflection on China's Claims in the South China Sea

Nazery Khalid

Nazery Khalid is a Kuala Lumpur-based maritime analyst. He can be contacted at nazerykhalid@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This article reflects upon the maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the principle actors involved in the issue, and their actions and reactions of late. Focus is given on China's actions, including its recent reclamation works and lighthouse construction, which are seen by many parties as overly aggressive, and the counteractions of the United States by patrolling close to the reclaimed area which has unnerved China. The article poses several questions for China to reflect upon in consideration of its actions and position with regard to the disputes. It calls upon China and the United States to refrain from undertaking actions that could jeopardise peace, threaten stability and security, and cause disunity in the region.

Keywords: South China Sea, Maritime disputes, China, United States

China's recent completion of two lighthouses in an area in the strategic and resource-rich South China Sea (SCS) and its construction of airstrips and artificial islands in areas claimed by several states have stoked further tension in this hotly-contested sea.

Beijing has ignored protestations against its reclamation works, most audibly coming from the United States, which takes a neutral position in the disputes in the sea but is adamant to protect freedom of passage there, and a chorus of concerns expressed by states with overlapping claims in the SCS, namely, Brunei, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan PRC. They were preceded by concerns raised over China's activities in the sea in supporting its claim of almost the entire sea as its sovereign territory.

China believes it has territorial rights over the entire sea based on historical records and its 'nine-dotted lines' map which is highly disputed by not only the claimant states but also the international community which believes the claim is not aligned to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS which defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, allows every State the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding **12 nautical miles** in accordance with this Convention.[1] However, China's 'nine-dotted lines' map does not specify the coordinates of those lines, hence the claim cannot be said to be aligned with international law.

An already tensed situation arising from China's conducts in the sea has further mounted with the announcement by the United States that it is sending a navy ship close to an artificially built island where China is constructing what military analysts believe is a landing strip for military aircrafts.[2] Beijing sees this action, which Washington describes as 'freedom of navigation operation', as intrusive and issued stern warning that it could 'backfire' while vowing to protect its "indisputable sovereignty" in the sea at all cost.[3]

Despite the feel-good vibes emanating from the visit by China's President Xi Xinping to the United States in September 2015 where he said that China did not intend to 'militarize' the sea, the dispute in the sea has continued to become a sore point between the two powers. China claims that like the United States, it is committed to preserving the freedom of passage in the SCS, where Washington is committed to "sail, fly and operate anywhere that international

---

[1]See UNCLOS Section 2: Limits of the Territorial Sea, Article 3: Breadth of the Territorial Sea. Available at <http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm> (accessed on 10 October 2015).

[2]Page, J. (12 October 2015). 'U.S. patrols to test China's pledge on South China Sea islands'. The Wall Street Journal. Available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-patrols-to-test-chinas-pledge-on-south-china-sea-islands-1444615926> (accessed on 13 October 2015)>

[3]Tiezzi, S. (22 October 2015). 'US Freedom of navigation patrols in the south China Sea: China reacts'. The Diplomat. A Chinese spokesperson was quoted as saying that the USS *Lassen* "illegally entered waters near relevant islands and reefs of China's Nansha Islands (the Spratly Islands) without the permission of the Chinese government." He stressed that the US patrol "threatened China's sovereignty and security interests, put the personnel and facilities on the islands and reefs at risk and endangered regional peace and stability". Available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/us-freedom-of-navigation-patrols-in-the-south-china-sea-china-reacts/> (accessed on 3 November 2015)./

law allows."[4] China has expressed "strong dissatisfaction and opposition" over what it sees as a provocation and potential violation of its territorial waters inside the 12 nautical mile zones around islands it has constructed in the chain of Spratlys Island.[5]

This claim, however, does not seem to be backed by its actions such as building airstrips in disputed islands, shoals and reefs in the disputed Spratlys archipelago. The United States and its regional allies have raised doubts over China's claim that construction of infrastructures in the SCS are meant to assist maritime search and rescues (SAR), environmental protection, navigation safety and disaster relief, and to assist vessels navigating near those infrastructures. A Pentagon report claimed that China's reclamation of landmass among a string of artificial islands in the South China Sea has "grown dramatically" in recent months and that China has been "aggressively patrolling the waters there to assert its territorial claims".[6]

SECURING MARITIME SPACE

Analysts have been going on overdrive to explain China's maritime strategies and to second-guess whether the construction of non-military maritime installations and facilities such as ports, offshore oil and gas structures, and lighthouses are vectors of securing its maritime space.

The tendency of Western-based analysts is to orientate China's construction in the sea towards military use. There is a common tendency to equate China's actions with words such as 'assertive' and 'provocative', and to suggest that China is building up its military muscle to back its claims of SCS and seeking hegemony in the region. In contrast, there is a growing narrative coming from Chinese scholars, analysts and government officials that the civilian aspect of China's maritime capability is part of its rise as a 'maritime power' beyond its military capability.[7] This complements Beijing's oft-repeated assertion that it

---

[4]See Paige, J.

[5]See Tiezzi, S.

[6]Lubold. G. (2015). 'Pentagon says China has stepped up land reclamation in South China Sea'. The Wall Street Journal. Available at < http://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-says-china-has-stepped-up-land-reclamation-in-south-china-sea-1440120837> (accessed on 11 October 2015).

[7]China National Military Strategy released in 2015 calls for a shift in what it describes as "the traditional mentality" of placing greater emphasis over the strategic value of land over the sea. See <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/> (accessed on 11 October 2015).

has undisputed sovereign rights in the sea and is committed to peace, stability and security in the region. In addition, China continues to emphasise that the SCS disputes are not an international but regional issue that should be resolved through bilateral negotiations, and external powers should not interfere on the matter; in others words, the dominant Chinese voice frames Beijing's claims in SCS in the context of the sea being central to its sovereign interests and its intolerance towards the claims and interests of other parties.

China has said that the construction of the lighthouses can boost navigation safety and can be useful in assisting civilian activities such as search and rescue, environmental protection and resource management.[8] It even went further by saying its Transport Ministry would continue to build facilities to provide passing vessels and countries in the region with navigational services.[9] However, there is no mistaking that the construction of airstrips in the South China Sea has a military aspect to it. At the time of writing this commentary, China was believed to be constructing two other airstrips on Subi Reef and Mischief Reef.[10]

CONSTRUCTION OR MILITARIZATION?

Only time will tell whether China's construction of structures like airstrips and lighthouses will serve the international community using the busy sealanes of the South China Sea. On one hand, China said they are for civilian use, but on the other, doubts are being cast by regional countries, the international community and the research community whether they would be purely used for peaceful purposes.

Amid the chorus of protestations, including by some of China's most important strategic, trading and economic partners and professed 'friends' in the SCS region against China's increasingly aggressive conduct in the sea, China has to seriously assess its conducts and the repercussions to its relations

---

[8]'China starts operating lighthouses in South China Sea reefs'. The Washington Post (10 October 2015). Available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-starts-operating-lighthouses-on-south-china-sea-reef/2015/10/10/ea310d70-6f06-11e5-91eb-27ad15c2b723_story.html> (accessed on 11 October 2015).

[9]Ibid.

[10]This claim was made by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington in its report titled, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, citing satellite photos taken in September 2015. See <www.csis.org>

with its neighbours. It must also ask itself the question of how its current tangent of actions in the sea is contributing to regional peace, stability and security, and how they will play out strategically in the long term. Among the key questions that China must ponder are:

i) How beneficial would it be for China to have these infrastructures – reportedly complete with piers and wharves, extended airstrips, and military garrisons with radar installations and coastal artillery – far away from home if they were indeed planned to be turned into military installations? What advantage would China hold over other military powers in the region, most especially the much more superior US Navy, with such facilities, should conflict break out in the sea?

ii) Is attaining sheer military power the kind of power that was referred to by President Xi Xinping when he said China aspires to become a "true maritime power"?[11] Is becoming a naval power the ultimate objective of this aspiration or is it complementary to becoming an economic maritime power as well, and a leading proponent of maritime cooperation in areas such as seaborne trade, navigation safety, environmental protection, SAR and disaster warning and relief?

iii) Will China simply shrug off growing and valid concerns among its neighbours and the international community at large over its rapid modernization and upgrading of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and Coast Guard? This is seen in the near break-neck pace of acquisition of modern, large and sophisticated vessels, submarines and an aircraft carrier capable of establishing forward presence far away from home base and mounted with offensive firepower including intercontinental ballistic missiles.[12] How can China expect its neighbours not to react nervously to its 'peaceful military modernization' and visibly ambitious naval exercises in the sea in the context of its increasingly assertive claims in the sea?

---

[11]'Xi advocates efforts to boost China's maritime powers'. Xinhuanet (31 July 2013). Available at < http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-07/31/c_132591246.htm> (accessed on 2 October 2015).

[12]Sevastopulo, D. (19 June 2014). 'China adds fresh focus on maritime power'. FT.com. Available at < http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/267cd164-f7ae-11e3-b2cf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz309M28WNC> (accessed on 30 September 2015).

iv) How does China reconcile its intention of exercising 'more diplomacy, less raw power'[13] in the sea and becoming a 'true and good neighbour, partner and friend''[14] to its regional neighbours and its frequent pronouncements of commitment to peace, stability and security?[15] In other words, how can China be part of the solution to disputes in the sea when it is seen by many to be the part – if not the main source - of the problem?

v) Why does China continue, on one hand, to assert its presence in the sea while on the other, stresses on 'confidence building and crisis management' in the sea?[16] Does it not have the confidence to restrain itself from taking actions that result in full-blown military conflict in the sea? Is there a discord between Xi Xinping's top-down leadership style and the PLAN in terms of shaping China's policy in the sea?

vi) How will other claimant states in the sea and regional countries react to China's offer of cooperation through initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Bank, Maritime Silk Road[17] and other 'soft power' approaches like holding conferences on the South China Sea when China continues to appear determined, even uncompromising, in safeguarding and advancing its maritime claims in the sea?

vii) Is China's strategy of rapidly expanding its naval forces consistent with modern naval warfare of establishing expeditionary forces capable

---

[13]'Xi eyes more enabling int'l environment for China's peaceful development'. Xinhua. net (30 November 2014). Available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/30/c_133822694.htm> (accessed on 2 October 2015).

[14]China Daily (6 July 2005). 'Wen : China a 'true friend and partner' . 'Available at < http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/06/content_457475.htm> (accessed on 2 October 2015).

[15]In his landmark speech at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in Beijing on 28-29 November 2014 that many analysts saw as a watershed speech in China's new foreign policy direction, President Xi Xinping emphasized China's commitment to foster international security by stating "We have advocated the building of a new type of international relations underpinned by win-win cooperation, put forward and followed a policy of upholding justice and pursuing shared interests and championed a new vision featuring common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security". Although he did not mention South China Sea, this pronouncement should apply to China's conduct in the sea as well.

[16]Medcalf, R. (1 December 2014). 'Xi Jinping's speech: More diplomacy, less raw power'. Available at < http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/01/Xi-Jinping-speech-More-diplomacy-less-raw-power.aspx> (accessed on 4 October 2015).

[17]'Chronology of China's belt and road initiative'.Xinhua.net (28 March 2015). Available at <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm> (accessed on 3 October 2015).

of establishing constant presence in faraway theatres[18] Is the current strategy of flexing muscle in the sea through constructing infrastructures more of a grandstanding manoeuvre and making a statement of intent rather than having serious, durable military value?

viii) Should China's political leadership curtail the visibly assertive risk-taking and adventurism of PLAN at sea by putting in place protocols and mechanisms like prevention of incidents at sea? Should China agree to the establishment of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to prevent military conflicts and to foster peaceful resolution of disputes among the claimants?

ix) Wouldn't China be conscious of the implication of its actions in the sea of driving its Southeast Asian neighbours to become closer to the United States?[19] Would China not be concerned that this would polarize the region and not be favourable to fostering regional unity and would not do its image as a growing regional power any good? Wouldn't China want to promote a friendly, non-belligerent image as an emerging power instead of one which does things that antagonize its trading partners and cause anxiety and disunity in the region?

These are among the questions for China's leadership and military to reflect upon. They should collectively consider whether the short-term gains in the sea by taking actions such as reclaiming islands, sending ships close to the EEZ of other claimant nations and talking tough are worth risking the long-term interests of establishing peaceful, win-win relationship with its regional neighbours.

WALKING THE TALK

China has repeatedly said that its actions in the South China Sea are non-military while it continues to pursue activities in what it adamantly describes as an area in which it has 'undisputed responsibility' for maritime search and rescue .[20] However, it continues to build islands and construct at a frantic pace

[18]See Medcalf, R. (1 December 2014).

[19]See Gaouette, N. & Tweed, D. (14 October 2015). 'China's island moves draw Asian neighbours closer to U.S., says Carter'. Bloomberg Business. Available at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-13/china-s-island-moves-draw-neighbors-closer-to-u-s-carter-says> (accessed on 10 October 2015).

[20]Glaser, B. (20 April 2015). 'On the defensive? China explains purposes of land reclamation in the

airstrips that can accommodate military planes, which raised doubts over its claim of non-militarization policy in the sea.[21]

China has been taking the effort to be more transparent in explaining that the purpose of the construction of installations such as airstrips and lighthouses are mainly to serve those living and working on the island where they are built and to provide services for the international community. Nevertheless, it has not masked the fact that there is a military application to the structures and facilities.[22] This stands in stark contrast to the surprise pronouncement of Xi Xinping during his visit to the United States in September 2015 that China had no intention to militarize the sea.[23]

Talk is cheap if not backed by meaningful actions. The claimant states and the international community have every right to be anxious about China's growing assertive conducts in the sea and opaqueness in explaining its intentions.

However, they should seize the slow but steady openness displayed by Beijing of late, as underlined by the earnest attempt to explain the purposes of the infrastructure development in the seas, to demand greater transparency and more details about the structures already built and being built.[24] They should also exert pressure on China to decouple the non-civilian assets from military use and refrain from taking any actions via these infrastructures that could stoke further tension in the sea. Most importantly, they should demand

---

South China Sea'. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at <http://amti.csis. org/on-the-defensive-china-explains-purposes-of-land-reclamation-in-the-south-china-sea/> (accessed on 30 September 2015).

[21]See for example Chock, J. (5 October 2015). 'China's non-military maritime assets as a force multiplier for security – Analysis'. East West Center. Available at <http://www.eurasiareview. com/05102015-chinas-non-military-maritime-assets-as-a-force-multiplier-for-security-analysis/> (accessed on 2 October 2015).

[22]In her statement issued on 9 April 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that the infrastructures are built mainly for civilian purposes but also to serve "necessary military defense requirements" and that they are being constructed in a "reasonable, justified and lawful" fashion. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China (9 April 2015). 'Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2015'. Available at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1253488. shtml> (accessed on 7 October 2015).

[23]Brunnstrom, D. & Martina, M. (2015). 'Xi denies China turning artificial islands into military bases'. Reuters.com. Available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/25/us-usa-china-pacific-idUSKCN0RP1ZH20150925> (accessed on 5 October 2015).

[24]See the statement issued on 9 April 2015, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Hua Chunying.

that China not do anything that could impede freedom of passage of navigation and overflight in the sea, for example through unilateral patrolling and its plan to establish an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in disputed areas in the sea.[25]

China should be reminded that such actions are against international law, can destabilise peace and unity in the region, and can draw reactions that could lead to escalation of tension and even full-scale conflict in the sea. It should abide by its pronouncement of taking the "path of peaceful development" and a defence policy which is "defensive in nature".[26] It should also not act in a manner that is contrary to its commitment to establish peace and stability in the South China Sea which serves its own interests of development and security, and uphold its commitment to resolving disputes in the sea through negotiation and consultation.[27]

As reports coming out from the United States suggesting that the US Navy may conduct "freedom of navigation patrols" near an artificial island built by China in the sea to challenge Beijing's claims and protect freedom of passage, there is mounting concern that it could lead to direct confrontation between the US and Chinese navies.[28] China should be mindful of the fact that the area it claims as its sovereign territory where construction of artificial islands is being undertaken does not generate 12 nautical miles territorial limits under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This means that from an international perspective, the area is open for international navigation. At the same time, other stakeholders in this complex situation in the sea must guard against taking any actions that may result in aggravating an already tensed situation and drive China towards hardening its position and departing from its commitment not to militarize the sea.

---

[25]Clover, C. (27 May 2015). 'China raises prospect of South China Sea air defence zone'. FT.com. Available at <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bd40ff7a-0447-11e5-a5c3-00144feabdc0. html#axzz3oVqyCvwO> (accessed on 2 October 2015).

[26]See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China (9 April 2015). 'Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2015'. Available at <http:// www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1253488.shtml> (accessed on 7 October 2015).

[27]Ibid.

[28]Perlez, J. & Hernandez, J. (12 October 2015). 'U.S. tells Asian allies that Navy will patrol near islands in South China Sea', New York Times. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/ world/asia/us-asia-south-china-sea-patrols.html?_r=0> (accessed on 13 October 2015).

China holds the trump card in the growing disputes in the South China Sea. Things have come to a point where China can no longer turn a deaf ear to the concerns and outcry raised by the other claimant states and international community over its conduct in the sea. It must cease all activities deemed provocative and contributing to stoking tension, align its claims to international norms and prove that the structures it has built in the sea are indeed for peaceful use. China knows that it has to preserve peace, security and stability in the region and maintain amicable ties with its regional neighbours, some of whom are its vital trade partners, for its own economic and strategic interests.

Above all, China must earn the respect of being an emerging power, not command it through actions that can be deemed assertive, provocative and destabilizing to regional peace. It must walk the talk of being a "good friend, good neighbour and good partner" to the region and a peaceful, responsible and trustworthy emerging power whom others in the region can look up to, not fear and are wary of.

Bringing the Battle against Daesh Online

Jasmine Jawhar

Jasmine Jawhar is Assistant Director under the Research and Publications Division at the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia. She holds a B.A. (Hons) Degree in International Relations from the University of Queensland, Australia (2010) and has a Certificate in Terrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, Scotland (2015). Currently, her areas of research include terrorists' use of the Internet and security in Sabah's Eastern seaboard.

ABSTRACT

The unprecedented number of foreign terrorist fighters "immigrating" to the so-called land of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has raised global concerns. As a result, many nations have come together in the form of a coalition while also increasing their internal security through legislature measures and heightened border controls, among others. While these are important steps to combat the threat from Daesh, the medium used by the terrorist group to garner such massive support must also be clearly understood and confronted. The medium is the Internet including the various social media platforms used to spread their vicious propaganda, radicalise individuals, and recruit members and sympathisers around the world. This article will examine the use of the Internet by Daesh in these three areas: to spread propaganda, radicalise and recruit potential members. It argues that while other measures to counter the threat of Daesh are essential, it is also important that nations take the battle online to defeat the appeal of Daesh. This includes mobilising religious movements online, countering Daesh propaganda online, utilising online tools to monitor and analyse Daesh's activities on the web as well as enhancing Public-Private Partnerships to strengthen the online presence of relevant authorities and agencies.

Keywords: Daesh, Internet, propaganda, recruitment, and radicalisation

INTRODUCTION

According to a recent research on the 'Top 10 Fears of 2015' conducted in the United States, cyberterrorism was ranked as the second most feared situation for Americans at 44.8%, only after corruption of government officials.[1] Conducted by Chapman University in California, the survey also showed that Americans were least afraid of credit card frauds and running out of money in the future.[2] This showcased that Americans, at least those who took part in the survey, viewed cyberterrorism attacks as a threat in which they could lose far more than just their personal income and to a certain extent, their future.

The heightened fear of cyberterrorism, particularly in the last couple of years could easily be explained with the rise of Daesh, also widely known as the Islamic State (IS) (previously called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant – ISIL and Islamic State in Iraq and Sham – ISIS). Although the use of the Internet by terrorist groups is not a new phenomenon, Daesh was able to utilise the Internet on an unprecedented level and has successfully mobilised several thousands of aspired terrorist fighters spanning from the American continent to Southeast Asia and Oceania to fight in Syria and Iraq. According to a report by the United States' Homeland Security Community, the number of foreign terrorist fighters in September 2015 was estimated to be close to 30,000.[3] While many have left their home countries to fight in those conflict zones alongside Daesh, the fear that many of the Western countries and along with the Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, have is the eventuality that these fighters will return to their countries equipped with battle skills and experiences, enabling them to conduct terrorist activities in their own countries.

Furthermore, what is even more concerning is the fact that Daesh has issued a statement urging those who are unable to travel to the so-called Islamic State to conduct attacks in their home country.[4] With this pressing

---

[1]Chapman University, "Top 10 Fears in 2015", 13 October 2015, https://blogs.chapman.edu/wilkinson/2015/10/13/americas-top-fears-2015/ (accessed 3 November 2015).

[2]Ibid.

[3]US Congress Homeland Security Committee, Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, September 2015, accessed on 2 November 2015, available at https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf.

[4]Jessica Lewis McFate, Harleen Gambhir and Evan Sterling, "ISIS's Global Messaging Strategy Fact Sheet, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), December 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/GLOBAL%20ROLLUP%20Update.pdf (accessed 23 October2015).

development, many nations have taken steps to strengthen their country's measures against possible attacks in their country. Malaysia in this regard has produced a White Paper on the threat of the Islamic State or Daesh as well as introduced a law specifically designed to tackle the threat of terrorism, known as Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). At the international level, Malaysia has co-sponsored the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178[5] and continues to support other international efforts at the multilateral level. The United States (US), in its effort to counter the growing threat of Daesh, had formed an international coalition, in which today has at least 60 members including Australia, United Kingdom, Tunisia, France, Australia and Malaysia.

Nonetheless, it is important to reiterate that many of Daesh's activities are also being conducted in the cyber realm, particularly in broadcasting its propaganda campaigns as well as facilitating the radicalisation and recruitment of susceptible individuals. With their impressive abilities to create and design videos comparable to that of Hollywood standard and disseminating it via the Internet as well as publishing captivating articles through its series of online magazine called *Dabiq* amongst others, their propaganda campaigns have been very successful in gaining new recruits and sympathisers from around the globe. It is against this backdrop that this article argues for a more robust, tangible and comprehensive efforts to counter the threat of Daesh through the Internet, both at the national and international levels, to prevent further recruitment and radicalisation of individuals, and ultimately abate the threat posed by Daesh.

However, some clarity on the difference between cyberterrorism and terrorist use of the Internet is greatly needed before deliberating on the attractiveness of the Internet in the eyes of the terrorists. The article will then follow with a discussion on the three main usage of the Internet by terrorists: Propaganda; Radicalisation; and Recruitment; and continue to focus on Daesh's online propaganda campaigns, radicalisation and recruitment strategies. Finally, it will attempt to provide some recommendations in the effort to counter the threat of Daesh through the use of the Internet.

---

[5]Malaysia Permanent Mission to the United Nations "Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hussein Haniff Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations" 19 November 2014, https://www.un.int/malaysia/sites/www.un.int/files/Malaysia/2014-Statements-Security-Council/2014-11-19_-_unsc_statement_by_pr_od_ct-f.pdf (accessed 5 November 2015).

UNDERSTANDING CYBERTERRORISM AND TERRORIST
USE OF THE INTERNET

How real is the threat posed by cyberterrorism? The threat of cyberterrorism has long been debated by policy-makers and scholars alike. While Western nations such as the United States is taking the threat seriously, going as far as calling it "the new language of war",[6] a look at the definition of cyberterrorism would suggest that such an attack has yet to occur. The fear of such an attack however, is not without basis, as the result of it would be catastrophic to the nation affected. What then is 'cyberterrorism'? Like the word 'terrorism', the definition of 'cyberterrorism', a term first coined by Barry Collins, a research fellow at the Institute for Security and Intelligence in California, in the late 1980s,[7] is also a highly debatable one among experts.

Andrew M. Colarik, in his book titled *Cyber Terrorism: Political and Economic Implication*, argued that cyberterrorism can be defined as:

"...a premeditated, politically motivated criminal act by subnational groups or clandestine agents, against information and computer systems, computer programmes, and data, that results in physical violence, where the intended purpose is to create fear on non-combatant targets".[8]

On the other hand, John Rollins and Clay Wilson proposed that when defining the term cyberterrorism, two views exists; the Effects-based view and the Intent-based view.[9] In essence, the Effects-based view regards cyberterrorism in terms of a computer attack's outcome, that is the creation

---

[6]Byron Dorgan. "Cyber Terror is the New Language of War", Huffingtonpost, July 17, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-byron-dorgan/cyber-terror-is-the-new-l_b_3612888.html (accessed 24 April 2014).

[7]Barry Collins, "The Future of Cyberterrorism", Criminal Justice Centre, March 1997, http://www.cjimagazine.com/archives/cji4c18.html?id=415 (accessed 26 August 2014).

[8]Andrew M. Colarik, Cyber Terrorism: Political and Economic Implications (Pennsylvania: Idea Group Publishing, 2006), 47.

[9]John Rollins and Clay Wilson, "Terrorists Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues", Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2007, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33123.pdf (accessed September 24, 2014). Also in, Catherine Theohary and John Rollins, "Terrorists Use of the Internet: Information Operations in Cyberspace", Congressional Research Service, March 8, 2011, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41674.pdf (accessed September 24, 2014).

of fear. Conversely, the Intent-based view regards computer-related attacks on the basis of its goal which is aimed at reaching certain political objectives.

Additionally, Dorothy E. Denning, Professor of Computer Science and Director of the Georgetown Institute for Information Assurance, Georgetown University, offers her definition of cyberterrorism as:

> "…a computer-based attack or threat of attack intended to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political, religious, or ideological. The attack should be sufficiently destructive or disruptive to generate fear comparable to that from physical acts of terrorism. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, extended power outages, plane crashes, water contamination, or major economic losses would be examples. Depending on their impact, attacks against critical infrastructures such as electric power or emergency services could be acts of cyber terrorism. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not".[10]

Comparing the various available definitions of cyberterrorism, Zahri Yunos, Chief Operating Officer (COO) of CyberSecurity Malaysia, argued that at least five elements are required to construe cyber attacks as cyberterrorism.[11] These are:

a) "Politically motivated cyber attacks, that lead to death or bodily injury";

b) "Cause fear and/or physical harm through cyber attack techniques";

c) "Serious attacks against critical information infrastructures such as financial, energy, transportation and government operations";

d) Attacks that disrupt essential services; and

e) "Attacks that are not primarily focused on monetary gain".

While the above characterisations are but a fraction of the available definitions of cyberterrorism, some primary themes could be identified in the

---

[10]Dorothy E. Denning, "Is Cyber Terror Next?", Social Sceince Research Council, November 1, 2001, http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm (accessed August 17, 2014).

[11]Zahri Yunos , "Putting Cyber Terrorism Into Context", STAR In-Tech, February 24, 2009.

effort to strengthen the discourse in defining cyberterrorism. The following table is an attempt to identify the primary themes.

Actions	Actors	Targets	Objectives	Aims/ Purposes	Nature of Attack
• Criminal activities • Enabling, disrupt and destruct	• Subnational groups • Clandestine agents	• Computer system • Information system • Computer programmes • Computer systems that control critical national infrastructure: • Power grids • Transportation system • Water system	• To produce physical violence • To create the threat of violence • To kill and injure in the physical world	• To generate fear amongst non-combatants • To cause grave harm to the people • To produce severe economic damage	• Political • Premeditated • Religious • Ideological

Table 1: Primary Themes of Cyberterrorism[12]

In this regard, several requirements are essential in defining cyberterrorism:

a) *Form of Attack*: Politically-motivated

b) *Target*: Information System/Critical National Infrastructures

c) *Means*: Computer and Cyberspace

d) *Objective*: To cause major disruption in victims' daily lives

e) *Aim*: To create fear amongst civilians

Based on these criteria, to suggest that a cyberterrorism attack has occurred is rather difficult[13]. Nonetheless, what is being conducted by terrorists, in

---

[12]Table taken from an ongoing research by author titled 'Terrorist Use of The Internet'.

[13]In the case of the 2008 Estonian cyber attack, it is rather difficult to confidently categorise the attack as a cyberterrorist attack as the details of the attack are still being contested.

general, through the cyber realm is using the Internet to spread its propaganda, radicalise, recruit, gain funding, coordinate attacks, data mining, plan, train and network. For Daesh in particular, the Internet is being used extensively and effectively to spread propaganda, radicalise and recruit individuals. In this case, the term cyberterrorism would not commonly include the use of the Internet by terrorists to conduct such activities. As such, the term 'terrorists' use of the Internet' would be more suitable to depict the current situation of terrorists utilising the Internet.

For many years, terrorists have been using the Internet for various purposes. This includes terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Basque uskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty - ETA), the Shining Path, Peru's Tupak Amaru, Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), Al-Qaeda, the Philippines' New People's Army (NPA), Al-Shabaab and most recently, Daesh. However, before going further to describe some of the examples of Internet usage by terrorists, it is logical that we look into the underlying factors that have led terrorists to use the Internet as a medium to conduct their terrorist activities.

WHY DO TERRORISTS USE THE INTERNET?

The Internet provides a solid and useful platform for terrorists to conduct their activities, particularly to spread its propaganda, radicalise, communicate and build network within their group or even with other affiliated groups. Several factors exist in explaining the attractiveness that the Internet holds for terrorists. The first is anonymity. In this regard, the Internet is able to provide a communication platform without having to reveal crucial details of the source of the communication, which includes identity of the individual and origin of the communication. Apart from anonymity, Kathy Crilley of the Internet Studies Research Group, City University, also cited a number of other reasons including uncomplicated access to the Internet where limited technical knowledge is needed in building a website and links to like-minded individuals that could lead to the creation of a large networking amongst them[14]. She also argued that the Internet could serve as a source of revenue where

[14]Kathy Crilley, "Information warfare: new battlefields Terrorists, propaganda and the Internet", in *Cyberterrorism*, ed. Alan O'Day, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 69.

donations can be obtained through terrorist websites as well as the ease of bypassing national laws with the Internet being owned by no one[15].

Echoing Crilley, the ease of bypassing the national laws was also mentioned by Professor Bilveer Singh of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Bilveer Singh opined that terrorists will often take advantage of a weak legal system[16]. Citing Indonesia as an example of a relatively weak legal system in dealing with cyber radicalisation, he argued that this has unfortunately led to terrorists taking advantage of the limitation[17] to conduct terrorist activities online.

Other reasons for using the Internet to conduct terrorist activities as maintained by Dr. Anne Aly, a Research Fellow at Curtin University, Australia were to gain information (in gaining information, terrorists tend to 'cherry-pick' information that serves to reinforce their worldview while disregard those that does not), strengthen personal identity as well as social interaction and for entertainment purposes[18]. With regard to cherry-picking information, this has led to the strengthening of their personal identity where the Internet can boost their credibility and ultimately enhance their confidence in support of the selected worldview.

Moreover, the speed in which the Internet provides for terrorists to facilitate their activities is also one of the reasons terrorists choose to conduct their activities via the Internet. Activities such as gathering information on potential targets, spreading propaganda which includes the dissemination of real-time news, videos and sermons in support of terrorism could be broadcasted faster and more effectively through the use of the Internet rather than through conventional printed materials.

---

[15]Ibid.

[16]Bilveer Singh, "Countering Online Extremism – A Perspective on the Indonesian Case", lecture given at the Workshop on Extremism and Terrorism Online: A Multidisciplinary Examination of Current Trends and Challenges, 14 October 2014, Singapore.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Anne Aly, "Focusing Attention on Terrorists' Audience: A Framework for Developing the Understanding of Extremism and Terrorism Online", lecture given at the Workshop on Extremism and Terrorism Online: A Multidisciplinary Examination of Current Trends and Challenges, 13 October 2014, Singapore.

Furthermore, the cost of conducting terrorist related activities online is much lesser than to conduct activities in the physical world with similar effects. For example, conducting credit card fraud online would be much easier than to conduct a bank heist given the need for weapons, gadgets, getaway cars and such. Not to mention the risk of getting caught. Furthermore, by doing such activities online, terrorists could gain more through credit card fraud activities than robbing a single bank.

In this section, it was maintained that the Internet is an effective platform to conduct terrorist activities. Not activities that target critical national infrastructures, like in the case of a cyberterrorist attack, but more of online activities conducted for the purpose of facilitating terrorist activities. The following section however will look at the three main Internet usages by terrorists in detail as to provide an understanding of these usages of the Internet in order to devise a comprehensive approach to counter the threat of terrorism online.

TERRORISTS' USE OF THE INTERNET
Based on an ongoing research by the author, there are essentially nine online activities conducted by terrorists in general. The following chart shows the nine internet usage by terrorists.


Chart 1: Internet usage by terrorists

However, for the purpose of this article, only three elements of terrorists' use of the Internet – propaganda, radicalisation and recruitment – will be discussed in depth. This is due to the fact that much of the terrorist groups', including Daesh's activities online are extensively focused on these three purposes.

Propaganda

The Internet has long been utilised by terrorist groups to promote and disseminate their propaganda. In fact, terrorist groups have managed to produce sophisticated, high-quality visuals for the purpose of spreading their propaganda. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had their own website to promote their cause which was to overthrow the British government from Northern Ireland and create a united Ireland[19]. Furthermore, according to a project conducted by the University of Arizona called 'Dark Web', major terrorists groups such Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese Red Army, the Shining Path, the ETA and the FARC amongst others[20], have established websites to provide information on their causes and struggles.

In addition, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) was said to be one of the earliest and most sophisticated terrorist groups to use the Internet to promote their cause for a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka. The war had resulted in the emergence of a Tamil diaspora across the world, particularly in Canada, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and France[21]. As such, the Internet was used widely by many in the diaspora to keep abreast of the situation in Sri Lanka during the war while at the same time continuing to promote the cause for a separate Tamil State for the Sri Lanka's Tamils by creating various websites such as CyberTamils and JafnaTamils. Additionally, not only did the Internet serve to promote their cause, it was also used to counter the propaganda maintained by the Government of Sri Lanka.

[19]Lorraine Bowman-Grieve and Maura Conway, "Exploring the Form and Function of Dissident Irish Republican Online Discourses", 2012, http://www.google.com.my/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CD8QFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fdoras.dcu.ie%2F17637%2F1%2FIrish_Republican_Online_Discourses_FINAL_NOT_PROOF.pdf&ei=-wH9VLeMIM2eugTr-4L4DA&usg=AFQjCNGiJUP3lNl9cxzFnHABxU3R-IHKGA&bvm=bv.87611401,d.c2E (accessed December 14, 2014).

[20]Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on "Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, May 2011, http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/ctitf_interagency_wg_compendium_legal_technical_aspects_web.pdf (accessed 20 January 2015).

[21]Peter Chalk, 'The Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka', 2008, http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/9.2-Chalk.pdf, (accessed 7 March 2014)

Another important terrorist group to be mentioned is the al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda has also been using the Internet to promote their cause for a global Islamic caliphate. To serve this purpose, the al-Qaeda established its own media arm known as As-Sahab Media. As-Sahab Media is responsible for disseminating the group's propaganda videos as well as statements from their leaders. Online magazines such as *Inspire* and the recent *Resurgence* were also published to promote their propaganda that is largely based on the ideology of Salafi-Jihadi. Through these magazines, the al-Qaeda's propaganda: that propagates the West as the enemy, the establishment of the Islamic caliphate as the way to alleviate oppressions and violent jihad as the only method to achieve a global caliphate; has managed to reach a much larger audience.

Like the al-Qaeda, Daesh also has a media centre, known as the al-Hayat Media Centre (HMC). Through this media centre, Hollywood-style videos, high resolution online magazines called *Dabiq*, and reports of Islamic State's events are produced. *Dabiq*, now in its twelfth issue, is an online magazine designed by Daesh through its Media Centre. Unlike the al-Qaeda's *Inspire* which focuses on calling for individuals to strike against the West and providing a how-to guide, *Dabiq*'s main purpose, particularly in its first issue, is to justify the birth of the Islamic State and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its Khalifah. How was this done? As the name of the magazine suggest, religious scriptures and hadiths were used to justify the establishment of Daesh as a so-called Islamic State. Dabiq, a place in the Northern countryside of Aleppo, was mentioned in a hadith as being a place where events leading to the end of time or Armageddon, would take place.[22] In fact, Daesh was careful in choosing from the most trusted hadiths, such as the *sahihain* to be quoted in the effort to justify its establishment and Abu Bakr as its Khilafah,[23] hence strengthening their rights and hold of the lands they claim to be controlling.

The first issue of *Dabiq* could be deemed as one of the most important issue in the series as it also served to reiterate the birth of the caliphate. Along with the issue was a powerful excerpt of a speech made by Abu Bakr al-Bahgdadi following the establishment of the so-called state in June 2014. In reinforcing

---

[22]Abu Hurayrah's narration of a Hadith in Dabiq, "The Return of the Khilafah" June-July 2014, Issue 1, Al-Hayat Media Centre.

[23]Harleen K. Gambhir, "Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State", *Institute for the Study of War (ISW)*, August 15, 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ Dabiq%20Backgrounder_Harleen%20Final.pdf (accessed March 1, 2015).

the legitimacy of the caliphate, Quranic verses such as Ahkamul-Qur'an 2:108, Al-Baqarah: 124:130, Nuh: 25, and Hud: 25-26, amongst others, were used and further deciphered to fit the Daesh's attempted messages.

Apart from that, *Dabiq* also aims to call upon all Muslims to support the group and emigrate, along with their families, to the land they call the Islamic State.[24] According to *Dabiq*'s second issue, titled *The Flood,* "the first priority is to perform hijrah from wherever you are to the Islamic State, from darul-kufur to darul-Islam".[25] Furthermore, it went on to suggest that if one was unable to immigrate to the Islamic State, one should organise a bay'at or pledge of allegiance to the Khilafah and publicise it.[26] Based on this, many terrorist groups around the world have pledged allegiance or support to Daesh including al-Shabaab, The Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria, Tehreek-e-khilafat in Pakistan, Okba Ibn Nafaa Battalion in Tunisia, Supporters of the Islamic State in Yemen and al-Tawhid Brigade in Khorasan in Afghanistan, amongst others.[27]

In Southeast Asia, several groups have also pledged their allegiance or support to Daesh. These groups include Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and Ansar al-Khilafah in the Philippines[28], Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)[29] and Jemaah Ansharut Daulat (JAD) in Indonesia, amongst others. In addition, Abu Bakar Basyir, the former Emir of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), had also called for his followers to support Daesh.[30]

---

[24]Ibid.

[25]Dabiq, "The Flood", 2nd Edition, June-July 2014.

[26]Ibid.

[27]International Business Times, "Boko Haram Swears Allegiance To ISIS: 31 Groups Now Pledge Support Or Allegiance To Islamic State Group", 7 March 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-swears-allegiance-isis-31-groups-now-pledge-support-or-allegiance-islamic-1839784 (accessed 20 November 2015).

[28]GMA Network, "BIFF and ASG Pledged Allegiance to Islamic State Jihadists"16 August 2014, available at http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/375074/news/nation/biff-abu-sayyaf-pledge-allegiance-to-islamic-state-jihadists

[29]V. Aranti and Jasminder Singh, "ISIS' Southeast Asia Unit: Raising the Security Threat", *Rajaratnam School of International Studies, (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore,* 19 October 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co15220-isis-southeast-asia-unit-raising-the-security-threat/#.VlunFL94ldg (accessed 20 November 2015).

[30]The Jakarta Post, "Abu Bakar Basyir calls on followers to Support ISIL", 14 July 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/14/abu-bakar-ba-asyir-calls-followers-support-isil.html

On the other hand, in Malaysia, there has been emergence of small cells and groups that aim to fight in the name of Daesh in Syria and Iraq as well as in Malaysia and the region as a whole. Since the crackdown by the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) on groups and individuals relating to Daesh, 141 individuals have been arrested in Malaysia. Apart from that, three identified Malaysians, who are currently in Southern Philippines, are planning to form an official Daesh faction in Southeast Asia by uniting all the groups in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.[31] Additionally, in April 2015, the RMP arrested 12 individuals who were part of a new group created in response to the call by Daesh to attack Muslim states that practise secularism in its governance. The group was planning to conduct several bombings in strategic places in the country including those with government interests.[32] It was reported that this group had learnt to make bombs via the Internet.

The *Islamic State (IS) Report* is another online publication by Daesh. In its effort to portray the group as not only an organisation but a state with a strong governing structure, the *IS Report* offers an insight into Daesh including events that unfolded in Syria, Iraq and the region as well as interviews with IS's "prominent" figures. For example, the first issue of the Report, published in June 2014, looked into how the IS prepared its Imams and Khateebs through education. In this issue, the report covered interviews with an organiser responsible for holding a seminar to educate new Imaams on their understanding of the religion.[33] According to him, the course involved studying religious books such as *The Essence of Islam: Tawheed and the Message* by Shaikh Ali Al-Khudair which was based on a book titled *The Essence of Foundation of Islam*, written by Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab.[34] Another article covered in the issue was an interview with Daesh's Head of Consumer Complaints Division in which he spoke of how his team went on the ground to inspect restaurants, shopping centres, wholesale outlets and slaughterhouses to ensure that these premises and business conducts were in line with Shari'a Law. Such a publicity stunt and media strategy has

[31]The Straits Times, "Malaysian militants plan to start ISIS faction in South-east Asia",

[32]The Guardian, "Malaysian authorities arrest 12 people in suburbs of Kuala Lumpur for Isis links" 26 April 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/26/malaysian-police-arrest-12-people-isis-links (accessed 15 November 2015).

[33]Islamic State (IS) Report, "Propagating the Correct Manhaj", June 2014, Issue 1, Al-Hayat Media Centre.

[34]Ibid.

led many to believe that Daesh is legitimate, and that it is an obligation for all Muslims to travel to their stronghold to join in the struggle.

In light of this, several hundred individuals from Southeast Asia, particularly from Indonesia, as well as Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have also responded to the call by Daesh and have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside the group. From Malaysia, though the actual number may be higher, 72 individuals have been identified to have travelled to Syria and Iraq, in which 14 have reportedly been killed, seven have returned to Malaysia while 51 are still in Iraq and Syria.[35] Moreover, there is also a group specifically formed in Syria for members from Indonesia and Malaysia with the Malay language as their first language. This group is called *Khatibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah* or the Malay Archipelago Unit for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.[36]

However, Daesh, through its videos, magazines and reports, is not the only source for the spread of propaganda and radicalisation of individuals. According to a research conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, individuals or rather sympathisers who are not linked to any of the militant groups in Syria, are the ones actively radicalising and influencing individuals, particularly in the Western countries.[37] This too is being done through various social media platforms such as the video-sharing website known as YouTube, networking website called Facebook, picture-sharing platforms called Instagram, Tumblr, forums and more prominently, Twitter and JustPaste.It.

Videos produced by Daesh, through its media arm, the HMC, as well as clips and pictures in support of the group are being uploaded through social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook and Instagram. On the other

---

[35]The Star, "Rehab scheme for suspected terrorists planned", 3 December 2015, pg. 16, col. 2.

[36]The Jakarta Post, "ISIS fighters from M'sia, Indonesia form military" 26 September 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/26/isis-fighters-msia-indonesia-form-military-unit.html#sthash.wtaJeNVw.dpuf (accessed 1 November 2015).

[37]J. A. Carter, S. Maher and P. R. Neumann, #Greenbirds: Measuring Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Networks, 2014, http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ICSR-Report-Greenbirds-Measuring-Importance-and-Infleunce-in-Syrian-Foreign-Fighter-Networks.pdf, (accessed 9 July 2014).

hand, documents produced by the Daesh and its affiliate and supporters are being shared via sites such as Tumblr, chat forums, Twitter and JustPaste.It.

JustPaste.It site is popular amongst Daesh members and its supporters to spread the group's propaganda. This is a site where one can share texts and images easily. Furthermore, it gives one the option to secure their texts and let only those permitted, to view the texts. This site also allows for one to encrypt their messages, hence enhancing the security of the texts or images posted. As an example of such usage, a handler by the name Islamic State Dawah, with Twitter ID @ISD313, used JustPaste.It to publish a six-page text reiterating the need to fully believe in Islam and to leave what is worldly and perform *Jihad*. Though searching for such texts on JustPaste.It may be rather difficult, such links could be found in forums and Twitter accounts of supporters and members which will take readers directly to the text's link on JustPaste.It.

Another important social media platform used by Daesh and its supporters to spread the group's propaganda is Twitter. Many of its members and supporters use Twitter to either quote verses or spiritual messages popularised by clerics or those deemed as religious teachers. They also use Twitter to post pictures of ongoing events in Syria and Iraq as well as discuss politics, strengthen their religious beliefs and connect with one another. For example, Ummatul HAQQ (@alaykum_bisham) tweeted "follo my Instagram – for Islamic/jihadi reminders…", while Islamic State Dawah (@ISD313) tweeted "Ya Mujahideen of IS, Syria belong to you only so flush out all the enemies of Allah swt from Syria" and Aby_Yahya_Assumaal (@WaziralHarb) tweeted "Yesterday – Tunisia, Today – Sweden. Adani (H.A) promise them we will attack them in their own lands. They will die in fear and terror…". These are some of the many tweets in support of Daesh.

Despite authorities' and social media companies' efforts to shut these accounts down, another account with the same owner will be created within hours or even minutes. As a result of authorities shutting down accounts belonging to Daesh or its supporters, Daesh, in another of their publication, called *Hijrah to the Islamic State,* referred to a member's Twitter account, Abdul_Aliy_4, and stated that if this account was to be suspended, another account will later emerge with the name Abdul_Aliy_6, and subsequently,

Abdul_Aliy_7 and so on.[38] This would make tracking the owner of the suspended account much easier.

In addition, due to authorities shutting down websites related to the Al-Hayat Media Centre, supporters and members are also creating other websites as archive centres for all of the Centre's publications and productions. These include 'Archive for Al-Hayat Centre', through blogspots and 'AlAzzam Media Centre', which disseminate news and propaganda of Daesh in the Malay language. Such savvy use of social media platforms makes it harder for the authorities to take down dangerous sites and track down those individuals involved.

Radicalisation and Recruitment
A powerful and successful media strategy to spread propaganda has led to the facilitation of radicalising and recruitment of potential terrorists. In fact, through such strategy, several had been radicalised and some went as far as committing terrorist acts in their own country. A case in point is the Boston bombing where two brothers had detonated a bomb at the Boston Marathon in 2013. They were radicalised via the Internet.

Apart from that, online sermons of Anwar Al-Awlaki, the American-born terrorist who was killed in 2011, and his YouTube videos have been linked to radicalising a number of individuals. This includes Nidal M. Hassan who perpetrated the Fort Hood Massacre in 2009 and Roshonara Choudhry who was responsible for stabbing British MP, Stephen Timms, in 2010.[39]

Realising the powerful impact of the Internet to facilitate the radicalisation and recruitment of individuals, the al-Qaeda has managed to improve their quality of videos. In 2002, the As-Sahab had issued about six audio or video files and by 2007, almost 100 multimedia files were uploaded.[40] Videos included clips of suicide bombings, western targets and enemies accompanied

---

[38]"Hijrah to the Islamic State", published online by the Islamic State (website address can no longer be found).

[39]The Washington Post, "Cleric linked to Fort Hood attack grew more radicalized in Yemen", December 10, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/09/AR2009120904422.html (accessed January 7, 2015).

[40]Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on "Countering the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes, May 2011.

by powerful narrations and religious scriptures. As a result, terrorist groups have managed to recruit, through the Internet, individuals to fight in wars in "Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and against Israel and the United States".[41]

Like most other terrorist groups, some of the main usages of the Internet by Daesh, apart from spreading their propaganda, are to radicalise and lure potential recruits into joining their ranks and to legitimise their violent actions amongst others.

As mentioned earlier, Daesh, through its propaganda, is utilising the Internet to radicalise and subsequently recruit individuals from all over the world. In fact, with its successful online propaganda campaigns, Daesh need not do much to recruit but rely most of their efforts on posting images and videos of the suffering of Syrian and Iraqi people and justify it by appearing to use legitimate hadiths as well as verses from the Quran through the various social media platforms.

One of the powerful narratives used by the Daesh is the idea of *hijrah* or immigration to the lands mentioned in the Islamic texts, particularly to lands where they today call the Islamic State. Coupled with the perceived mandatory duty of all Muslims to perform *Jihad* or struggle in the path of God and the promise of *Jannah* or heaven for not only themselves but their entire family, we are now seeing thousands of individuals, both men and women, children and adults, fleeing to the war-torn areas. Many of these individuals come from countries that are peaceful, comfortable and free. Nonetheless, Daesh was able to attract these people to travel to those conflict zones through its posting of videos and articles online.

Apart from its successful social media strategy and promise of heaven in the hereafter, another contributing factor is the promise of a good life in the Syria and Iraq. Aqsa Mahmood, a British teenager who left to join the Daesh in 2013 wrote on social media platforms about the benefits of being in the warzone. She said that those who are loyal and committed to the Daesh will receive "a house with free electricity and water provided...and no rent included".[42] Furthermore,

[41]The New Atlantis, "Dot-Com Terrorism", 2004, http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/dot-com-terrorism (accessed January 20, 2015).

[42]CNN, "What is ISIS' appeal for young people", February 25, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/25/middleeast/isis-kids-propaganda/ (accessed March 1. 2015).

to make Syria feel more like home, she added that basic necessities such as soap, shampoo and other vital essentials for women can be found in Syria easily.[43] Additionally, women are also lured by promises of marrying so-called jihadists as an access to heaven in the hereafter. For instance, in late December 2014, a Malaysian woman was arrested at Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) before boarding a plane to Turkey, en route to Syria. She was persuaded by a Daesh fighter from North Africa, whom she married in mid-December 2014 via Skype to fly to Syria and join the group.[44]

In addition to the promise of a good life, the so-called humanitarian work that Daesh claims to be doing is also a major factor in attracting individuals to Syria. According to Abu Tareq, a Danish foreign fighter in Syria, what attracted him most to Daesh or the so called Islamic State, is the fact that Daesh has departments for everything including education, humanitarian aid as well as electricity and roads while stating that the humanitarian side of Daesh was what drew him to fight in Syria.[45] Such a strong, government-like structure would certainly increase its profile as legitimate Islamic State, further making disillusioned individuals certain of its validity.

With the promise of a good life in the world and the hereafter as well as a well-structured organisation made real via online broadcasting of videos, sermons, tweets of real-time happenings and sharing pictures via Instagram of the 'fun' side of Daesh, the appeal, especially to disgruntled and gullible youth, is almost impossible to resist.

Nonetheless, it is also important to note that there is no direct indication to suggest that Internet can be the sole source of radicalisation and recruitment. As suggested by Christina Schori Liang, the role of the Internet only serves to facilitate or accelerate the process of radicalisation by complementing efforts made offline.[46]

---

[43]Ibid.

[44]International Business Times, "Police Arrest Malaysian Woman Who Married ISIS Fighter Over Skype", 3 January 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/police-arrest-malaysian-woman-who-married-isis-fighter-over-skype-1772584 (accessed 20 November 2015).

[45]Louise Stigsgaard Nisse, "Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical", Narratively, http://narrative.ly/stories/inside-isis-the-making-of-a-radical/ (accessed March 1, 2015).

[46]Christina Schori Liang, Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda", February 2015, available at *www.gcsp.ch/download/2763/72138*

COUNTERING THE THREAT OF DAESH ONLINE

As demonstrated above, Daesh has been utilising the Internet for spreading propaganda as well as facilitating the processes of radicalisation and recruitment of potential members. While government officials, security officers and civil society alike play important roles in countering the threat of terrorism in the real world, it is also important that the battle against the threat is taken online to complement offline measures. This could include efforts such as mobilising religious movements online, countering the Daesh propaganda online, utilising various online monitoring tools and above all, reinforcing and strengthening Public and Private Partnerships.

Mobilising Religious Movements Online

As can be noted under the propaganda section, Daesh often use religious doctrines including verses from the Quran, hadiths (sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad), and statements from so-called Islamic scholars to support their arguments for armed jihad and the creation of a so-called Islamic State. Religious concepts such as 'hijrah' and 'jihad' are being misinterpreted. Apart from that, Daesh also uses sacred texts to justify indiscriminate killings of civilians and prosecutions of non-Muslims. It is then necessary that we seek to create a force that could shatter such propaganda campaign that is supposedly based on legitimate religious doctrines and Islamic creed.

Apart from misinterpreting religious concepts such as 'hijrah' and 'jihad, one of the leading religious narrative espoused by Daesh particularly through online media, includes the "End of Time Prophecy", This prophecy refers to the Islamic view of one of the final battles between Muslims and "disbelievers" before the end of time, which will take place in Syria.[47] Relating to this, another compelling narrative advocated by Daesh is the establishment of a caliphate with clear physical boundaries in which the so-called true practices of Islamic laws and traditions are observed, implemented and performed. In the first issue of Dabiq, an article titled "Khilafah Declared", offered readers with excerpts of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi speeches announcing the establishment of the "Islamic State". In these excerpts, al-Baghdadi was persistent in portraying that the "state" will return Muslims' dignity, might, rights and leadership.[48]

[47]Abu Hurayrah's narration of a Hadith in Dabiq, "The Return of the Khilafah" June-July 2014, Issue 1, Al-Hayat Media Centre.

[48]Ibid.

This is in contrast to al-Qaeda in which the al-Qaeda never sought for a specific land to call an "Islamic State" but rather a more global reach in nature. Furthermore, another compelling narrative based on religious tradition is the dispute between the Sunnis and the Shias. This line of narrative is evident in Daesh's propaganda strategy. In the eleventh issue of Dabiq, an article titled "The 'Mahdi' of Rafidah[49]: The Dajjal", clearly portrayed Daesh's aversion towards the Shia sect, calling Shia's Messiah as Dajjal or the Devil.[50] It went further to suggest that the sect is also an ally to the Jews in a future war against Muslims.[51]

Hence, governments should consider gathering religious experts, with undeniable credibility and charisma that would be able to quash Daesh's propaganda based on religious texts and mobilise them online. These movements should work closely with monitoring agencies to gather information on the current trend of Daesh's propaganda and work together, preferably in a short span of time, to produce texts based on religious scriptures that offer a different interpretation of the verses used by Daesh and post it online via social media platforms.

Admittedly, challenges do exist in gathering members of the movements that possess the required credibility and charisma needed to win the hearts and minds of gullible youths as well as ensuring their unwavering commitment and time for the effort. Nonetheless, disregarding the effectiveness of such movements would probably lead to Daesh having the upper hand in exploiting religious scriptures and posting it online where disenchanted individuals could easily find and ultimately reinforce their world view.

Countering Daesh Propaganda Online
This leads us to efforts in countering Daesh's general propaganda online which

---

[49]Rafida or Rafidah is referred to as the Shia sect according to Daesh.

[50]The Memri, "Article In 'Dabiq': The Shi'ite Mahdi As Actually The Devil; The Shi'ites Will Ally With The Jews In A Future War Against The Muslims", 10 September 2015, http://www.memrijttm.org/article-in-dabiq-the-shiite-mahdi-as-actually-the-devil-the-shiites-will-ally-with-the-jews-in-a-future-war-against-the-muslims.html (accessed 27 November 2015) and "The 'Mahdi' of Rafidah: The Dajjal" in Dabiq issue 11, http://www.clarionproject.org/docs/Issue%2011%20-%20From%20the%20battle%20of%20Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20war%20of%20coalitions.pdf (accessed 27 November 2015).

[51]Ibid.

includes humanitarian, political and social aspects of their propaganda. In light of this, it is essential for nations to establish institutions with the specific focus on countering terrorist propaganda online. In this regard, many nations have taken the necessary steps forward towards battling the Daesh propaganda online through the establishments of counter-messaging centres. For example, the United States along with the Emirati government have established a counter messaging centre known as Sawab Centre. Based in Abu Dhabi, the Centre focuses on fighting Daesh's propaganda on social media.[52] In this regard, Malaysia too will set up its own centre to counter Daesh propaganda.[53]

However, in ensuring the effectiveness of such initiatives, several criteria are required. The first of the criteria is identifying the enemy. In the case of Daesh, it is important that we identify the different players involved in disseminating the Daesh propaganda. According to Jared Cohen, there are four tiers of distributing Daesh materials for propaganda.[54] The first involves the central command, comprising of very few accounts with strict privacy settings, which is responsible for the content of the propaganda.[55] The message would then be passed on to the second tier of disseminators – the rank and file. This rank and file tier is responsible for disseminating propaganda though guerrilla tactics such as hijacking trending hashtags to flood users with their propaganda.[56] The third tier, on the other hand, comprises radical sympathisers from around the globe that do not have direct ties to Daesh but nonetheless assist in disseminating the group's propaganda.[57] The fourth type is non-human, in the form of fake accounts such as Twitter Bots, with the ability to automatically disseminate contents and messages.[58]

---

[52]Hindustan Times, "US, UAE Launch Online Messaging Centre To Counter IS Propaganda", * July 2015, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/us-uae-launch-online-messaging-centre-to-counter-is-propaganda/story-ERJ3GfeaDIUgspOPypqbhP.html

[53]The New Straits Times, "Msia-US to establish counter-messaging centre to tackle terrorism", 20 November 2015, http://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/11/112756/msia-us-establish-counter-messaging-centre-tackle-terrorism (accessed 27 November 2015).

[54]Jared Cohen, "Digital Counterinsurgency: How to Marginalise the Islamic State Online", Council of Foreign Relations, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/digital-counterinsurgency (accessed 5 November 2015).

[55]Ibid.

[56]Ibid.

[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid.

The following criterion is identifying the targeted audience[59] in order for the counter messages to reach the right groups of people. In Western countries such as the United States and United Kingdom as well as other parts of Europe, Daesh often targets groups, particularly youths who are having difficulties in adapting themselves with the locals. Daesh, in essence is targeting individuals who are facing identity crisis due to being scrutinised for their religion as well as those who have been exposed to Islamophobic sentiments.[60] In this regard, these individuals, in search of their identity, would turn to the Internet for soul searching where they could "...partake in an online community that allows them to experience a shared national identity with people of similar backgrounds".[61]

But what of those who are part of the majority of a country, for example Malaysians who have travelled to Syria to be part of the war? Therefore, it is also essential that we acknowledge the different driving force that led an individual to travel to a foreign land to fight alongside unknown comrades. In other words, we need to also cater to the different driving force associated to countries in different regions. In the case of Malaysia, individuals who have travelled to Syria and Iraq have cited local political, religious and personal reasons as the basis for their flight to the war torn areas.[62]

Apart from that, another important element in countering the terrorist propaganda and their ability to facilitate radicalisation and recruitment is understanding the message being put forth by Daesh in their propaganda materials.[63] These include narratives of political, social and humanitarian natures. For example, with regard to the political aspect of Daesh's narratives,

---

[59]Bibi T. van Ginkel, "Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards an Effective Counter Narrative", *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, March 2015, http://icct.nl/publication/responding-to-cyber-jihad-towards-an-effective-counter-narrative/ (accessed 13 November 2015).

[60]Christina Schori Liang, Cyber Jihad: Understanding and Countering Islamic State Propaganda", February 2015

[61]M.G. Opera, "The Digital Caliphate", The Federalist, 2 November 2015, http://thefederalist.com/2015/11/02/the-digital-caliphate-2/ (accessed 7 November 2015).

[62]Ahmad el-Muhammady, Lecture at The Content Creators Workshop on Countering the Narrative of Violent Extremism on 19 May 2015 in Kuala Lumpur.

[63]Bibi T. van Ginkel, "Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards an Effective Counter Narrative", *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, March 2015, http://icct.nl/publication/responding-to-cyber-jihad-towards-an-effective-counter-narrative/ (accessed 13 November 2015).

Daesh through various social media platforms, particularly Twitter, will often post images depicting the brutality of Assad's regime and how they have been oppressing the Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. In this regard, Daesh, through its first issue of *Dabiq*, has strongly stated that among the services that they will provide to the people of the so-called Islamic State is to return the rights and properties to their rightful owners, to provide a state of security for the people, to ensure adequate supply of food products, and to reduce crime rate amongst others.[64] Apart from that, Daesh has also been promoting the idea that Islam is under attack and the West and un-Islamic Muslim states are enemies of Islam who should be eliminated or brought to justice.[65] In the eleventh issue of *Dabiq*, Daesh openly declared that Malaysia too was against the group.[66] With regard to the social and humanitarian sides of Daesh's narratives, promises of a good life in the "state" where the welfare of the young, women and old will be taken care of as well as the inclusiveness of people from all walks of lives including those of different cultures, education background and social standings, are apparent. This is evident in the first issue of *Dabiq* as it clearly stated the benefits of being under the so-called Islamic State which include the assurance that services important to Muslims will be well funded, *zakat* or alms will be collected and distributed based on a compiled list of orphans, widows and the needy so that the alms could be distributed to them.[67] Furthermore, the issue also stated that the so-called state "is a state where the Arab and non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are all brothers"[68], suggesting that those who travel to the "state" will no doubt be accepted by its citizens.

Last but not least are the disseminators of the counter messages.[69] This criterion is important in the effort to counter Daesh propaganda as it requires the messenger to, first and foremost, be credible. In this regard, "the credibility

---

[64]Dabiq, "The Return of the Khilafah" June-July 2014, Issue 1, Al-Hayat Media Centre.

[65]Rachel Briggs and Ross Frenett, "Policy Briefing: Foreign Fighters, the Challenge of Counter-Narratives", *Institute for Strategic Dialogue*, 2014, http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Foreign_ Fighters_paper_for_website_v0.6.pdf (accessed 2 November 2015).

[66]Dabiq, "From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions", issue 11, http://www.clarionproject. org/docs/Issue%2011%20-%20From%20the%20battle%20of%20Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20 war%20of%20coalitions.pdf (accessed 27 November 2015).

[67]Dabiq, "The Return of the Khilafah" June-July 2014, Issue 1, Al-Hayat Media Centre.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Bibi T. van Ginkel, "Responding to Cyber Jihad: Towards an Effective Counter Narrative", *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, March 2015, http://icct.nl/publication/ responding-to-cyber-jihad-towards-an-effective-counter-narrative/ (accessed 13 November 2015).

of the messenger lies in the eyes of the beholder" in which the messenger is seen as a trusted person of the group.[70] For example, government officials may not be in the best position to speak of religious matters as opposed to local religious leaders. Other credible figures or groups, including associations representing minority groups of migrants, role models and youth leaders, former terrorists, victims of terrorism, family members and close friends amongst others, could also play the important role of disseminating the counter-messages.[71]

Online Monitoring Tools

In broadcasting Daesh propaganda as well as the facilitation of radicalisation and recruitment, various social media platforms are used. These include Facebook, Twitter, JustPaste.It, Tumblr, Ask.fm, Instagram, blogs, websites, among others. Therefore, it is vital that authorities monitor the various social media platforms. In this aspect, online monitoring and analytic tools could be used to analyse trends, propaganda activities, potential individuals that could be lured into extremism, supporters and so on. In fact, online monitoring and analytic tools could also "pinpoint who to target, where to find them online, who they are connected to, their trusted sources of information and the keywords they are searching for".[72]

What would be of great benefit for the authorities in using online social media monitoring tools is that they could also serve to measure the effectiveness of the counter-propaganda efforts too. In addition, social monitoring tools could also identify if the messages are reaching the right target audience as well as how receptive these audience are towards the messages. The following table shows several of the available tools to monitor the various social media platforms.

No.	TOOL	PURPOSE	NATURE	COST
1.	Google Alerts	Notify users via e-mail of new contents on the Internet (blogs, websites and social media platforms) based on users' keywords	Monitoring	None

---

[70] Ibid

[71] Ibid.

[72] Rachel Briggs and Ross Frenett, "Policy Briefing: Foreign Fighters, the Challenge of Counter-Narratives", *Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014*,

2.	Google Analytics	Able to measure how audience are interacting to users' website contents, and track downloads and video plays among others on the page.[73]	Analytic	None
3.	Google Trends	Able to analyse search terms on Google based on interest over time, regional interest where it could provide data on which region and country searched most for the term, as well as related searches that people may search for. For example, if one was to type 'how to make a bomb?' the tool would be able to show the amount of times, by years, that people have searched for it. It could also let the user know in which country and region these terms were most searched for.	Analytic	None
4.	Boardreader	This is a tool suitable for monitoring contents and keywords on forums.	Monitoring	None
5.	Omgili	Similar to Boardreader, this tool serves as a monitoring tool for forums, message boards and discussion threads.	Monitoring	None
6.	Social Mention	This tool both monitors and analyses various social media platforms including Twitter. This tool is able to analyse data as well as influence based on four elements: strength, sentiment (positive, neutral, negative), passion and reach.[74]	Monitoring /Analytic	None
7.	Twazzup	This easy-to-use tool is able to track the name or term on Twitter that is of interest and immediately get real-time updates, most active influencers, top retweeted photos and links and the top ten keywords related to the names or term searched for.[75]	Monitoring	None

[73]Google Analytics, "Features", https://www.google.com/analytics/standard/features/ (accessed November 15 2015)

[74]Brandwatch, "Marketing: Top 15 Free Social Media Monitoring Tools", August 2015, https://www.brandwatch.com/2013/08/top-10-free-social-media-monitoring-tools/

[75]Ibid.

8.	HootSuite	This tool allows you to schedule messages for future publishing, as well as analyse how well user's "...social media efforts are being received", amongst others.[76]	Analytic	Yes
9.	Klout	This tool measures the influence or impact of users' links, and recommendations as well as how people interact with user's content across various social media platforms.[77]	Analytic	None
10.	Monitter	This tool allows users to key in up to three keywords and monitor what is being said on Twitter in real-time.[78]	Monitoring	None

Table 2: Several available tools to monitor the various social media platforms

Public-Private Partnerships

In bringing the battle against Daesh to the cyber realm, Public-Private Partnerships are essential. In this case, governments, security forces and other relevant agencies could engage with companies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and cyber security companies in the effort to strengthen their online presence to fight the propaganda and recruitment strategies of Daesh.

In this regard, private and public sector could work together against the threat of Daesh online. For example, experts from Google, Twitter and Facebook could share their knowledge and expertise with authorities, civil servants and other relevant private institutions on using the available online tools to counter the threat of Daesh online. This could be done through workshops, seminars, forums and lab sessions.

Additionally, the government could also provide the relevant private sectors with authority to conduct counter-propaganda activities as well as granting assistance in developing and enhancing screening tools. In this aspect, it is also essential that governments create a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)

[76]HootSuite,"HootSuite lets you do more with Social Media" https://hootsuite.com/ (accesed 15 November 2015).

[77]Procommunicator, "Free Social Media Monitoring Tools", http://www.procommunicator.com/ free-monitoring-tools/ (accessed 14 November 2015).

[78]Ibid.

for private sectors involved in the effort to relay messages and information of possible threats more effectively and in a secure manner.

CONCLUSION

The presence of Daesh in the cyber realm should not be taken lightly. The force that they have created through their propaganda, radicalisation and recruitment strategies have managed to mobilise thousands of fighters across the globe to not only support them but to act brutally against civilians on behalf of the group. What is even more poignant is that these indiscriminate killings, brutality and acts of sheer barbarism were all committed in the name of Islam, a religion of peace, tolerance and justice.

When deliberating on Daesh's propaganda narratives, three elements are apparent. The first of the narrative is related to a religion where religious concepts and traditions such as *hijrah* and *jihad* are misconstrued, as well as the notions of the "end of time", Islamic Caliphate and the tensions between the Sunnis and Shia sects are played up to give a sense of urgency and basis to fight alongside Daesh. The second factor is narratives based on political beliefs. These include the oppression purported by the Assad regime against the Sunni sect, the idea that the West are against Muslims as well as secular Muslim countries that are not practising the true Islamic teachings in its governance. The third element is related to the social and humanitarian aspects of the narratives. This involves targeting individuals who are unable to adapt to their surrounding nature at home as well as those who aspire to lend their hands to help those who are in need; in other words, those who are looking for a sense of belonging and purpose in life.

While external elements such as political and social issues could be the push factors for individuals to seek more knowledge on Daesh and its activities, the aspect of religion in Daesh's narratives could be one of the 'pull factors' for disillusioned individuals to seek for a more direct involvement in the conflict. As such, particular focus must be given to the religious aspect of the group's propaganda. This could be done through mobilising religious movements to tackle the religious features of Daesh's propaganda by forming groups consisting of credible religious scholars or icons either at the national or international levels to create videos of discussions and debates that talk about misinterpreted concepts of religion used by Daesh, amongst others.

These videos would then be broadcasted online through the same social media platforms used by Daesh.

However, to focus solely on the religious aspect of Daesh's narrative would not suffice either. Other aspects of their propaganda such as the political and social narratives must also be challenged. Therefore, efforts in countering Daesh's propaganda in general must also be designed and strengthened. In doing so, several criteria are needed to make informed, thus effective counter-narratives. The first is identifying the designers of the narratives being broadcasted, second is identifying the recipient of the messages, third is understanding the nature of the messages being distributed and the last one is ensuring the right disseminators of the counter-narratives.

Additionally, to ensure that counter-messages are being broadcasted effectively and are reaching the right audience with intended impacts, online monitoring and analytic tools such as Google Analytics, Google Trends, Boardreader and Social Mention, amongst others, should also be used to measure the effectiveness of the counter-propaganda efforts. Nonetheless, it is also important that authorities and relevant agencies identify and acknowledge the limitations that governments may have in positioning themselves as the sole disseminators of the counter-propaganda. In this aspect, it is important for governments to enhance engagements with the private sector through Public-Private Partnerships. It is hoped that by engaging in such collaborations, the online presence of agencies involved in countering the threat of Daesh on the Internet will be stronger and more forceful.

In this regard, governments, security forces and civil society alike should work together in fighting against Daesh. While offline measures such as arrests, strenghtening laws and collaboration between and among regional and international entities should continue to take place, online measures to combat the presence of Daesh in the cyber realm is equally important. Though challenges and obstacles may exist in countering this threat, the relevant parties must be robust and dynamic in facing these barriers in the effort to safeguard the peace and stability of our nations and future generations.