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Reflections on the Concept of Human Security and its Increasing Relevance to International Relations Today

Razali Ismail

Tan Sri Razali Ismail served as Malaysia's Ambassador to Poland and to India. He was appointed Malaysia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1988 to 1998 and was President of the United Nations General Assembly's 51st Session from 17 September 1996 to 23 December 1996. In April 2000, the UN Secretary General appointed him as his Special Envoy to Myanmar, a position he held until December 2005. He is currently involved in IT and environmental industries, is the Pro-Chancellor of Universiti Sains Malaysia, Chairman of the National Peace Volunteer Corp (Yayasan Salam) and was appointed as the Malaysian Prime Minister's Special Envoy to facilitate assistance on tsunami disaster victims in affected areas. He is a Council member of the Geneva-based Humanitarian Dialogue Centre, and President of World Wildlife Fund Malaysia.

For the greater part of the last four centuries since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, international relations has concerned itself with the protection of states from external threats. That the focus has been the security of nation-states rather than the security of the individual is evident in the opening words of the United Nations Charter signed in 1945, which pledges "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". With the increasing interdependence of nation-states in a post-cold war world and the impact of globalization, among other factors, the traditional model of security has come under closer scrutiny and re-examination. This has been particularly so since 1994 when the first clear definition of human security by the Bangladeshi economist Mahbub ul Haq was made in his UN *Human Development Report*.

Part of the reason for the renewed discussion of human security has undoubtedly been the terrorist attacks of 9/11. There have also been the terrorist bombings in Indonesia in 2002, 2003 and 2005, SARS in 2003, the tsunami in 2004 and the earlier Asian financial crisis between 1997 and 1998. Each of these events is relevant to the discussion on the state of human security, or rather insecurity, it would seem, because

they all constitute threats toward human security. In addition, they are all globalised threats, unpredictable (although the financial crisis may have been predicted somewhat), contagious in that they each affected social, political, financial etc spheres, and all have had to be managed with the cooperation of international partners. These phenomena lead us to believe that our world is becoming less secure, although we must remember that with these added threats come also added opportunities for dealing with them in ways hitherto untried. As Amartya Sen said (2000), "there is an enhanced possibility in the contemporary world to put our efforts and understanding together to achieve a better coordinated resistance to the forces that make human survival so insecure."[1]

But are these real or perceived threats? Interestingly enough, there exists data suggesting that the latter may be the case. According to the *Human Security Report 2005*[2] (which analyses data on the incidence and intensity of violence around the world), most forms of political violence have declined significantly since the end of the Cold War due to the huge upsurge of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding activities that were spearheaded by the United Nations in its aftermath. The Report found that since the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts have increasingly taken place within, and not between states.

We could ask ourselves the question of whether it matters *where* violence occurs, or if indeed a threat is merely *perceived* and not real. However, this would miss the whole point of the human security perspective, since proponents of the human security framework address, quite rightly, *all* threats affecting human beings, which is to say that they must address these threats *whether they are real or perceived*. It is about freedom from the *fear* of violence, which means it may be just a perceived threat, as well as freedom from actual violence. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's declaration in 2000 that the twin goals of the UN Millennium Summit were the "freedom from want and freedom from fear" already encompasses both the incidence and perception of threats and violence.

We now find ourselves thrust into a world of extreme fears, contrasts, countless opportunities and formidable challenges. This is a world quite different from the one in which the Millennium Summit Goals were declared, let alone compared to the world before the UN was born. Yet the question is, how equipped are we to handle these challenges of today when we are still grappling with trying to solve the problems of

[1] 2000. Amartya K. Sen. Why human security?. International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, 28 July.
[2] 2005. *Human Security Report*. See www.humansecurityreport.info

yesterday? Amid the cry of desperate voices calling out for peace and ceasefire in the many areas of conflict around the world, must we finally announce, in capitulation, that international relations, that diplomacy, are well and truly dead? For the failure to truly solve our problems, among other things, to stop the senseless killings more often than not of women and children, is indeed a failure of diplomacy. We must ask ourselves the question, why is this so?

Part of the answer lies in the saying that the more things change, the more they stay the same. The fact is that modern international relations remains stubbornly resistant to change. The so-called 'custodians of peace' in 1945 have stayed at the helm, and thus France and the United Kingdom still retain the veto even though their share of economic and political contribution has dwindled enormously. It is interesting that, at the systemic level, international political life and the science of physics seem to share the same law of inertia, so that without any outside impetus, it trucks along at its own pace, of its own accord, as it were, unless another force is impressed upon it from outside. The correction of Aristotle by later philosophers, culminating in Einstein, is in a way correct of international relations as well—a thing in motion tends to stay in motion, and not come to rest, as the older philosopher had argued. And why should things change? Great powers have no interest in changing a system with which their superiority is assured.

Yet things are slowly changing. Traditional security policy emphasizes military means for reducing the risks of war and for prevailing if deterrence fails. With the increasingly loud voice of human security proponents, we now hear that, while not eschewing the use of force, there is more often now greater focus upon non-coercive approaches ranging from preventive diplomacy, conflict management and post–conflict peacebuilding. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu wrote in 2005: "Human security privileges people over states, reconciliation over revenge, diplomacy over deterrence, and multilateral engagement over coercive unilateralism. Over the past 30 years the collapse of some 60 dictatorships has freed countless millions of people from repressive rule. The number of democracies has soared, interstate wars have become increasingly rare, and all wars have become less deadly".[3]

As the 2005 Report shows, cooperative multilateral security strategies are far more effective than the UN's critics would allow. However, consider what co-chairperson of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), Sadako Ogata had to say earlier in the

[3] Ibid., Foreword.

final report of the CHS (2003): "Internal conflicts have overtaken interstate wars as the major threats to international peace and security. The globalization process has deeply transformed relationships between and within states. Although more people than ever have access to information and essential social goods, the gaps between rich and poor countries—and between wealthy and destitute people—have never been greater than today. The exclusion and deprivation of whole communities of people from the benefits of development naturally contribute to the tensions, violence and conflict within countries."[4]

It turns out that although people are more the current focus of international relations rather than states, there is much or even more to fear now than ever before. And this fear is more often than not generated from happenings within states rather than outside of them— it seems a paradox that while most attention in the West focuses on international terrorism, domestic terrorism may truly be far more deadly. Many more people die from domestic than international terrorism. Of course, there is still no consensus, least of all from the UN on how terrorism should be defined. Still, it may be more useful to reflect on what is happening domestically rather than internationally; to notice perhaps, the proverbial elephant under one's own nose rather than the mosquito yonder.

Human security proponents thus force us to look closer to home, to what is happening to a state's own people and to ourselves. A nation's state of security or insecurity then emanates outwards but starts always from the individual, moving on to the group, the nation and finally the international arena. This is in contrast to the previous practice which moved in the opposite direction, namely, from a focus on the security of nations to the security of groups and only then of individuals; security was extended downwards from nations to individuals. It has now begun to diffuse upwards from the human being to the nation, etc, so that the security of nations can now enjoy a symbiotic relationship with that of the security of the international system in which both depend on one another.

This, in a sense, is a landmark, for with the relevance of the issue of human security, international relations has slowly evolved into the study of problems which relate not only to sovereign states but, equally, to problems which plague the equally sovereign individual. I say 'sovereign' individual because, like a nation-state, the individual is also the repository of certain rights. In fact, one may say that the individual is more deserving in a sense to the claim of sovereignty, since his rights are inalienable whereas those of

[4] 2001. Ogata, Sadako. State security–human security. Chapter One. The Fdridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture. Tokyo, 12 December.

a nation-state depend on the government by which it is governed or, literally, on its sovereign, who can 'give' or 'take away' the nation's rights.

It is thus necessary to carefully work out the exact relationship between human security and state security. The only way to do this is to rethink existing organizational mandates and mechanisms, both of national as well as international organizations, which are still locked in old patterns of action and draw heavily from worn-out state security assumptions.

We must therefore recognize at the outset that the international relations of today is, in a very fundamental sense, grappling with a hierarchy of security concerns, where there is constant, albeit often latent, tension between the needs of the state on the one hand and those of the individual on the other. The logical corollary to this fact is the fear that the security of states and thus their very sovereignty may be undermined by an emphasis on the security of the individual, with the resulting fear for international peace and security. This fear is in fact largely responsible for preventing the human security discussion over the past decade from reaching levels significant enough to warrant real action on the part of the world's key players. It has been expressed that there exists almost a "competition" between state and individual security. I think this is inaccurate because a competition presupposes *a priori* that there are three things: a judge, a winner and a loser. When Sadako Ogata declared that states should practice "responsible sovereignty"[5] the statement becomes merely an idealistic utterance, presupposing some gentle benevolence on the part of the power-wielding state, for who will adjudicate? Who will decide who wins and who loses? Indeed, why should there be a winner-take-all when there could be two winners sharing everything? In fact, the latter is the main reward and pull of multilateralism, with its offer of win-win solutions to problems. Yet still—who will adjudicate?

Unfortunately, it is the reality of the world of international relations, changed as it is, that the success of the human security, human rights and human development frameworks still depends heavily on the compliance and cooperation of governments. There is at present no institutional body or mechanism that can force governments to abide by existing frameworks. In a sense, the only thing constituting a push to governments is the current international climate that is in favour of multilateralism and which consequently challenges the return by some governments to unilateralism.

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[5] Ibid.

In recent years there has been more and more discussion on human security and consequently on how states can encourage the security and development of those individuals residing in them, and on ways of doing so which do not impinge upon state sovereignty. Canada, Japan and Norway are leaders in the discussion, having even incorporated human security into their foreign policy frameworks. Japan's universities have also recently enjoyed a healthy debate on the topic, even offering higher degrees in human security studies. Of course, this may in part have to do with Japan's bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, but still, the trend is encouraging. What we are seeing is a shift back to placing the human being at the centre of discussions on development rather than taking him purely as a means to another goal, namely, that of economic development. If anything, it is *state* security which should be viewed as being a means for providing security for people. We in ASEAN also have seen a shift from complete non-interference toward a softer approach, toward a 'caring, sharing society', as the future ASEAN Charter intends. So the international relations of today has become increasingly people-centred rather than purely state-centred.

The fact that international relations today has become people-centric holds certain implications. For one thing, in order to make human security an effective agenda, what is truly needed first is a serious and systemic institutional reform. The manner in which this may be carried out must allow for a much higher role for civil society groups and NGOs as well as governments themselves. How these interact with one another and how much power or 'sovereignty' is shared must be worked out by respective governments in such a way that these non-governmental actors are not relegated to becoming extended arms of the government and thus to promoting human security only in marginal ways. Without some sort of charter to guide such organizations or actors, the link between human security, governance and development becomes lost. In order for there to be progress in the human security agenda there needs first to be parallel progress on institutional and procedural reforms.

The UN is one of the best places to start this. Here, instead of tackling the hardened and wisened phalanx of the old frontline members, the best strategy is to target new UN members—once new members are voted into the UN Security Council, they should also begin to embrace human security as an ethically explicit policy. Otherwise, international relations and the diplomacy of today would seem to be, literally, nothing more than 'lying in state'. The humour of this statement does nevertheless point to the utter truth that it admits, especially in the world of today. As I said earlier, the stubbornness of the system of international relations toward change, especially of itself, is a stumbling block that must be recognized and overcome.

Here I would like to focus a moment on the very word 'international relations'. In light of our previous discussion, the word itself seems to be a bit of an anomaly, for what we are dealing with today is not so much just relations between nations and governments but, more and more, relations between supranational entities and vast international business conglomerates. The EU, maybe even ASEAN, is in the first category, while big transnational corporations and NGO's fall into the second. And make no mistake of it—the latter category of 'powers' have come to be, in our modern world, the more formidable. Witness, for example, the power of a handful of transnational corporations and NGO's to own and thus control the entire world of the media. The power of the media in shaping not just public opinion but also public and even foreign policy can only be but acknowledged. This power can and has easily been manipulated and misused, so much so that we can agree with one American philosopher at the turn of the 20th century, who wrote that, "those in possession of absolute power can not only prophesy and make their prophesies come true, but they can also lie and make their lies come true".

Therefore, the diplomat of today has received a new portfolio of handling not just relations between states but also between companies and supra-state bodies, as well as negotiating the minefield that is the modern media. All this is, to say the least, a daunting task. But it also means that the task of diplomacy now falls not only on the shoulders of the diplomat and statesman but on all of us. It is in recognition of this fact that America is one nation at the forefront of the new diplomacy called 'public diplomacy' to distinguish it from the 'private' diplomacy done only by practitioners in the past.

But it also means that we are all, in some way or another guilty when diplomacy fails. What we do, how we behave, at home, at work, in business, in politics, will all reflect itself to others far and wide in this transparent globalised world we now live in, so that, in a sense, there is nowhere left to hide. It is America, again, which, sensing the repercussions of this fact, has devised a method to harness this phenomena and use it to its own advantage—hence the 'transformational diplomacy' of its Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In her view, change begins at the very grassroots so that, by going from one formerly hostile country to the next, one can push one's own agenda by seeping into the very mindset of the locals through the guise of building schools, offering development aid, and other such ostensibly benign tactics. In Rice's words, this diplomacy seeks to "move from paternity to partnership". Hence, the interest of the West in the East, the recent shift of focus to countries of the Southeast Asian region, in an effort to forge partnerships with us on all fronts. There is nothing wrong with this, in forging partnerships. But only if it suits us; and let us not allow ourselves to become partners in crime.

The world of politics and international relations lives by some very harsh rules. Napoleon is said to have declared, "never retreat, never retract…never admit a mistake". This mode of thinking is clearly evident in the way countries of the world relate to one another today—it is most often a scenario of sheer arrogance. It comes as no surprise that the words "for diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible—and no one can now doubt the word of America" were spoken by George W. Bush, self-appointed 'leader of the free world'. That nation has allowed one other nation to turn the Holocaust in upon itself, so that it is now Zionism that truly means a superiority of that race over all others, so that their blood and flesh, ounce for ounce and pound for pound, is more valuable than any other; so that their people may choose to live a life of security, while others, even the lives of innocent children, are destined to be frozen in the ground or in the morgue. Such is the problem of the recalcitrance of modern international relations to change.

We have said that the current focus of international relations has been the individual, in particular, the *protection* of the individual. But the question arises: protection from what? The fact that this question has not received a clear answer has been in part responsible for the concept of human security having a limited utility all this while for policy analysis. It has not helped that neither the oft-cited *Human Development Report* of 1994 nor Kofi Annan's call at the 2000 Millennium Summit to establish "freedom from want and freedom from fear" has been particularly specific in terms of delineating the precise nature of the threats that wreak havoc upon individuals. Again, neither the first report of the Commission on Human Security (CHS), established in 2001 in response to the Millennium Summit goals, nor its final report of 2003 mentioned earlier outlined a detailed yet comprehensive response to the call of the Secretary General although the CHS's concept does make the vital link between human security, human rights and human development. It is links such as this that can guide policy formulation and form a useful basis for working towards peace and social justice. The affirmation by mainstream organizations such as the UN can certainly help point other organizations and governments in the right direction.

It is important to emphasize here that the conceptual integration of human rights, human security and human development should not devalue the intrinsic importance of human rights and economic justice, otherwise a repressive regime like Myanmar, for example, would then be able to claim that it champions human security simply because it has built a certain number of bridges or because its people have had their basic needs met. This would have the unwanted opposite effect of sidelining human rights altogether as we have seen in the case of Myanmar which holds the dubious distinction

of being the most conflict-prone country in the world, according to data analysed between the years 1946 and 2003, with over 200 years of conflict to its credit.[6] National and international actors must not use the human security concept as a means for avoiding the human rights system. The aim is for something deeper, for a secure society that is also a just society.

The emphasis on protection implies recognition of the need for respect for the individual, which in turn does justice to the human being and thus society at large. In this way human beings are ends in themselves and not just means to another purely instrumental objective like economic growth or state rights. It is with this in mind that proposals have arisen to have a human security index, much like the human development index, measuring "years lived outside a state of generalized poverty"[7] in an effort to shift the focus to those other factors that bear upon an individual's security, like political freedom and democracy. These are good efforts to operationalise human security and move it away from the domain of the purely conceptual to that of the actual.

We can reflect upon our altered security environments in today's world and conclude that constructive advances in the discussion of human security must be made in three domains: the empirical, by recognizing the nature of security threats as they actually occur today; institutional, at both national and supra-national and international levels; and finally, the analytical, most importantly, arriving at a useful understanding or at least agreement on an acceptable hierarchy of securities. As Amartya Sen says, "The basically normative nature of the concept of human rights leaves open the question of which particular freedoms are crucial enough to count as human rights that society should acknowledge, safeguard and promote. This is where human security can make a significant contribution by identifying the importance of freedom from basic insecurities—new and old."[8]

[6] 2005. Human Security Report.
[7] 2000. Gary King and Christopher Murray. Rethinking human security. Working manuscript, quoted from Alkire.
[8] 2003. *Final Report of the Commission on Human Security*, Chapter One.

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Meeting South-South Challenges in a Changing World

Amer Al-Roubaie, Ph.D.

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GENERAL REMARKS

Stemming from internal dynamics of change within the hemisphere and from external pressures imposed from without, South-South challenges abound. Important strata of these challenges besetting the South are the diverse effects of globalization on the political and technological structures of heterogenous societies in the disparate geographical regions of the hemisphere in which the role of women, technology transfer, education, health, good governance and trade as a driver of development, deserve special attention. The South must try to cope with these challenges by making the necessary adjustments needed for managing globalization and protecting national sovereignty. Interdependencies and interconnections among people, driven by modern communication technologies, are creating a porous world in which traditional cultures, social values; ethical and moral principles, religious practices, economic activities, scientific and technological products, political ideologies, and ecological forces are spilling over across nations and territories far beyond the capability of many nations to cope with them. Globalization is creating a wireless world in which communication among individuals and groups is propagated to the extent of the internet's becoming an important venue for social change, modernization and democratization. Access to knowledge, new ideas, political ideologies and information are putting pressure on governments worldwide to rethink their positions and introduce changes that meet the new challenges brought by the massive forces of change unleashed by the new global society. The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the important challenges facing countries in the South as well as to explain how cooperation among these countries could enhance socio-economic change.

* The author is grateful to to his colleague at Ahlia University Dr. Richard Cummings for his help in reading and editing this paper.

NATIONAL CONFLICTS

Unfortunately, the forces behind the changes currently taking place in our world are uneven, creating in the process a global disequilibrium characterized by economic inequalities, injustices, social intolerance, religious conflicts, terrorism, nationalism, political anarchy, poverty and rising ethnic identities. The disintegration of institutions in some societies and ethnic cleansing in others is adversely affecting neighboring countries and territories by engendering destabilization of social orders and political structures of modern states. Most countries in the South have been subjected to destabilizing forces that negatively affect democratization, political stability, economic development, social cohesion, ethnic relations and future prospects. Antagonistic forces stimulating internecine conflict among groups and nations are undermining the body-politic type of various southern states by impeding the ability of the state to formulate policies and implement programs for building capacity and improving civil liberties. Lack of cooperation among groups affects the state of socio-economic development by weakening governments' abilities to make decisions, fight corruption, allocate resources efficiently and equitably, reduce poverty, and assuage injustices.

The challenges facing countries in the South are numerous comprising complex sets of social, political, cultural, ethnic, economic, environmental, moral, racial, religious and linguistic factors. Solving these diverse problems is virtually impossible without a radical socio-economic reform, particularly in the areas of development and education. Prosperity and education increase tolerance and enhance understanding among groups and nations. Recent experience in the South has proven that social intolerance, economic injustice and lack of democracy are largely responsible for the current state of political anarchy and state decomposition. Furthermore, relations with the North over the past several decades have proven to be inadequate to reengineer development and promote stability in the South. Western interest is driven by old colonial policies and great power geopolitics designed to control resources and markets of the South to preserve Western hegemony.

POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT

Poverty and employment are the most pressing problems facing most countries in the South. During the last several decades substantial efforts have been directed at combating poverty by national governments, international institutions, non-governmental organizations, individuals and groups. Perhaps the most comprehensive program often credited with being launched to tackle global poverty is the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations that sets a target of 2015 for reducing extreme poverty and for improving the living standards of millions of poor people,

mainly in countries of the South. Poverty is a multidimensional problem comprising a large set of economic, social, cultural, political, educational, environmental, technological, institutional, and global factors. Almost one third of humanity, mainly those in the category of low human development, is living under intolerable conditions defined as being below $2 a day. As Table 1 illustrates, a large percentage of populations in the South still suffers from extreme poverty measured not only by the size of the population living on less that $2 a day but also from high adult illiteracy, low life expectancy, inadequate income per capita and low human development. Similarly, lack of knowledge, poor health, corruption, and ineffective institutions perpetuate poverty by not allowing poor people to gain access to adequate services that would enable them to participate in the economy. Sustainable development requires building strong local capacities capable of creating more opportunities including greater access to knowledge, information, communication, government services, and markets. Among other things, the knowledge of the global economy, particularly the use of information technologies, has become necessary for promoting local development. Poor people need to be given access to recent knowledge on scientific and technological advancement in agriculture, the environment, family planning, water management, pollution control, health prevention, and market activities.

Furthermore, governments in the South should make sure that poor people and poor regions get their fair share of the activities of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment. Globalization is likely to encourage production for export with little attention paid to human development and poverty reduction. Thus, to avoid exclusion of poor people from the new global opportunities, national economic policies must incorporate measures to manage globalization.[1]

[1] See Al-Roubaie, Amer. The Global Dimension of Poverty in the Muslim World. *Al-Shajarah*, Volume 9, Number 2, 2004, pp. 147-192.

TABLE 1
POVERTY IN THE SOUTH, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 2006

Country	*Life Expectancy*	*GDP Per capita US*	*Adult illiteracy*	*Population below $2 a day (%)*	*Human Development Index (HDI)*	*Human Poverty Index (HPI)*
Niger	44.6	228	71.3	85.8	0.311	56.4
Mali	48.1	371	81.0	90.6	0.338	60.2
Zambia	37.7	471	32.0	94.1	0.407	45.6
Nigeria	43.4	560	----	92.4	0.448	40.6
Bangladesh	63.3	406	----	82.8	0.530	44.2
Pakistan	63.4	632	50.1	73.6	0.539	36.3
Cambodia	56.5	354	26.4	77.7	0.583	39.3
Egypt	70.2	1,085	28.6	43.9	0.702	20.0
Mauritania	53.1	515	48.8	63.1	0.486	41.0
Tanzania	45.9	228	30.6	89.9	0.430	36.3
Ethiopia	47.8	114	----	77.8	0.371	55.3
India	63.6	640	39.0	79.9	0.611	31.3
Indonesia	67.2	1,184	9.6	52.4	0.711	18.5
Malaysia	73.4	4,753	11.3	9.3	0.805	8.3

Source: United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2006* (New York: United Nations, 2006).

South-South cooperation should involve exchanges of information about successful policies in other countries in the South. In this respect, Malaysia could provide substantial assistance to other countries in the South. A recent study by the United Nations has shown that Malaysia has made significant contributions toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The Report states that "Malaysia's experience in poverty reduction is of particular interest because it has been achieved in a multi-ethnic and culturally diverse setting. Furthermore, its economic growth strategy has integrated commitments to poverty elimination and restructuring of society as central objectives in its development vision."[2] This implies that Malaysia has gained experience and knowledge about poverty reduction which can be shared with

[2] United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, *Malaysia Achieving the Millennium Development Goals* (Kuala Lumpur: United Nations), p. 34.

other countries in the South. The success of Malaysia in combating poverty and reducing unemployment could enable other countries to initiate similar programs and construct sound macroeconomic policies to reduce the burden of poverty. In most countries, poverty is largely a product of locally driven forces; this in turn requires indigenous solutions. The poor are incapable of solving their problems due to extreme resource constraints and, therefore, state intervention becomes vital for combating poverty through the handling of various developmental issues. Building infrastructure, investing in rural areas and providing credit for the poor reduce poverty by allowing the poor to participate in the economy.[3]

ECONOMIC CHALLENGE

Economic globalization is making states more and more dependent on international institutions and global markets. Under such circumstances, the sovereignty of the state is undermined to the extent that the ability of national governments to make decisions and promote development is restricted. Nations in the South need to maximize the return on their development by constructing policies capable of enhancing the national economy and protecting the local industry. Global competitiveness through liberalization of trade and privatization of the domestic market may create imbalances within the economic structure and redistribute income in favor of exports and highly skilled workers. It is important that countries in the South learn how to manage globalization by trying to integrate global transactions into their national policies. Benefits from globalization need to be shared by all people of the world if a peaceful co-existence and common future is to be maintained. It is not income gap that is currently dividing nations into rich and poor; rather, it is the knowledge gap that is widening between the countries in the North and those in the South. Thus, global cooperation becomes a necessity for preserving international justice and promoting peace and security.

To cultivate the fruits of globalization, countries in the South need to make major internal reforms. Economic development requires setting up effective institutions, building infrastructure, encouraging public participation, mobilizing political support and inaugurating economic incentives. Economic institutions must be made efficient, accountable, and responsive to a country's social, economic, and environmental requirements. Similarly, the educational system needs to be restructured to meet the needs of a rapidly changing economy by providing the necessary skills and knowledge for development. An equitable redistribution of income and wealth could stimulate

[3] See World Bank, *Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?* (Washington: Oxford University Press, 2000); see also Sachs, Jeffrey, *The End of Poverty* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005).

effective demand in the South by increasing consumer expenditures and enhancing investment. Undertaking such initiatives will promote sustainable change and create a sound business environment that would stimulate economic growth at home and increase competitiveness in the global market. The South needs to build bridges for promoting peace and security as well as for reducing social tensions. Political stability and social tolerance within and among nations is vital for economic development. The complex nature of the world renders cooperation vital to share resources and to establish a common vision based on hope and continuity.[4]

Table 2 shows the extent of income inequalities between the North and the South. For example, in 2004 high income countries, mainly located in the North, representing 15.4 per cent of the world's population, earned 80 per cent of global income, whereas the rest of the world's population, representing countries mainly in the South, earned 20 per cent of the world's income. In the meantime, low income countries accounting for 37 per cent of world population received only 3 per cent of world income in 2004. No doubt, such a wide gap in global income inequalities could hamper efforts in countries of the South to eradicate poverty and foster growth. The influence of the countries in the North over the flow of FDI, technology transfer, export of manufactured goods and services, research and development and international institutions has weakened the countries in the South with regard to multilateral negotiations, global competitiveness, access to markets and international finance.

TABLE 2
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2004

Region/Country	*Population (millions)*	*% of world's total*	*GDP (US$ billions)*	*% of world 's total*	*Human Development Index (HDI)*
High income	982.5	15.4	32,590.4	80.0	0.942
Middle income	3,043.0	47.6	7,155.3	17.0	0.768
Low income	2,361.3	37.0	1,236.6	3.0	0.556
Malaysia	24.9	0.4	118.3	0.3	0.805
World	6,389.2	------	40,850.4	-----	0.741

Source: United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2006* (New York: United Nations, 2006).

[4] Thomas, C, How Can South-South Cooperation Contribute to a Knowledge-based Development Strategy, *Cooperation South*, Bangkok, No. 1, 2000, pp. 49-59.

THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Globalization has posed new challenges to most countries of the South. The pressure to compete globally has left countries of the South with little latitude to balance development by skewing production toward exports and away from domestic markets. Globalization not only subjects economies, particularly developing economies dependent on commodity exports with low value-added, to greater instability by increasing openness, but also weakens the ability of the state to protect its interests in the global markets. Globalization is driven by a small number of actors, mainly the industrialized countries, transnational corporations and special interest groups. In addition, the new economy is a knowledge-based economy which requires certain skills, investment and technology that most countries in the South cannot afford to have in the early stages of their development. In other words, the new global economy has weakened national sovereignty by making developing countries less able to act unilaterally to protect their interests. Globalization may have even decreased the prospects of development by allowing labour and capital to migrate from the South to the North to the extent that the countries in the South are losing to the North skilled labour creating, in the process, critical shortages of skills in the domestic economy. In this regard, globalization is a double-edged sword, creating both liabilities as well as opportunities for developing countries.[5]

Increasing economic activities is deepening mutual cooperation among nations. South-South development cooperation induces understanding as well as reduction of tensions through trade, investment, factor mobility and political security. However, countries in the South should keep in mind that foreign assistance, mainly from the North, primarily serves to enhance the commercial interests of the donor countries rather than being designed to promote the development of the South. The impetus to initiate cooperation among the countries of the South should be intra-hemispherical inasmuch as the immediate problems facing the South stem from rapid growth in population, corruption, mismanagement, human rights violations, illiteracy and environmental degradation—all of which require local remedies. In this respect, joint efforts to increase cooperation among countries in the South enhance efforts for collective action designed to construct policies and make decisions that help to solve some of the problems shared by these countries.

Table 3 shows trade transactions and external debt. As Table 3 indicates, the share

[5] United Nations, *Human Development Report 1999* (New York: United Nations, 1999).

of high income countries in global trade accounted for more than two-thirds of world exports and imports in 2004. Such a large share, however, reflects the control of high income countries over world markets, particularly trade in manufactured goods and services. On the other hand, the share of middle and low income countries in total world trade accounted for about one quarter in 2004. With respect to external debt, low and middle income countries had a total debt close to 3 trillion dollars in 2004.

TABLE 3
EXTERNAL TRADE TRANSACTIONS AND EXTERNAL DEBT, 2004

Income Group	*Exports ($millions)*	*Share in world's total exports (%)*	*Imports ($millions)*	*Share in world's total imports*	*External debt ($millions)*
World	9,145,027	-----	9,376,651	-------	----
High income	6,672,648	72.0	6,962,657	74.0	---
Middle income	2,259,406	25.7	2,161,147	23.0	2,328,780
Low income	212,988	2.3	252,827	3.0	426,945

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2006* (Washington: World Bank, 2006).

POLITICAL CHALLENGE

Among the important challenges facing countries in the South are political systems which exhibit disagreement, ideological differences, external influence and domestic alliance. To increase cooperation, countries in the South need to set aside these differences and act in the national interest of their citizens without interfering in the sovereignty of other nations. Cooperation enhances political stability and increases economic prosperity through trade, investment and labour mobility. Furthermore, it decreases tension and improves social linkages by trying to solve conflicts through negotiation instead of via threats and counter threats on the part of different regimes. In the South, governments usually exercise substantial control over their nations which qualifies them to make compromises and establish channels for greater cooperation. Political tensions could lead to disastrous situations including the outbreak of wars, loss of human life, social intolerance and economic destruction. Our world is full of contradictions which are subject to many diverse influences at both local and global levels. We seem to lack the awareness of political conflicts by failing to control differences and manage individual and group acts.

The new global society is forcing countries to inaugurate radical changes pursuant to demands for freedom, justice, equality and democracy. Absent political cooperation, lack of communication, inadequate education and institutional constraints to promote global understanding, the world's ability to preserve the ecological balance of the planet and reduce inequalities remain extremely limited. The chasm between the North and the South has grown so wide that the social and economic afflictions of the South cannot be solved without cooperation between the two hemispheres. It is unlikely that the developing countries will be able, given their limited financial, educational and scientific resources, to promote development to contain social conflicts. International help to developing countries should be directed towards reducing income and knowledge gaps between rich and poor countries as well as towards the aim of increasing democratization and enhancing social investments. It is important that a balance in the degree of development be achieved among all countries in order to spread equitably the potential rewards of globalization. The confrontation between superpowers during the Cold War characterized by a bipolar world has disappeared such that North-South relations can now occupy center-stage with the South gaining greater access to aid and investment.

The countries of the South should allocate a greater share of their expenditures towards improving the status of human development away from military buildups. A reduction of armaments among the countries in the South could yield a substantial peace dividend for development by diverting resources toward production of goods for peace and social security.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

Countries in the South are experiencing substantial technological and scientific gaps with countries in the North. Future development in these countries will depend on the ability of these countries to reduce the knowledge gap by making efforts to apply, absorb and create knowledge. Access to knowledge can be facilitated through investment in information technology and development of skills. Insofar as technology could have an adverse impact on development, particularly on employment, countries in the South should introduce technology on a step-by-step basis in order to avoid social conflicts generated by increasing levels of unemployment. In addition, most countries in the South are lacking skilled labour and trained managers who can understand the application of modern technologies. Without good management, technology could be costly in terms of its environmental, social and economic costs. Technology that serves development and the environment should be acquired.

Ecological problems are directly linked to economic growth and, therefore, technology should become complementary to the process of development rather than be treated in isolation. Not only are programs that embrace environmental protection important, but so too are collective policies to minimize cross-border pollution, to set up better water management projects and to put in place measures to preserve renewable resources.

Technology transfer is necessary for building indigenous capacities capable of reducing dependency and supporting local industries. Countries should introduce measures to cultivate the benefit of technology transfer through increasing investment in knowledge creation, training, skill development and scientific research. Governments should take the lead in creating a friendly business environment amenable to multinational business, foreign capital, knowledge acquisition and industrial development. Both credit and regulations are important for providing incentives for technology transfer. However, making use of technology should eventually contribute to the reduction of poverty, the improvement of the environment, the augmentation of productivity and the sustainability of development.[6]

ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE

It is obvious that environmental degradation generally exacerbates poverty in the South. Environmental degradation impacts poverty both directly and indirectly: directly, where pollution of air and water cause health problems; and, indirectly, where environmental damage causes substantial productivity losses to the economy. Over-fishing, soil erosion, air pollution, deforestation and water mismanagement decrease the country's economic potential to alleviate poverty. In addition, environmental problems increase the risks of drought and famine. In recent decades, experience with environmental problems in Africa has proven to be destructive not only in terms of food shortages and loss of human lives, but also in terms of human dislocation and environmental refugees. Poverty means lack of productive resources and limited knowledge and information. This is true in a rapidly changing world where inadequate access to modern knowledge could jeopardize the employment of modern technologies and new production methods, especially in agricultural production and environmental management. In this regard, conducting research to identify "friendly" technology becomes important for minimizing the negative externalities associated with environmental degradation. The Brundtland Commission's report *Our Common*

[6] See Al-Roubaie, Amer and Al-Zayer, Jamal, Sustaining Development in the GCC Countries: The Impact of Technology Transfer. *World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2006, pp. 175-188.

Future (1987) established strong linkages between the environment and economic development. In the South, development programs have generally been carried out without adequate environmental devices for ensuring safety and adequate management of resources.[7]

Poor nations are faced with complex challenges including rapid population growth, water scarcity, inequitable distribution of land, inadequate financial resources, counterproductive incentives, and negligible infrastructure inasmuch as the resources available to these countries are far below the minimum required for sustaining development and combating poverty. Reliance on a nation's resources alone may prove insufficient. Accordingly, cooperation among countries in the South is essential for sharing financial and technical resources as well as for making collective decisions to increase support and share existing resources. Capacity-building in countries of the South requires knowledge-driven systems to increase economic linkages and enhance global competitiveness. Additionally, it is important that governments in the South establish a comprehensive framework that increases linkages to combat various challenges collectively facing them. Coordination among various levels of society must be enhanced in order to speed up the process of change and reduce environmental degradation.

In parallel, support from countries in the North, non-governmental organizations and international institutions is also required for providing managerial, organizational, financial, technical and scientific assistance. In recent years, energy has become an important issue in most countries in the South, both because of environmental impacts and its support for economic growth. Energy shortages could deepen poverty by reducing a country's capacity to produce goods and services.

WOMEN AND THE SOUTH

Women represent half of the South's population and, therefore, their participation could have considerable impact on combating poverty and promoting development. Unfortunately, most women in the South suffer from high illiteracy, inadequate skills, labour market discrimination, low income and social inequity. To reactivate the economy and promote equity, countries in the South need to reform their socio-economic systems in order to ensure women's contribution to development. Several challenges facing countries in the South—rapid population growth, environmental degradation, weak health care and educational systems—are a consequence of women's

[7] See Al-Roubaie, Amer. Globalization, the Nation State and Sustainable Human Development, *Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations*, Vol. 5, No. 1, June 2003.

activities in society. Many countries are still practicing old and traditional social and cultural values which are not suitable for modern development. Economic policies and government programs should be structured to take into account the impact of women on the allocation of resources. Knowledge, science and technology represent important tools for advancement in modern societies, and, therefore, women should be given a fair share of government initiatives to promote development.[8] There are similarities in the problems shared by countries in the South. Women could establish contacts and conduct studies that allow sharing of information and increasing exchange programs to lessen the impact of social, economic and environmental forces on development in their respective countries. The recent success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in the extension of micro-credit is a recognition of women's contribution to development and bears testimonial to the fact that the vast majority of micro-credits distributed in the South are extended to women, whose default rates are extremely low. Similar programs can be created to increase women's participation not only in the economy, but also politically through their participation in government. Countries in the South need to build capacities for encouraging women to participate in development. Violence, inequality and discrimination against women should be eliminated through public education and government support programs in order to help women become partners in development. Women's contribution could help in sustaining development, particularly in the areas of deforestation, water management, pollution control and soil degradation.[9]

In this age of globalization, people in both the South and the North share a common future involving mutual challenges that cannot be resolved without a collective vision. It is false to speak of isolation as a guarantor of economic security, social justice, political fairness and human rights. A single common future underscores the need for collective cooperation on the part of all countries to reduce tensions and to enhance tolerance among various groups and nations. We live in a pluralistic world made up of different groups with diverse cultures, religions, races, value systems, social traditions, languages and mores. Conflicting global regimes abound in the world where relations among individuals, groups and nations are subject to influences and tensions. Injustices, poverty, exploitation, inequality and discrimination are very much common to people everywhere. The potential to build a just and equitable global society is not possible without eliminating international disparities among nations, particularly those of knowledge and income.

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[8] See United Nations, *LDCs: Building Capacities for Mainstreaming Gender in Development Strategies* (New York: United Nations 2002).
[9] See United Nations, United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2006* (New York: United Nations, 2006).

Countries in the South should construct policies to allocate their resources to gain comparative advantages. In recent years, the United Nations has been endorsing programs of human development that direct investment towards health and education, and that promote good governance, equal opportunity, human rights, fair trade and justice. North-South relations have increased inequalities and injustices between rich and poor countries. Social strife, economic injustices are largely responsible for political instability, social disobedience, nationalism, religious intolerance and cultural fragmentation. Human development aims to enlarge human capabilities through enhancement of knowledge, understanding, gender equality, equal opportunity, information and communications. Human development implies development for, of and by the people. In other words, investment in human beings fulfils people's basic needs, and increases public participation in the democratic process and in decision-making. Such tendencies broaden the development base by engaging the whole nation, including women, in a process, the benefits of which span individuals, groups and nations.

MALAYSIA'S ROLE IN SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

During the last few decades, very few countries in the South have been able to achieve satisfactory economic progress. However, Malaysia has been credited with high rates of economic growth surpassing the performance of many countries in the South. Malaysia's performance could provide an important lesson for other countries in their attempt to combat poverty and induce rapid development. With respect to the current drive to increase cooperation among countries in the South, Malaysia could have a substantial impact on development by sharing its experience with other countries. Given the existing socio-economic conditions in countries of the South, the Malaysian model provides solutions to promote social harmony, gender quality, ethnic understanding, religious tolerance and economic development. Malaysia has been able to build a strong capacity for promoting growth through the establishment of effective institutions, the construction of sound macroeconomic polices, the enhancement of equity in government services and the creation of a balance in development efforts between rural and urban resource allocations. Currently, these issues represent the main challenges facing many countries in the South and, therefore, increasing cooperation between Malaysia and these countries could help in transferring Malaysia's know-how and expertise to induce change in the South. Economically, Malaysia has also become a leading trading country, particularly in services and in the production and export of manufactured goods. Increasing cooperation between Malaysia and the other countries of the South provides an opportunity for the latter countries to learn from the Malaysian economic success in creating a knowledge-based economy and in establishing a just society.[10]

[10] See World Bank. *The East Asian Miracle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

At the national and regional levels, Malaysia has achieved resounding success vis-à-vis enhancing national integration and reducing economic disparities, increasing regional stability and promoting cooperation, and restructuring strategies for global security. Locally, the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced by the government in the early 1970s and reemphasized in the recent Ninth Malaysia Plan, has succeeded on the whole in enhancing social harmony and promoting growth with equity. Emphasis in the new policy was directed toward education and human resource development in order to meet the challenges of globalization and increase the country's ability to compete in the global markets. Another important objective of the government was to reduce poverty and create balance between urban and rural development through creation of more opportunities for employment as well as through economic diversification and industrialization. The success of these policies can inspire other countries in the South to adopt similar strategies and construct macroeconomic policies which allow for building a capacity capable of ensuring growth and reducing poverty. Malaysia also benefited from the use of information technology (IT) in development by providing incentives for production in the electronics industry and investing in skills. Inducing development in this age of globalization requires modern technologies in order to ensure access to global knowledge and enhance competitiveness. Information technology catalyzes cooperation among countries in the South by increasing communication and enhancing trade and financial transactions. The Malaysian experience could be shared with other countries to build their own respective capacities capable of utilizing global knowledge with a view toward eradicating poverty, promoting growth, increasing knowledge and sustaining development.

At the regional level, Malaysia is an active member of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967 to help member countries to accelerate economic growth, promote political and economic stability and to resolve problems through negotiations and mutual understanding. ASEAN, which comprises Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, represents a vast geographical region with a combined population of 550 million. With respect to trade and investment, Malaysia has always enjoyed surpluses with other members. To this end, Malaysia's experience in ASEAN and its successful relations with other members of ASEAN could be extended to the countries in the South where economic development, export trade, education and social progress represent the most important challenges facing these countries. During the last two decades, several Malaysian companies, particularly PETRONAS, have grown to become international companies with operations in several countries in the South. This expertise in multinational business, which very few developing countries possess, can be shared with other countries of the South.

CONCLUSION

The North and the South as constituents of the new global society need to resolve the challenges facing humanity through innovative strategies capable of promoting peace and reducing tensions among groups and nations. Ethical values and justice provide a common ground for all groups to build strategies that increase understanding, alleviate poverty and enhance equity. Tolerance facilitates agreement on a shared multilateral vision in which creativity, courage, problem-solving, innovation, justice and freedom figure prominently. Ethics, principles and justice serve as an edifice undergirding a unified approach to a highly diverse world comprising pluralistic groups and nations.

Another important step towards resolving global and regional issues is leadership and good governance. Effective leaders contribute positively to the development of their societies and work closely with others to establish peace and security for all people. Good leaders are those who serve their people in a participatory way to ensure cooperation and unity and to extend assistance to others via knowledge creation, information dissemination, investment expenditure, resources sharing and peaceful coexistence.

Peacekeeping on the Korean Peninsula through the United Nations*

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ABSTRACT:
This article is concerned with peacekeeping on the Korean peninsula through the United Nations. Its purpose is to examine the role assigned to the United Nations in dealing with the Korean question, and to evaluate the use and influence of the machinery of the organization as a means of facilitating a solution to the problem of peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

In studying the Korean question and peacekeeping in Korea, a divided Korean history and UN mission in Korea are reviewed. For them, the birth of the two Koreas and the permanent division of Korea, the Korean War, demand for dissolution of the United Nations Commission for Unification Rehabilitation of Korea, the role of the UN in the maintenance of peacekeeping on the Korean peninsula and dual admission for UN membership for the maintenance of peacekeeping are main focuses.

Realistically considering the existing differences in the social, political and ideological system of both the North and the South, the peaceful reunification of Korea is possible only when a durable peace has been established on the peninsula, and not the other way around as is persistently claimed by the North. Peace cannot be

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achieved without the unfailing will and determination of both parties to pursue it. Reducing tension through dialogue, constant reaffirmation of faith in the dialogue and legitimization of the existing peace system are some of the more realistic and most essential patterns of approach to conflict resolution.

At present, it is difficult to find positive developments concerning the Korean question in the UN. Considering the hopeless impasse that had developed in the UN, the majority of UN member-states appear to be in favor of seeking a solution for the Korean question through dialogue between North and South Koreans themselves. It is noted that the eventual solution of the problem of Korean reunification depends upon inter-Korean dialogue at the UN or elsewhere.

THE KOREAN QUESTION

The Korean question became an issue at the United Nations as a result of the failure on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to implement the Cairo Pledge of November, 1943 made by three wartime leaders, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek. They promised that in due course Korea would become free and independent. The Cairo Pledge was reaffirmed at Potsdom in July, 1945. But the allied victory over Japan, ending thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule in Korea, did not bring about a free and independent Korea. Instead, Korea was divided at the thirty-eighth parallel by the United States and the Soviet Union as a temporary military measure to facilitate their acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese troops. Subsequently, this temporary military demarcation line turned into an immovable wall that divided the Korean peninsula into North and South Korea.

The US decision to divide Korea was prompted by a sudden and rapid deterioration of the Japanese forces in the Pacific. On August 8, 1945, two days after the dropping of the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. The Soviet troops had already crossed into north-eastern Korea and two days thereafter, the Japanese emperor announced that he would accept the terms of total surrender, putting an end to the Pacific war. As a result, the US strategy changed from an invasion of the islands of Japan to the military occupation and disarmament of the Japanese army.

The decision of the US government at that time led to serious consequences in the Korean peninsula. At last, on June 25, 1950, North Korea launched the surprise invasion of the South with the military help of the Soviet Union. As a result of this Korean War, U.S. leaders failed to perceive Korea's strategic importance in case of limited war in the Korean peninsula.

Even though the war was temporarily stopped in terms of the agreement of the armistice in 1953, the Korean War brought about Korea's permanent division into two parts, the North

and the South. This was the beginning of the longstanding political and military competition between the two Koreas.

After the division of Korea, the Korean question of a free, independent, and unified Korea became one of the main issues at the UN. Although the General Assembly of the UN has not discussed the Korean question since 1976, the role of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula should by no means be considered as diminishing, not only because of the unique place that the UN holds on the Korean peninsula after the Second World War, but also because of the formal responsibility of the UN for maintaining peace and security as stipulated in its Charter. Indeed, were it not for the special relationship that exists between the UN and Korea, one may hesitate to discuss what the United Nations can do to seek a solution to the problem of the Korean peninsula, which appears to have been all but forgotten as an issue at the United Nations, especially since the UN is saddled with what some would regard as more pressing and dangerous problems today, such as the Iran-Iraq War, the continuous conflict in the Middle East, and the mounting tensions in southern Africa, to mention but a few issues.

In spite of the decreasing attention which the Korean question has been receiving at the UN recently, the division of Korea into two hostile regimes continues to threaten the peace and security of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, a renewed attention of the UN to the problem of peace in Korea is warranted. If so, what can the UN do to find a solution to the problem of peace and security on the Korean peninsula? The purpose of this paper is to examine the role assigned to the UN in dealing with the Korean question, and to evaluate the use and influence of the machinery of the organization as a means of facilitating a solution to the problem of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. The term, the Korean question, will be used throughout to mean not only the problem of maintaining peace and security, but also the issue of Korean reunification, which is the basic condition for peace and security on the Korean peninsula.

THE BIRTH OF THE TWO KOREAS AND PERMANENT DIVISION OF KOREA

Early in November 1947, the US formally laid the matter before the international body. A UN committee heard the American delegation recommend the establishment of a United Nations Commission to oversee an election in Korea to create a representative government which would then negotiate for the withdrawal of American and Russian troops. The Soviet delegation introduced a counter-resolution, calling for Soviet and American troops to leave Korea by the end of the year so as to allow the

Koreans to set up a government 'without foreign intervention.' The Russian proposal was voted down; the American plan won approval.

On November 13, the Soviet delegation, in a speech to the UN Assembly, strenuously opposed the impending intervention of the part in voting on the resolution. However, an adviser to the state Department argued for the US position before the Assembly, urging adoption of the resolution.

The next day, November 14, 1947, the General Assembly voted forty-three to zero, with six abstentions, to inject itself into the Korean peninsula.[1] In an important resolution the Assembly created a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe free and secret elections, and recommended these elections be held not later than March 31, 1948, on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot, with the goal of choosing a national assembly. The General Assembly also recommended that, immediately after establishment of a national government, arrangements be made with the occupying powers for a complete withdrawal of their armed forces from Korea.

Despite the Soviet Unions' opposition to its activities, the UNTCOK began its work in Seoul from January 1948. However, the UN Commission soon realized that it would not be able to execute its programme in North Korea: when it informed the military commanders in both zones of its wish to pay them courtesy calls, the Soviet commander in Pyongyang did not even accept its letter.[2] As a result, UNTCOK resolved to consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly as to what was the best course of action.

It was obvious that without Russian cooperation, there would be no nationwide elections in Korea. Rhee Sung Man, first President of the Republic of Korea, who had expressed doubts about getting Soviet cooperation, urged the UN to go ahead with separate elections in the South. The UNTCOK, on February 11, 1948, queried the US body on whether it should go ahead and observe elections in that part of Korea occupied by the US.

The US government decided that there was no other choice, and the American representative to the UN urged the Interim Committee to proceed with elections where

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[1] Carl Berger, "The Road to the United Nations," *Readings in Contemporary Political Science* (Seoul, Korea: Pak Yong Sa, 1982), p. 211.
[2] U.N. Document, A/575, add. 1, p. 8.

possible. Acting upon this, on February 28, 1948, UNTCOK in Seoul aimed to observe elections in those areas accessible to it. Several days later the UNTCOK announced it would monitor South Korean elections, to be held not later than May 10, 1948.[3]

The task of state building was completed in both halves of Korea in the course of 1948. In the south, a UN-supervised election took place, a constitution was adopted, and a separate government from the Republic of Korea (ROK) was founded on August 15, 1948. In the north, a constitution was adopted early in 1948, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was officially proclaimed on September 9, 1948. The rival regimes forwarded conflicting claims for political legitimacy. South Korea, for instance, claimed that the establishment of the ROK was 'legitimate' because it was based on a UN-supervised election held throughout South Korea and because it was subsequently recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as 'the only and lawful government of Korea.'

North Korea, on the other hand, claimed that its government was 'legitimate' as it represented the interests of all Korea, and that the establishment of the DPRK in September 1948 was based on an election in North Korea and also an underground plebiscite held in the south. North Korea criticized the US decision to refer the Korean issue to the UN as ultimately responsible for perpetuating Korean partition. Neither side of divided Korea, therefore, was prepared to recognize the reality of separate political regimes in Korea or to accept the counterpart government as 'legitimate.'

In fact, ever since the government of the DPRK was established, one of the most important foreign policy objectives it has persistently pursued has been the search for legitimacy. The ROK was established almost one month earlier in Seoul under the auspices of the UN. That the government in the south was born with the blessings of the world organization presented North Korea with what appeared to be an insurmountable disadvantage in the competitive claim to legitimacy. Indeed, the major thrust of Pyongyang's foreign policy efforts since then has been concentrated on overcoming this disadvantage, on taking the halo of the UN away from South Korea and establishing itself as a legitimate government representing the entire Korean peninsula.

THE KOREAN WAR (1950 -1953)

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War was provoked by the surprise attack of North Korea against South Korea. Both the US and the United Nations Commission on Korea

[3] State Department, Korea 1945 to 1948 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 70-71.

informed the UN that South Korea had been attacked that morning by North Korean forces. The Security Council called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon North Korea to withdraw its armed forces to the 38th parallel without delay.

Two days later, it recommended that members furnish such assistance to South Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area. The US announced on that same day that it had ordered its air and sea forces to give cover and support to the troops of the South Korean government and, later, that it had also authorized the use of ground forces.[4]

Fifty-one member states expressed support for the stand taken by the Council, while five, including the USSR, together with the People's Republic of China, shared the view that the June 27 resolution was illegal, because it had been adopted in the absence of two permanent members of the Council, the People's Republic of China and the USSR. The Soviet Union declared that the events in Korea were the result of an unprovoked attack by South Korean troops and demanded the cessation of United States intervention.[5]

In response to the June 27 Security Council resolution, 16 UN Member States sent troops to Korea, which transformed the conflict into a struggle between the DPRK and UN forces. In order to coordinate this assistance, the Security Council adopted on 7 July 1950 a further resolution which reads as follows:

The Security Council…

Recommends that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operation against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

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[4] Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence*, Second Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1984), p. 178.
[5] Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946-1967, Documents and Commentary* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 173-175.

The UN force that went to the assistance of the ROK following the DPRK attack was in the beginning composed exclusively of US forces and never comprised more than a relatively small number of men from other Members. While it was constituted and functioned under Security Council resolutions, it was under United States command, was largely financed by the United States, and the United Nations exercised very limited control over its actual operations.[6] Furthermore, the national military contingents and other assistance were sent specially to Korea for the purpose of repelling the North Korean armed attack and restoring international peace and security in that area.

Meanwhile, on October 7, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 376 (v) which recommended that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea," established the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK),[7] which reaffirmed as the objectives of the UN in Korea, the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea and recommended that the UN forces should not remain in Korea other than for the objectives stated and that all necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea.

By the time the Chinese People's Volunteers crossed the Yalu River in October, 1950, rescuing North Korea from the brink of defeat, the Soviet Union had returned to its permanent seat in the Security Council and was able to veto a draft resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Chinese forces.[8]

In accordance with the experience gained during the early stage of the Korean War, the UN General Assembly passed on November 2, 1950, 'the Uniting for Peace Resolution.'[9] They were:

- The presence in the affected area of a UN authority (the UN Commission on Korea) which was able to provide immediate, unequivocal, and official evidence that aggression had occurred.
- The presence, almost on the spot, of American armed forces whose aid, inadequate as it was, enabled the South Koreans to avoid being completely submerged by the first wave of invasion.

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[6] Chong-Ki Choi, "Re-evaluation of the Peace-Keeping Operations of the U.N.," in the Institute of International Peace Studies (ed.), *Search for Causes of International Conflicts and Ways to Their Solutions* (Seoul, Korea: Kyung Hee University Press, 1988), p. 480.
[7] *Year Book of the United Nations* (hereafter *YBUN*), 1950, pp. 280-283.
[8] Jacobson, op. cit., p. 179.
[9] H. G. Nicholas, *The United Nations as a Political Institution*, Fifth Edition (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 52-53.

- The absence from the Security Council not only of the formal aggressor (North Korea was not even a member of the UN) but also of her Great Power champion.

The resolution made it possible for the General Assembly to obtain authority to recommend that member nations take collective measures including the use of military force in case the Security Council was unable to fulfill its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in the absence of unanimous agreement among its permanent members.

On February 1, 1951, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 498 (v) naming the People's Republic of China as an aggressor in Korea.[10] On May 18, 1951, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 500 (v) concerning the "additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea," and recommending that every state apply an embargo on the shipment of strategic materials to the People's Republic of China and North Korea.[11]

In the meantime, the Korean War reached a complete stalemate. In June 1951, a series of negotiations for an armistice began, and finally the UN and Communist sides managed to agree that wounded and sick prisoners of war would be exchanged. On April 18, 1953, the General Assembly adopted, with the unanimous support of the 60 member nations, Resolution 705 (vi) calling for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war.[12]

When the war came to an inconclusive end on July 27, 1953, it was the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command who signed the Armistice Agreement with the commanders of the North Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. Under the provision of Paragraph 60, article of the Armistice Agreement, the military commanders of both sides were called upon to recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three months after the Armistice Agreement was signed and became effective, the convening of a political conference at a higher level between both sides be held by representatives, appointed respectively to settle through negotiating the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other items.[13]

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[10] Jacobson, op. cit., p. 179.
[11] Louis B. Sohn, ed., *Causes on United Nations Law* (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd., 1959), p. 526.
[12] *YBUN*, 1953, pp. 113-114.
[13] Higgins, op. cit., pp. 296-310.

The General Assembly subsequently approved the 'implementation of Paragraph 60 of the Korean Armistice Agreement' Resolution 711 (vii),[14] and a political conference was convened in Geneva lasting from April 26 to June 15, 1954, but no substantial progress was made.[15]

DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES

The focus of the Geneva Conference centered on the unification formula and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The UN side maintained that it had the right to supervise an all-Korean election and should not withdraw the United Nations Force until a united government in Korea was established. The ROK, in consideration of the legitimacy of the Republic, later accepted the UN view. But North Korea opposed an all-Korean election under UN supervision and insisted on the withdrawal of foreign troops before election.

Elaborating on the demand for departure of the UN forces, Huh Dam said in the report,[16]

The forcible occupation of South Korea by the American imperialists is the fundamental barrier blocking the unification of Korea, is the cause of all the pain and unhappiness suffered by our people, as well as a factor contributing to tension and threat of war on the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, withdrawal of the aggressive forces of the American imperialists is a prerequisite to the alleviation of tensions, elimination of threat of war, and realization of peaceful unification. In the presence of alien troops, no genuine peace can be expected, nor can the people express their rightful opinion. In this view, it is necessary to withdraw the aggressive forces of the American imperialists from South Korea in the first place for the peaceful unification of the fatherland.

North Korea's demand for withdrawal of the UN forces, the Reds hope to clear themselves of the brand of aggressor—a brand which is bound to remain implicit as long as the UN forces stay in Korea—and at the same time to create a state of military vacuum in the South.

North Korea has adopted the 'theory of revolutionary unification' as a basic strategy toward the issue of national unification. 'Revolutionary unification' means unification by force under communism. As long as 'revolutionary unification' remains its basic strategy, North Korea needs military strength sufficient to invade the South.

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[14] *YBUN*, 1953, pp. 127-128.
[15] S.S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 260-262.
[16] *Road to Peaceful Korean Unification* (Seoul, Korea: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1973), p. 72.

The demand for the withdrawal of UN forces, despite these enormous military forces in the North, is a carefully calculated scheme to shake the equilibrium of power on the Korean peninsula by one-sidedly reducing the military strength of the South, with a view to creating a foothold for the accomplishment of communization of the South.

The minute the equilibrium of military strength is shaken between the North and South, dark clouds of war will surge over the Korean peninsula, as was the case in the Korean War. North Korea perpetrated the invasion of the South in the Korean War because its military strength was vastly superior to that of the South. Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, the Soviet Union, in consultation with North Korea, unilaterally announced that it would withdraw its forces completely from the North, and asked the US to pull its troops out of the South, too. This, of course, was a carefully conceived plot to leave the South powerless prior to the North's invasion.

At that time, some South Koreans, fresh from prolonged Japanese occupation, were sentimental nationalists, and wrongfully believed that withdrawal of alien forces would bring about national unification automatically.

North Korea was confident that the US would have to withdraw its forces from Korea under public and political pressure, under a propaganda barrage claiming that "now that the Soviet forces have been withdrawn, the American troops should leave Korea, too" taking advantage of sentimental nationalism on the part of some Koreans.

North Korea laid down a set of preconditions to the realization of national unification whenever it had the opportunity, and those conditions have always included the withdrawal of American forces. The North Koreans alleged that the American troops in Korea form a barrier blocking national unification or a cause contributing to the threat of a new war. Needless to say, these allegations are all without validity or justification.

First, the US forces presently stationed in the South are not an alien invasion force as alleged by North Korea, but a UN police force dispatched to Korea under a resolution of the US to deter aggressors and safeguard peace. The UN force, therefore, cannot give up its original mission at least until there is a firm guarantee that there will be no further provocation of aggression, and lasting peace is restored on the Korean peninsula.

It is quite ridiculous to argue that the UN forces in Korea are the cause of the threat of a new war. Since the UN forces are in Korea with the mission of deterring

aggression, they are a 'bulwark of peace' against aggressive or provocative acts perpetrated as part of a scheme to communize the South by force.

The UN, as an international peacekeeping organization, is the most effective and authoritative security institution of the world. Article 1 of the UN Charter gives the principal mission of the UN as "taking collective action for maintenance of the peace and security of the world."[17] It was this noble mission that made the UN, in a decision of the Security Council, send forces to Korea following the outbreak of the Korean War.

Second, the North Korean call for unconditional withdrawal of UN forces is unrealistic and dangerous especially at this time when the UN forces help form an equilibrium of power and therefore are vital to the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

The withdrawal of the UN forces from Korea will pose a serious problem to the enforcement of the Armistice Agreement in Korea, for the UN force is a party to the truce agreement. Of course, the armistice agreement itself will remain valid even after the departure of the UN forces, because they signed it for the UN which, therefore, is ultimately responsible for the treaty. Nonetheless, absence of one of the parties to the treaty will actually have the effect of putting the agreement into question, giving rise to confusion on the maintenance of the truce which, in turn, will create a grave threat to peace on the Korean peninsula.

DEMAND FOR DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK)

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) is an organization of the UN established under a UN resolution for the purpose of helping to reunify and rehabilitate Korea. In case general elections were held in North and South Korea for the establishment of a unified government after North Korea accepted the UN resolution, UNCURK would fulfill its mission of supervising the elections as a UN agency supporting the unification of Korea.

Therefore, North Korea has always demanded the dissolution of UNCURK whenever it called for the withdrawal of the UN forces. It is to cover up its responsibility for freezing the national division through boycott of unification by means of general elections in the North and South, and to turn the issue of unification

[17] Article 1, Para 1 of the United Nations Charter.

into an internal question, thereby providing a setting for the eventual communization of the South. The 'independent methods' referred to in North Korean utterances mean unification of the peninsula under communism by means of armed invasion or violent revolution in the South.

The North Koreans call UNCURK a 'foreign influence' because they believe the presence of UNCURK in the South obstructs their schemes. It is utterly contradictory and fictitious for the Communists in the North to object to UNCURK as a 'foreign influence' compared with such episodes as the Communist support under Moscow's goading to place Korea under trusteeship of three world powers after national liberation.

In fact, it is unreasonable for North Korea to demand dissolution of UNCURK, and to call UNCURK a foreign influence. UNCURK has been functioning in Korea under a resolution of the UN with the purpose of helping Korea realize unification and rehabilitation. Therefore, South Korea does not want to see UNCURK dissolved but wants rather that UNCURK enter North Korea and fulfill its mission there, too, of peacekeeping in the Korean peninsula.

At the 28th United Nations General Assembly in 1973, a compromise to avoid a vote on the two rival draft resolutions on Korea was reached. The General Assembly agreement urged both North and South Korea to continue their dialogue to expedite peacekeeping in Korea. The only substantive decision in the consensus was the dissolution of the UNCURK. It is important to note that the way in which the accord was reached signified the inevitable dependency of both North and South Korea on the major powers regarding peacekeeping in Korea.

THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEKEEPING ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Although it is difficult to assess the role of the UN as a facilitator of peace on the Korean peninsula, there appears to be substantial correlation between the political orientation of the Organization's membership and the substance of proposals for the solution of the Korean question. For instance, as UN membership has increased with the admission of a number of radical Afro-Asian nations, resolutions on the Korean question supported by them have increasingly been critical of the position of the US and South Korea. The establishment of an analytical framework to discover and test such correlations would be useful for the study of the UN role in the maintenance of peace on the Korean peninsula.

It is the General Assembly that has been the main forum for the Korean debates and where the rival forces have sought to mobilize support for their points of view. Nearly several decades of the Korean debates in the General Assembly, however, yield no solution. In fact, the Korean debates reached a point where the reputation of the General Assembly was seriously tarnished when it adopted mutually incompatible draft resolutions in 1975, contributing little toward the settlement of the Korean problem. As a result, it might be wise to look elsewhere within the UN for future progress toward resolving this problem.

The Security Council will certainly play a role in the maintenance of peacekeeping on the Korean peninsula, not only because of its formal responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as stipulated in the Charter of the UN but also because of its responsibilities connected with the United Nations Command, which was established as a result of its resolution of June 25, 1950, adopted immediately after the North Korean aggression on South Korea. In recent years, the United Nations Command has become a subject of much controversy, and if, as demanded by the Soviet bloc and the radical Afro-Asian group, it were to be dissolved, the Security Council will inevitably be involved, in that the United Nations Command, which is responsible for the preservation of peace in the area, cannot possibly be terminated without the Security Council's approval.

The Security Council cannot avoid its involvement for another reason. An uneasy peace on the Korean peninsula has been maintained under the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953. Yet, in the view of North Korea, the present state of armistice is inadequate for not merely the reduction of tension but also a durable peace in Korea. Consequently, North Korea has argued for the dissolution of the United Nations Command and for the conclusion of a peace agreement which will replace the Armistice Agreement. In response, the US and South Korea have insisted on maintaining the Armistice Agreement as the condition indispensable for the preservation of peace in Korea.

Quite apart from the probable involvement of the Security Council in the problem of peace in Korea, however, the voting arrangement in the Council, which requires permanent members' unanimity on substantive issues, makes it unlikely that it can be an effective organ for dealing with the Korean question. If the Security Council were to become involved in the future discussion of the problem of peace in Korea, it is not unreasonable to expect a disagreement among the powers concerned. Among them there are permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Russia, and

China) each of whom may likely exercise its veto power to prevent the adoption of a resolution not amenable to its interest. In short, the effectiveness of the Council in dealing with the problem of peace in Korea is in doubt, and for this reason, the Security Council may be disposed of as an alternative organ to be used for the settlement of the Korean question.

There is, then, a possibility that the good offices of the Secretary General of the UN can be utilized. The Charter of the UN has granted to the Secretary General a political power beyond that given to any other international official. The legal basis for this power can be found in Article 99 of the Charter, which gives the Secretary General the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten peace and security.[18]

In addition, the Secretary General's position as the most prestigious international official and his duty to make an annual report on the work of the UN provide him with a unique opportunity to air his views on important international problems. Moreover, Article 99 implies a mediatory function of the Secretary General which can be exercised discreetly and impartially in order to ease international friction and with a view toward suggesting a settlement of international disputes.

Does the Korean question warrant mediation of the Secretary General? The ad hoc nature of UN peacekeeping missions generally requires the UN Secretary General to be responsible for administering the operations.[19] Indeed, upon realization that his good offices would be able to facilitate the process of inter-Korean dialogue designed to resolving the issue of reunification, Kurt Waldheim, a former Secretary General of the UN (1971-81) accepted the invitation to visit both North and South Korea. During his visits to Pyongyang and Seoul, May 2-5, 1979, Waldheim conferred with the officials of Park Chung Hee concerning their efforts to bring about the reunification of their divided nation. After the conversation with these leaders, Waldheim voiced his willingness to assist in whatever way possible to advance the process of inter-Korean negotiation to achieve reunification, while conceding that the consensus in the UN was that only the Korean people can solve the problem of the peaceful reunification of their divided country.[20]

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[18] Article 99 of the United Nations Charter.
[19] Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Future of Peacekeeping*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, no. 2 (New York: International Peace Academy, Inc., 1989), p. 10.
[20] Chong-Ki Choi, "The Role of the United Nations and the Korean Question," in Tae-Hwan Kwak, Chonghan Kim, and Hong Nack Kim (eds), *Korean Reunification* (Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University Press, 1984), p. 280.

What is the implication of Waldheim's visit to Korea for the future role of the Secretary General of the UN with regard to the Korean question? While the Secretary General's conversation with the two Korean leaders did not produce any concrete results with respect to the reunification issue, it must nevertheless be viewed as a significant development in the history of UN involvement in the Korean question.

DUAL ADMISSION FOR UN MEMBERSHIP FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEKEEPING

South Korea applied for membership to the UN on January 19, 1949 and the North Korean regime followed suit on February 10 of the same year. The UN Security Council voted on April 8, 1949, 9 to 2 to recommend South Korea's admission, but the Soviet Union vetoed it.[21] The Security Council at the same time voted down, 2 to 8, North Korea's application for admission.[22] Nevertheless, South Korea's application for membership was endorsed by the 4th United Nations General Assembly on December 22, 1949, in a resolution advising the Security Council to approve South Korea's admission into the world body.[23]

In the meantime, the Seoul government opposed neither North Korea's admission into the international organizations nor its entry into the UN together with South Korea. On the other hand, the Pyongyang government kept its position not to enter the UN separately and that the North and the South should enter as one state at least under the name of the 'Confederal Republic of Koryo.' At the same time, Pyongyang rejected the simultaneous entry of North and South Korea into the world organization on the surface, while actually seeking admission in effect, and trying to open a permanent mission to the UN.

The North Koreans turn their back on simultaneous admission under an illogical and contradictory pretext. The reason is more than clear. The Communists have managed to gain advantages comparable to UN membership from admission to the world organization. This has opened the way for obtaining entry into other specialized agencies of the UN, and enabled them to open a permanent mission at the UN.

Another reason for opposing simultaneous admission is that they would be able to engage in various propaganda activities at the UN, free from numerous restrictions

[21] Ibid., p. 281.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

such as the peacekeeping obligations required of UN member nations, while enjoying nearly the same benefits as UN membership.

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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The most important function of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN was established as a peace maintenance organization under the expectation that cooperation among the great powers would continue in the postwar period, but the bipolarization of power has influenced the operation of the UN even more than the language of its Charter.

What is meant by peace? Does it merely mean the absence of military conflict? The whole direction and emphasis of UN actions would be different, depending on how peace is defined. But the UN Charter does not spell out the meaning of peace although it provides for the various approaches to the maintenance of international peace and security. As a result, there has been no consensus on the concept of peace among Member States. The different concepts of peace which the superpowers have held stem not only from ideological or strategic rivalries but also from the nature of the peace that is not defined.[24] Indeed, it is this 'undefined' peace that has caused much confusion in the UN, and for this reason its actions for peace have inevitably become ambiguous and indecisive.

It has often been held that peace can be maintained on the basis of compromise, assuming that political compromise among the major powers helps to preserve their unity in the maintenance of peace and security. However, the problem with this idea lies in the mistaken assumption of common interest by the major powers in peace. The common interest in peace is unreal. In reality there is no real common interest in peace at all.

The UN Charter provides various means of resolving international disputes and conflicts in consideration of multiple causes of war. Theoretically, the UN is to function as such as an impartial body. In practice, it has not successfully fulfilled its task. The Security Council, one of the UN organs which is assigned the task, has often failed to form fact-finding missions or investigate disputes or conflicts due to the veto of the permanent members. The General Assembly, another organ in charge of the task, has also not functioned effectively in this regard because the Third World has often passed resolutions demanding the investigation of disputes or conflicts despite the opposition of the parties concerned.

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[24] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 447.

In short, the fact-finding function of the UN is hampered by the minority in the Security Council, the majority in the General Assembly and the powerlessness of the Secretary General. As a result, serious threats to Korean peace developed which the UN, already weakened by the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to agree, was quite incapable of handling effectively.

The Charter of the UN contains specific provisions for an international military force to combat an aggressor. However, these provisions have never been used despite the several cases of aggression which have occurred. Only in one case of Korea, did the organization take military action against the aggressor, but it did so without relying on the specific provisions on military forces in the Charter.

The experience in Korea has demonstrated the feasibility of the UN action based upon the voluntary contribution of contingents by Member States pursuant to a recommendation by the Security Council. But it was felt that this had been made possible in the cause of the Korean War only by three accidental facts. First, the UN Commission was already present on the scene. Second, forces of Member States which could be made quickly available were already present in the area. Third, one of the permanent members was absent from the Security Council. Since this situation might not repeat itself in the event of any further aggression, it was proposed that the General Assembly be put in a position to recommend collective measures and to draw upon national contingents made ready in advance.[25]

In the case of the Security Council action against the aggression in Korea, the character of the UN action was symbolic as much as it was real, because the US supplied most of the forces and exercised most of the control. As far as the possibility of using the UN for collective security was concerned, the Korean case was an encouragement in the maintenance of peacekeeping.

CONCLUSION

Realistically considering the existing differences in the social, political and ideological system of both the North and the South, the peaceful reunification of Korea is possible only when a durable peace has been established on the peninsula, and not the other way around as is persistently claimed by the North. Peace cannot be achieved without the unfailing will and determination of both parties to pursue it. Reducing tension through dialogue, constant reaffirmation of faith in the dialogue and legitimization of

[25] Finn Seyested, *United Nations Forces* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1966), p. 41.

the existing peace system are some of the more realistic and most essential patterns of approach to conflict resolution. This fact was stressed in the UN consensus statement which called for a continuation of the dialogue and a widening of exchanges and cooperation between the North and the South.

Both North and South Korea must remember the spirit and principles of the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique which they signed. Peace must be maintained on the Korean peninsula by all means. And the North and the South should neither interfere with the other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against the other, thus allowing for the peaceful coexistence between both systems. This reduction of tension and hostilities is the initial step toward the promotion of mutual relations, peaceful coexistence, and the unification of Korea.

North Korea claims that unification must be achieved completely without outside assistance whereas South Korea insists that the United Nations command and not be regarded as an 'outside force.' South Korea has also favoured a gradual, functional and step-by-step approach, and stressed the need for removal of long-standing distrust and misunderstanding between the two Koreas.

At present, it is difficult to find positive developments concerning the Korean question at the UN. Considering the hopeless impasse that has developed at the UN, the majority of UN Member States appear to be in favour of seeking a solution of the Korean question through dialogue between North and South Koreans themselves. It is noted that the eventual solution of the problem of Korean reunification ultimately depends upon inter-Korean dialogue, whether at the UN or elsewhere.

Diplomatic Training: Options and Opportunities

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Most people would agree that a craft skill cannot be taught through an academic process; it can only be learnt on the job, or by way of apprenticeship. If diplomacy is essentially a craft, is it exempted from the above principle? A British philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, not particularly interested in diplomacy as a subject, wrote some decades back that diplomacy belongs to a class of practical knowledge that 'exists only in practice' and that 'the only way to acquire it is by apprenticeship to a master'.[1] At that time, a good number of diplomatic services did not offer any formal induction training to new entrants; but even in those days, several others operated elaborate training programs. With the passage of time, the pendulum has decidedly swung in favor of structured training, both at the entry stage, and even more important, at mid-career and senior levels. So was Oakeshott in error? Let us come back to this question at the end of this examination of the options and opportunities in diplomatic training.

The Vienna-based association of diplomatic academies, with an expanding membership of some 70 institutes, representing foreign ministries around the world, testifies to the growth in training facilities in diplomatic services. These training institutions typically cater to their own personnel; a good number of them also offer training facilities to diplomats from other countries (e.g. China, Egypt, Germany, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Switzerland, and many others). Universities and specialized institutes in a few countries (e.g. in Austria, China, Malta, Russia, UK, US) offer courses in diplomacy at MA and diploma levels that enjoy a high reputation. Small private institutions offering training to diplomats have also mushroomed, based in London, Geneva, Washington DC, and other places that hold large concentrations of diplomats; they usually work as profit-making entities; their academic and professional standards are of variable quality.

[1] Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics*, (Methuen, London, 1962).

In 2004-05, Ambassador and Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Chile, Rolando Stein, carried out a survey of diplomatic training around the world; Ambassador Stein presented a summary of that exhaustive survey to a conference on foreign ministries held at Geneva on May 31-June 1, 2006.[2] He is working on publishing that analysis.

One unusual entity in this field is the DiploFoundation, created jointly by the governments of Malta and Switzerland, a not-for-profit institution, having no 'captive' clientele unlike the academies run by foreign ministries. It draws its student-participants from all continents, on the basis of the quality and relevance of its courses, and is continually tested at the marketplace. It now offers university-recognized diploma level and MA courses. Its USP is text-based e-learning, in which it has been a pioneer.[3] The mission of the DiploFoundation is to assist all countries, especially those with limited resources to participate more meaningfully in international relations; at the end of 2006 it had 673 alumni from 141 countries. There also exist a small number of private establishments that offer diplomatic training on a commercial basis, including teams of consultants who have established a reputation for excellence. As we see below, Canada and the US have also accumulated vast experience in e-learning at foreign service training institutes.

We must also take into account the academic institutes, located in the US, the UK and a number of European countries that offer courses focused on diplomacy, at BA, MA and diploma levels (as distinct from the very many universities that run a variety of courses on international affairs). Several foreign ministries sponsor diplomats to attend such courses, a few at the entry stage (e.g. Japan), and many more at mid-career levels; usually the positions offered are limited in number, and the courses tend to concentrate on the academic dimension, rather than craft skills. Consequently, they are not usable by foreign ministries as a mainstream training option; cost and the rather lengthy duration of the courses is another inhibiting factor.

From the perspective of a typical foreign ministry, looking to improve its overall training for diplomats, what are the available options and opportunities? One way of examining this is to consider the levels of personnel for whom training is needed, and the different kinds of courses that can be conducted, by traditional methods and e-learning.

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[2] This paper is included in a book that the DiploFoundation is to publish by the end of February 2007, titled *Challenges for Foreign Ministries: Managing Diplomatic Networks and Optimizing Value*.

[3] This point came across at a one-day workshop on e-learning held at the British FCO in January 2004. A second workshop sponsored by the DiploFoundation was held in Geneva in May 2006.

This narration of contemporary training practices is based on the author's experience—35 years in the Indian Foreign Service, 11 years teaching at the Foreign Service Institute in New Delhi (involvement with training new Indian recruits, plus three or four courses each year for about 24 foreign trainees coming for eight-week programs, and special courses run for South African, Afghan, Iraqi Laotian and Palestinian trainees), plus seven years of developing courses and teaching at the DiploFoundation, besides lectures delivered in various countries.

We assume that the purpose of diplomatic training is not only to impart knowledge of international affairs, but train personnel in diplomatic craft skills. This core fact limits the degree to which academic training is of practical use for diplomatic services. A typical course in a university, focused on international affairs simply does not meet the needs for practical, hands-on training for this profession, though it may do much to develop analytical skills, and provide training in concepts and theory.

ENTRY-LEVEL TRAINING

Three training models for new service entrants can be identified.

1. *A full course at one's own institute*: On entry to the diplomatic service, this may entail full-time training for a year or so at one's institution—this is the model followed, among others, by Brazil, Chile, China, Germany, and India. It gives concentrated training, for an extended period. It has the virtue of a strong training focus, but also the disadvantage that the trainees cannot relate their learning with work experience, which they are yet to gain. Since typically the professional service entrants are fresh university graduates, they are usually keen to start 'real' work—their absorption capacity for academic learning is poor. Further, they find it hard to relate to craft skill presentations, because they simply do not have the work context to absorb this fully.

   In the late 1990s, Germany cut its entry-level training course from two years to one, in partial recognition of the need to speed up transition of new recruits into first jobs. Brazil runs a two-year course, but has recently decided to exempt this for those who hold master's level academic degrees. In China, while a year-long entry course at the Foreign Affairs University[4] is mandatory for new entrants, those who have graduated from this institution (usually

[4] This small university, with about 1500 students in BA, MA and Ph.D. programs, is a unique institution. It is run by the Foreign Ministry, and also runs special training programs for foreign diplomats. The author has had the privilege of regularly lecturing at this University.

around 30% of the intake) are exempted from this, and go straight to work in the Foreign Ministry. Most institutes that run courses of this kind have their own fulltime training faculty, and also use others on a part-time basis—like retired officials and academics. Thus running such institutes involves sizable investments.

But this method has one major advantage in countries where the intake comes from very broad academic catchments, not just the graduates of international affairs or political science.[5] It becomes essential to offer to such diverse groups a solid foundation in international affairs. No less vital is grounding in economics. Thus a 'foundation' course has the merit of offering this range of knowledge—as distinct from the craft skills mentioned earlier.

2. *Sandwich Courses*: In the countries utilizing this option, apart from an initial briefing-familiarization session that may last from two to six weeks, the new entrants are put to work at a desk job, and are pulled out from that during the first period of eight to 12 months to attend short, specific courses on the key themes. This is the practice followed by Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, UK, US and others. This method has the great merit that the class instruction and exercises are made relevant to the work experience of the new recruits, as this accumulates. Many of the courses are outsourced to specialists, either corporate trainers or to specialist who have developed material for the foreign service (the trainers are often former diplomats or those connected with the service). This means that the training entity can function as a virtual institute, essentially arranging training, but without a permanent faculty of its own; this saves on material and human resources.

Malaysia practises a variant that belongs to this category. Its new intake spends two to three years at the Foreign Ministry before going abroad on their first assignments. During this period they spend four months at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations. The skills covered are diplomatic writing, negotiations, media handling, cross culture communication, etiquette and grooming, English language, speech writing, economics, law, political issues; they also tackle a written assignment, individually or in groups. They go on a two-week assignment to a Malaysian Embassy abroad.

[5] In India we have noted continual diversification in the academic background of Foreign Service entrants; a typical 'batch' of 20 annual entrants now includes graduates in medicine, engineering, agriculture, and sometimes even in the veterinarian sciences. Ambassador Stein's global study offers a similar finding.

3. *Training at foreign institutions*: This is at best a second-level alternative, since foreign agencies cannot fully cater to one's own needs. It may be feasible to send a few to such outside courses, but sending a full year's intake abroad is not an option used by anyone, except for Japan which uses such courses for intensive foreign language training, coupled with exposure to international affairs. Of course, for any entity, if the option of special training at an institution like ENA in France or the Fletcher School or Harvard becomes available for a small number of officials, (e.g. by way of scholarships) this is worth pursuing.

An ideal compromise is to offer academic training for two to three months, focused on international affairs, economics, and issues specific to the home country. Thereafter, training in craft skills must go hand in hand with hands-on experience, i.e. a desk job at the foreign ministry for at least one year.[6] One would go so far as to say that it is impossible for new entrants to absorb the practical learning offered to them, until they begin to accumulate their own points of reference in relation to such training. In Delhi, we simulate diplomatic discussions so that new entrants get the hang of how to prepare a 'record of discussion'. But even the best of simulation is good only as far as it goes. On the other hand, if one has attended real diplomatic discourse, even a routine meeting between a foreign ministry official and a foreign diplomat, one begins to grasp the real meaning of what the injunction on noting down 'key words and phrases'; one is then able to identify these in the midst of a mass of verbiage and politesse.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

In many services, the new inductees are required to learn at least one foreign language; English is usually not counted for this purpose, even if it is not the principal language in that country. This may mean giving special English language training to those new recruits who are weak in this knowledge (Japanese recruits are given special training to ensure that their level of English reaches world class). In the British Diplomatic Service, there is a similar requirement for all officials at the diplomatic level to master French, besides other foreign languages. Singapore has tried to ensure that its new recruits are proficient in *Bahasa*, which gives linguistic access to both Indonesia and Malaysia, but it is not able to enforce this as an obligatory requirement.

It is a mistake to think that language and area expertise is a dispensable luxury for small services. It is essential that all new recruits, regardless of the size of the diplomatic

[6] In a few countries new entrants are sent off to work in embassies abroad, barely weeks after initial orientation at the foreign ministry. They get down to real work very rapidly, but without any understanding of how their system works from its headquarters, and missing out also on the chance to absorb learning from peer exchanges.

service, learn one major language (e.g. the UN languages, plus any language relevant to one's neighborhood). Languages are best learnt in one's youth, and they become the platform for area specialization, which is a vital need in any diplomatic service—except perhaps the very smallest services. Language training can be given in the home country, or at the first foreign assignment; where foreign language study is obligatory, it is customary to confirm new recruits only when they pass the language exam. Additionally, some reward should be given for language re-qualification, say at five-year intervals. Re-qualification in languages is essential to keep the investment in language study operational during that official's career.

Some argue that small services cannot always send language speakers to specific foreign countries—they are too small to permit such specialization. True, but even if for some of the time the right kind of language speaker is sent to a particular country, that will work to one's advantage. We also see increasingly, thanks to proliferation in multilateral and regional diplomacy, that a foreign language comes in handy in unexpected places, even outside the environment where it is the main lingua franca.

Many countries now work on the principle that foreign ministry support personnel, who occupy non-diplomatic posts when sent to embassies, also receive effective training. Support staff is now called upon to perform a wider range of tasks than before, and it is essential to devote attention to their training as well. This can be done by one's own full-scale training institute, or by a virtual institute. Here too, e-learning is a cost-effective option.

MID-CAREER AND PROFESSIONAL COURSES

Typically, such courses focus on imparting knowledge on the situation in the home country, and relation to international affairs, management, and economics. The British Foreign Office runs an on-line MBA, in partnership with an academic institution, for its diplomats. Even more vital is the need to raise the level of diplomatic skills; this means that the trainers must have practical experience. Such courses are needed at all levels. Some diplomatic services treat them as mandatory for promotions (e.g. Canada and the US).

Special attention has to be given in such training to specific skills—negotiation techniques, relationship management, investment promotion, export assistance, technical aid programs, multilateral negotiation, inter-cultural communications, culture work, administration, and the like.

Several options are feasible:

1. *In-house courses*: these may be run by one's own professionals, specialized trainers and other home agencies. They are usually run in the home capital but could also be conducted in a regional location for personnel in neighboring embassies.

   It makes sense to offer short, sharp courses, focused on specific topics, such as negotiation, economic skills and other professional subjects. Case studies, simulations, and scenario planning are particularly appropriate. Typically, the courses have to be developed or adapted in-house, since little is available off the shelf; collaboration among MFAs in developing course material is helpful.

2. *E-learning*: this is especially cost-effective, but demands good discipline and tight management for success. A workshop held in early 2004 in London by the British FCO showed that a large number of countries are beginning to use this internet-based learning method. One variant on this (used extensively by Canada and to some extent by the US as well) are 'self-paced' learning courses, which may involve minimal or no faculty intervention. These are especially good on specific subjects like document security or administration, but are also being used for diplomatic skill enhancement. Here again collaboration among MFAs is useful.

   One e-learning variation is 'just-in-time' short courses (the term comes from modern manufacturing, where a company cuts down on stockpiles of items needed for assembly, and gets these delivered by its sub-suppliers exactly when needed, sometimes even twice or more often in one day). Courses are available to officials taking up assignments, when they need this training—e.g. those posted abroad, or going to handle new tasks in areas such as consular or economic affairs, or needing special training on emerging global issues, as these issues take shape. The course delivery may be 'on-line', or in blended formats.

3. *Short courses in foreign institutes*: This is a good way of supplementing one's own training options. After some time it becomes easy to identify the ones that are best suited to one's own needs. They are offered by many countries, and it pays to try them out. Well-chosen corporate courses or 'executive management programs' can be a good option for a select number of officials.

4. *Academic 'sabbaticals'*: It is of utility to send a few officials each year to spend up to one year at places such as Harvard, the Fletcher School of Diplomacy or the London School of Economics, to pursue academic study, *provided* this blends in with the real needs of the ministry, say to study multilateral trade issues or negotiation technique. The US State Department each year sponsors about a dozen officials to obtain a Master's degree in economics, and Singapore is another practitioner of this option. It is vital to ensure (through a contract) that the official will not quit the service after such expensive sponsored studies.

The author's research over the past eight years shows that many diplomatic services had neglected training at the mid-career level; they are now working hard to introduce and expand such courses. One traditional view was that diplomats were trained at the start of their career, and that was sufficient; further learning would come from their work experience. Even Japan, with Thailand the most experienced diplomatic service of Asia, paid little attention to mid-career training until very recently. The new realization everywhere is that training helps to raise performance standards, and is a hallmark of the best diplomatic services.

It makes sense to open up such courses to officials of other ministries that are particularly concerned with external affairs—those from commerce, defence, finance, industry, the environment, transport and related agencies. It also makes sense to bring in representatives of business and even NGOs that have an external affairs related vocation. That helps professional diplomats to better understand the perspectives of these organizations, and indirectly helps the foreign ministry in its wider domestic outreach to its home stakeholders.[7]

COURSES FOR AMBASSADORS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS

Until some years back such courses hardly existed.[8] Today they are a key training element for countries such as Canada, China, Malaysia, UK and US; many more plan to

[7] At a recent 4-day training program in Delhi, conducted by an NGO and attended mainly by mid-level officials from several ministries, a candid discussion took place on the merits of having representatives of business and other sectors at that program. A few felt that they might not be able to speak as openly as they had, in the presence of a mixed group, but the majority view was that it would be an advantage and would permit peer exchanges. Indian agencies are now opening up to such mixed training, as never before, and this too is part of a wider trend.

[8] China has run such three-month courses for envoys since the 1950s, mainly on account of the fact that it had to appoint many ambassadors from the army and the provincial administration in the early years when it was establishing its diplomatic service. The US with its long tradition of non-career envoys has also long run a much shorter course of two weeks.

introduce such high level training. Often, such courses take the character of seminars, in which the participants learn from one another. Some foreign ministries balk at the notion of training their ambassadors; but it is a great mistake to imagine that these high officials are 'too senior' to attend training courses.[9] Rapid changes in the international environment and the craft requirements make these vital. For example, public diplomacy and building the country image (or 'brand') are new skills that have emerged in the past five years, and require the foreign ministry to operate in close harmony with other domestic partners. The same is true of handling of terrorism and security issues, and the close interconnections between the home and the international actors.

Such courses can only be conducted at home, essentially run by one's own personnel. A foreign ministry should include, in the training faculty *and* the course participants, home administrators, academics, think-tanks scholars, business leaders and others. Typical course duration might be as little as one week, but optimal use should be made of that time. For instance, Canada begins such courses with a stark narration of the hazards of financial and other misdeeds in embassies, to awaken ambassadors to their management tasks. Special emphasis is needed on human resource management, given that people are the only real resource that a diplomatic network possesses.

OTHER OPTIONS

One e-learning option that is useful is the 'self-learning course', consisting of a set of lectures that are supported by multimedia material (animation, film clips, verbal commentary), that is available either on a CD or can be accessed via a central server that is run by the foreign ministry. Such courses may cover basics such as document security or guidance on maintenance of property, or cover craft skills such as commercial or cultural diplomacy. The special advantage offered is that such courses are self-contained, available all the time, to be completed whenever an official wishes. Canada is a pioneer in the use of such material and has developed some 70 such courses; from simple ones to a comprehensive course that deals with inter-cultural management, at a high level of sophistication and with built-in tests that permit the participant to move to the next higher level. Every member of Canada International is required to pass this particular course. [10] The only investment is in the preparation of the course; it is thereafter available for use at any time, at zero additional cost.

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[9] This was a comment by diplomats from an Arab country. Similar conservative attitudes are encountered in other traditional settings.

[10] 'Canada International' is the short name for its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, a neat way of getting away from standard terminology.

A number of other points should be considered.

1. It is essential to include officials from the home administration in almost all diplomatic training courses (except perhaps those for fresh inductees). This widens mutual horizons for the civil servants and also indirectly builds better relations between the foreign ministry and home agencies. This also applies to the corporate world.

2. Non-diplomatic level officials must be included in the training courses because they provide vital support to embassies and because modern diplomatic management mandates better use of support staff. It is a weakness of the traditional systems that they underutilize their support staff.

3. One must particularly include locally engaged staff in training programs. More and more, local staff critically contribute to the performance of the system. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, UK and others increasingly use local staff to replace home-based officials at sizable cost savings; UK even deploys some of them as 'political officers' in very small embassies.

4. Annual conferences of ambassadors have a training value and can be developed in that direction with careful planning (e.g. as the Germans do). Not to hold such conferences on grounds of 'economy' is a serious miscalculation. While ambassadors can meet on a regional basis (say during a visit abroad by the foreign minister or the prime minister, or a conference held in a particular regional context), these are no substitute for the full conference of all envoys, held in the home capital.

5. All diplomats, regardless of level, should travel within the country to familiarize themselves with the changing scene and build personal contacts with chambers of commerce, corporates, thinktanks and academic institutions and others, and reach out to a range of domestic stakeholders. This action also serves the foreign ministry in improving its home outreach, which is a basic requirement in all situations today.

6. The practice of 'in' and 'out' placement of foreign ministry officials is another valuable device for building interconnections with home agencies and for widening mutual horizons among the diplomatic personnel and the home administrators. Empirical evidence shows this to be the hallmark of good systems.

A corporate dictum declares: 'training is not a cost but an investment'. The organization must calculate its 'ROI' (return on investment) in this as in other areas. Under the globally-recognized ISO system, a new international training standard has emerged, 'ISO 10015'. At least one foreign service training academy is in the process of getting itself qualified under this scientific standard—in the same way that the French Ministry of External Affairs has obtained ISO certification for its economic services and the Thailand Foreign Ministry for its consular services. This is surely a trend that will gain momentum in the years ahead.

Among the surveys that a diplomatic system might ideally carry out are the following:

- An assessment of perceived training needs in its own system, among the key departments, major embassies and also the key partner ministries.
- An assessment of all its officials who have attended training programs, many months and years after the conclusion of those programs, on the concrete value derived and the learning retained from participation in different courses. (A survey of a just concluded course is considered by experts to be of little value, since it is influenced by the 'happiness factor' and leads to false conclusions.)
- An assessment from its departments and embassies that have used the trainees, on their experience of the skills and knowledge that they have brought with them and the elements that are missing.

Without such surveys, the training program operates in limbo, isolated from reality. While the surveys provide the data, training policy has to depend on carefully conducted evaluation by the foreign ministry's top management, on the current and projected requirements. In today's complex international environment, training merits attention at the highest level.

CONCLUSION

By its nature, diplomatic training is *sui generis*, focused on specific professional skills. The training software is almost never available off-the-shelf and it is expensive to develop one's own material. One cannot get value from training experts from other fields, including the corporate world, though general advice on pedagogy is always relevant. Published information on diplomatic training in foreign ministries is seldom available. The small size of the market makes it unattractive for commercial enterprises that specialize in corporate training.

At the same time, diplomatic services can learn a good deal from one another—this is often neglected by foreign ministries. The key is to choose the right mix of countries

for such mutual learning. Sharing course materials, simulation exercise does take place, but there is ample scope for doing more. Entities such as the EU are ahead in the learning curve on such mutual exchanges, but the notion is only slowly gaining ground in other regional cooperation bodies.

The Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, a unique training institution with its historical experience, runs an annual series of meetings of diplomatic training institutions (mentioned earlier), traditionally held in Vienna and at an overseas location in rotation. This is a fine clearing house for new ideas, though the three-day meetings among so many participants perhaps do not permit more than broad discussion of major themes.

The annual meeting of the diplomatic training academies deans established by the 'ASEAN + 3' group is an excellent forum, and now that the 'East Asia Summit' group of 16 states has emerged (the original 13 member countries plus Australia, India and New Zealand), it is surely worthwhile to include them as well, the more so as they have valid experiences to bring to this Asian entity.

Let us now come back to diplomatic training in the way Professor Oakeshott posited the issue. Baumgartner's renowned knowledge theory identifies three categories: L1, which is factual knowledge or 'know that'; L2, which relates to procedure knowledge or 'know how'; and L3, which is social practice or 'knowledge in practice'. Applied to diplomacy, knowledge of international affairs, law, IR theory and the rest is factual knowledge but this just provides the base for the professional's expertise. The bulk of what he knows is in the category of L2, which is practical 'know how and do how'. And when applied well, these skills become L3, knowledge in action.

Even in the days of classic diplomacy, and in the Inter-War years of the first half of the 20th century that are captured in the famous writings of Harold Nicolson and Satow, diplomats were expected to demonstrate high personal virtue, plus a wide range of professional skills. The catalogue of demands made on them has only become longer with the rising importance new activities: economic and other promotional work, dealing with the media, outreach to stakeholders outside the charmed circles of the official interlocutors, public diplomacy, domestic outreach, country image management and the like.

In one literal sense, diplomats belong to the elites in their countries—not by their class origin or academic background but simply in the fact that each of them has been chosen out of a very large number of applicants. In some countries barely one in a

thousand applicants gets into the diplomatic service. This rigorous selection imposes a large obligation on them, to live up to expectations. We should couple such expectations, from the public and those that originate from the diplomats themselves, with the challenging work environment and its new demands; we must conclude that training is more central to the foreign ministry than ever before. For the top management of the foreign ministry, training is a core function that shapes its total performance.

Therefore, while this profession depends on knowledge in practice, the pace of events is such in contemporary times that the system simply cannot depend upon the slow accumulation of learning that took place a generation and more in the past, during one's career span, mostly under the mentorship of experienced envoys. While learning from example and mentorship remains important, the range of craft skills involved need to be put across in a structured fashion, which is possible only through organized training programs. Continual training is thus an absolute, indispensable necessity.

State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III

By Bob Woodward
Review by Zahid Rastam

State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
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The world now knows: that there were no WMDs in Iraq; that there were no links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda; that the United States did not adequately plan for post-Invasion Iraq; that the United States made the mistake of dismissing the old Iraqi Army and anyone affiliated to the Baath Party; that the United States did not want to recognize the existence of an organized insurgency; that even to this point, US policy in Iraq has essentially failed. The question arises then as to whether these mistakes were independent of each other, or whether they reflect a series of policy mishaps which built upon one another and which has led the United States and Iraq to where they are now. Bob Woodward, in his latest book, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III,* suggests the latter. He further implies that these mistakes were the result of a crippled policymaking process whereby dissident views were suppressed, and where decisions were made based on ideology and conviction, and not facts.

In supporting his view, Woodward illustrates in *State of Denial* the discussions which took place among the various individuals and government agencies involved in US foreign policy formulation from even before the first inauguration of George W. Bush up until mid-2006. The book necessarily gives more attention to the situation in Iraq in terms of US post-conflict management, and less so on the 'Global War on Terror'. As Iraq remains the main focus of US foreign policy, Woodward cannot escape from this fact. He relates, however, that despite evidence to the contrary, there continues to be a genuine belief among Bush and his close advisers that Iraq is only another front on the 'War on Terror', and as such, the US invasion and continued occupation of that country remains justified.

As can be seen in its title, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* is the third in a series of books which Woodward has authored on how the Bush Administration has

responded in facing the world following the 9/11 attacks. While the first book, *Bush at War*, recounts 9/11 and the handling of the War in Afghanistan, the second book in the series, *Plan of Attack,* deals with the reasoning used by Bush and his administration to invade Iraq. What sets *State of Denial* apart from the earlier books is that there is more in-depth examination of how the Bush Administration administered Iraq. Fundamentally, the 'State of Denial' implied in the title is one where negative assessments in Iraq were replaced with optimistic predictions. In other words, the denial by Bush and his administration was not only of the facts, but was a mindset locked into the idea of victory and success.

As with all of Woodward's books, the author writes in the present tense. Unlike an academic case study of presenting facts and drawing a conclusion based on these, Woodward describes events as a story. He provides dialogue, discussions and exchanges between different individuals, and conveys the feelings, assumptions, and thoughts of those individuals as if he himself was present—as an aide taking notes, a journalist with a tape recorder, or an intelligence officer who has gained trust and confidence. Woodward as an author is portrayed as also a narrator who is omnipresent, combining passages from first-person interviews with passages from third-person points-of-view.

In writing *State of Denial*, Woodward uses his influence and standing as a renowned journalist to elicit information from a variety of sources. Among the sources cited as speaking on the record are Donald Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defense, and Jay Garner, former Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq, US Department of Defense. Additionally, Woodward does not explicitly cite the following individuals, though the frequent quotes and references attributed to them would indicate that they were indeed sources: Andrew Card, former White House Chief of Staff; George Tenet, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Richard L. Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State; and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, former Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States. Interestingly, the other most important members of the US administration as antagonists in the story of US involvement in Iraq were not interviewed for this book: President Bush; Vice President Richard Cheney; and Condoleezza Rice, in her capacity as the former National Security Adviser and current Secretary of State. On the other hand, for L. Paul Bremer III, former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Woodward quotes directly from the former's own book, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.*

Woodward's style of writing, and sources he used places *State of Denial* as a book that is non-fictional in nature, yet written as a novel. It is a fast-paced read, suspenseful,

building into climaxes at parts. Yet as a work written to illustrate the very serious nature of policy and decision-making at the highest levels of a superpower, the book raises questions on the objectivity of the author. Woodward was not present during the various meetings and discussions he writes about, thus the depth of his writing could betray the human condition of forgetting events and words spoken, or misinterpreting body language and individual thoughts and feelings. In effect, while the reader is entertained and informed, *State of Denial* reads more like a Hollywood movie than a documentary.

Woodward's books usually proceed through a timeline based on the individuals he deems most important during that period. *State of Denial* is no different, and Woodward sets the tone with Bush's pre-inauguration and lack of foreign policy experience. From there, he moves to the choices made for various cabinet positions, and provides numerous pages on Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld's character is examined and portrayed more thoroughly than many of the other individuals involved. He is shown as being one who is arrogant, abrasive, dismissive of the uniformed military, the staff of the National Security Council (NSC), and the State Department. From this point onwards, the planning for the invasion of Iraq is taken away from the point of view of the White House, and is reflected in the efforts by Rumsfeld to ensure that the Department of Defense had the lead role both before and after the invasion. In this respect, Rumsfeld is seen as being disinterested in nation-building, an understood precondition for defeating an insurgency, and as one who would like to see the armed forces focus on what he thought to be tangible military threats.

In the immediate post-invasion portion of the book, Rumsfeld gives way to Jay Garner and subsequently to Paul Bremer. Jay Garner is portrayed by Woodward as being a capable manager hampered by different chains of command requiring him to report to Rumsfeld, but without the necessary military support to ensure security for vital civilian infrastructure in Iraq. Bremer, on the other hand, is portrayed as a Viceroy confined to the Green Zone in Baghdad, making decisions such as dismissing the old-Iraqi Army and anyone affiliated to the Baath Party on ideological grounds, without taking into account the view that such a move would feed into the insurgency.

As the insurgency continued to proceed, attention shifts then to Philip D. Zelikow, Counselor for the State Department, and then Andrew Card. Zelikow is portrayed as an objective observer who reports faults on US policy in Iraq, but to whom superiors refuse to listen. Card becomes a voice of reason in *State of Denial* as

being the person who tried to persuade Bush, unsuccessfully, to replace Rumsfeld, but who eventually resigns on the grounds that Iraq would be seen as a failure.

Throughout the book, other individuals are given prominent mention. Among them are US Army Major General James 'Spider' Mark, who realised from an early stage, as head of intelligence for the Iraq Invasion, that there was inadequate intelligence on alleged Iraqi WMDs. Condoleezza Rice is depicted as the loyal follower of Bush, always agreeing, and too weak to provide alternative views to Rumsfeld, thus undermining her position as the National Security Advisor. For the State Department, Armitage is revealed as a professional diplomat and civil servant who knew that mistakes were being made in Iraq, but whose position prevented him from garnering a larger influence in the policy-making process. In line with this, much of what is attributed to Colin Powell comes from Armitage.

In building his case on the 'State of Denial' within the Bush Administration, Woodward provides hints pointing in certain directions, but does not guide the reader as to which he believes the more important one to be. On the one hand, it is Rumsfeld's attitude that deters the military, the NSC and the State Department from giving their own objective views. On the other, it is Bush's own conviction of invading Iraq and 'Staying the Course', while dismissing the views of his advisers. Above all this, Woodward also suggests a defeatist thinking creeping into the administration and a malaise towards ever-increasing problems and continued unsuccessful solutions. Whatever the main causes may have been, Woodward implies that the US government policymaking process was crippled.

This book is recommended to the reader interested in the situation in Iraq, government policy making, and foreign policy formulation and implementation. *State of Denial* as a story ends in July 2006. For Woodward, the fault for Iraq lay in the mindset within the administration which looked straight but never to the sides and behind—indeed, a 'state of denial.' However, Woodward leaves it open to the reader to make his or her own conclusions as to whether or not a 'state of denial' did indeed exist.

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After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads

By Francis Fukuyama
Review by Azril Bin Abd Aziz

After the Neocons : America at the Crossroads
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ISBN: 13 978 1 86197 922 2

Many political scientists claim that the present day is the age of the neocons, the world will be shaped by their thoughts and that they are here to stay. On the other hand, things may be to the contrary, as the world that they are trying to change may not be that easily moulded. The rise of the neocons is linked primarily with the rise of American military might and the American doctrine of exceptionalism. Since the balance of power has shifted tremendously after the fall of communism and the Cold War, American supremacy is seen as unstoppable. Many would not have imagined the amount of criticism and repulsion the rest of the world would have for America and its neo-conservative foreign policy. *After the Neocons—America at the Crossroads* is a shocking and damaging critique on neoconservatism and the Bush administration by Francis Fukuyama, a well known prominent neoconservative himself (former neoconservative after this book).

Dr. Francis Fukuyama is a Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. Not a stranger to the field of international relations, he has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning politics, political theory, international relations, democratization and international political economy. He shot to fame when his book, *The End of History and the Last Man,* was published in 1992, which made the bestseller of over 7 countries and was translated into twenty foreign languages. He is also the author of *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (1995); *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (1999); and *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (2002), *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (* 2004). and his latest fame *After the Neocons* was published in March 2006. Dr Fukuyama, a former State Department official is a well known neoconservative, and has been known to rub shoulders and work together with other key neocons such as Paul Wolfowitz, Eliot Cohen and Gary Schmitt, which makes this new read highly provocative.

After the Neocons is an impressive book. In it, Fukuyama explores the United States' shift towards unilateralism after 9/11 and the link between Bush's policy and that of neoconservatism. Readers baffled by the history and surprised by the emergence of neoconservatism in the wake of 9/11 will be enlightened as Fukuyama's book offers by far the best detailed history of the birth of neoconservatism, with the profiles of academicians, thinkers and writers who shaped the neoconservative school of thought. Fukuyama's work is important and attracts great attention as he reveals the nature, study and history of neoconservatism. The background he provides is so stimulating and well-organized that it makes understanding neoconservatism an easy task, tracing the neoconservative lineage from Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell to Leo Strauss, Albert Wohlstetter to Paul Wolfowitz himself. Fukuyama also reveals his own beliefs and thoughts which identify him as a neoconservative. However, he exposes the distorted interpretation and association of a "new" neoconservative school which has been predominantly characterized by the Bush administration. This distortion from the traditional roots of neoconservatism has convinced him to renounce the school of thought and henceforth embrace a new ideological school which he coins "Realistic Wilsonianism".

In his book, Fukuyama also talks about what he terms "Islamic terrorists" and the Bush administration's outlook on the matter. He is wary of the misconceptions and the many distortions of Islam. He plainly states that such misconceptions are dangerous and that it is important to distinguish the various references of perceived threat, such as Islamist, radical Islamist, Islamic fundamentalist, Jihadism and the ordinary Muslim. This is important especially as the initial perception of threat emerges by linking radical Islamism with weapons of mass destruction. The misconception of Islam itself and linking it to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has only cultivated greater anti-American sentiments, in particular within the Middle East. He states his argument plainly, that "*Muslims don't dislike the United States or the West as such but rather dislike American Foreign policy*", citing examples that "*Muslims believe that the United States supports Israel one-sidedly against the Palestinians and supports Arab dictators*" which he points out is something "*a lot of Americans, and many neoconservatives in particular*"[1] would not want to hear. He relates that the linking of Islam with WMD, however, has propelled the Bush administration to apply preventive war as a remedy, thus the military move into Iraq. Fukuyama's unbridled antipathy for the military intervention in Iraq is evident as he categorically states that there was "*insufficient discussion of the proposition that rogue state proliferators, including Iraq, would be willing to donate or sell their nuclear weapons to terrorist groups*" and that "*circumstantial evidence linking Iraqi intelligence to the 1993 attack…could not be verified*".

[1] Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons : America at the Crossroads* (London: Profile Books, 2006), p. 76.

Fukuyama sets out to disparage the Bush administration by bluntly highlighting that the *"administration eventually stated for the record that there was no evidence linking Iraq to September 11"* [2].

Bush foreign policy has succeeded in pitting the rest of the world against the United States while at the same time irritating its closest allies. Fukuyama is right in believing that it will not be easy for the United States to recover the credibility it has lost. Such elementary blunders by the Bush administration is costly as America's integrity is at stake—considering that after the Iraq fiasco the Europeans may tread carefully after the massive anti-war demonstrations in Europe, while perception of the United States in the Middle East is at its lowest. As Fukuyama states, in the Arab world, *"the United States…has virtually no credibility or moral authority in the region"*[3]. The implication of Fukuyama's critique is as mischievous as it is tremendous, for it clearly establishes itself against neoconservatism and therefore the Bush administration. The most significant effect could probably be linked to the recent Democrat–Republican elections in the United States itself.

Fukuyama, like a doctor, not only identifies the history of the problem itself but also recommends the necessary prescription needed as a solution. He prescribes a lucid and comprehensive outline of a different kind of American foreign policy. He argues that *"preventive war cannot be the centerpiece of American strategy"*[4] and that America should shift its approach from unilateralism to multilateralism as well as the use of soft power, rather than hard power. Fukuyama admits the weakness of the United Nations and like many other Americans he joins the debate in disparaging the organization. He cynically states that the *"Security Council…was deliberately designed to be a weak institution"* and admits that *"the veto power enjoyed by the five permanent members guaranteed that the Security Council would never act contrary to their national interest*[5]*"*. As a solution, Fukuyama prescribes the need for the *"creation of new institutions and the adoption of existing ones to new circumstances"*. These competing and overlapping international organizations would foster legitimate and effective international action in what he calls *"multi-multilateralism*[6]*"*. Multi-multilateralism is Fukuyama's remedy for facing the various emerging challenges of the world.

Fukuyama is precise, analytical and succinct. The book is also provocative and radical in its criticism of the Bush administration and its foreign policy. The causal connection between neoconservatism and the Bush administration and its foreign

[2] Ibid., pp. 88–89.
[3] Ibid., p. 187.
[4] Ibid., p. 183.
[5] Ibid., p. 160.
[6] Ibid., p. 157–158.

policy has never been so clear, as Fukuyama makes a compelling case that entrenches the two. In many senses, this book is also Fukuyama's explanation for his departure from being recognized as a neoconservative due to his conclusion that neoconservatism has changed and his distasteful view of the Bush administration's foreign policy. In his own words, he says that *"I have concluded that neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something that I can no longer support"*[7].

His advice for America's future and his remedy of "multi-multilateralism" is a bold and definitely "out of the box" idea that merits further study and understanding. His idea of multi-multilateralism may be accepted and fit the American foreign policy mould; however, it may be extensively debated by others, especially staunch supporters of the United Nations.

By way of conclusion, this timely, holistic and vivid book is an essential read. It places itself beside the works of Kennan, Kissinger, Huntington and many other political thinkers who have shaped the world with their thoughts. Whatever it may be, *After the Neocons* is definitely a wake up call for US policy-makers and neoconservatives alike. This book is a searching reflection of America's foreign policy while exhibiting the failure of the neoconservative grand strategy of regime change and preventive war. America is definitely at the crossroads. After *After the Neocons*, it will be interesting to see which direction America chooses to take.

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[7] Ibid., p. ix.