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The Knowledge Management Launching Ceremony and Exchange of MOUs



The Knowledge Management Launching Ceremony was held at the Multipurpose Hall, Wisma Putra, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia on 14 February 2020. The event was graced by the Honourable Dato' Saifuddin Abdullah, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia. Also present were Datuk Wira Marzuki Yahya, the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dato' Amran Mohd Zin, the Ministry's Deputy Secretary General I, Vice Chancellors, and representatives from Universiti Malaya, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak, and Universiti Malaysia Sabah. Apart from the launching of the Ministry's Knowledge Management (KM) initiative,

there were also exchanges of copies of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between IDFR and Universiti Malaya (UM), Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS), and Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS). The event was attended by 150 attendees comprising of Wisma Putra officers, representatives from public universities, government agencies, and the media.

In his speech, Dato' Saifuddin Abdullah stressed the importance of knowledge and the need to manage it systematically for future reference. He also touched on the importance of the process of capturing, storing, and reproducing

tacit knowledge for the benefits of future decision-makings by officials of the Ministry on matters pertaining to diplomacy and international relations. The Minister applauded the co-operation and collaboration between IDFR and the Higher Learning Institutions in Malaysia in ensuring the knowledge on diplomacy and international relations is shared, circulated, and utilised by officials of the Ministry, academicians, and KM practitioners. He also touched on his aspirations pertaining to the KM initiative of the Ministry, as a platform for knowledge-sharing activities, which in future will benefit the officers of the Ministry and the public.

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Navigating the Samurai Bond and ‘Look East Policy 2.0’: A Deeper Malaysia-Japan Economic Partnership?

Norraihan Zakaria

Imran Hakim Mohamedsha

Upon his return to the premiership in May 2018, Tun Mahathir Mohamad has made six official visits to Japan to further strengthen bilateral relations. In one of the visits, the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, has reciprocated Malaysia’s wishes to reinforce economic partnership, particularly on exchanges in technical education, human resource competency, and technology transfers.¹ Consequently, the Japanese Government had offered financial assistance to Malaysia in the form of a low-interest, Tokyo-based, yen-denominated bond, or the Samurai bond, in November 2018. The bond, eventually issued in March 2019, was offered at an ultra-low interest rate of 0.65%, in which cheap access to capital market can finance infrastructure projects and alleviate Malaysia’s public debt concerns.² The renewed ties have arguably drawn a parallel with the Look East Policy, first introduced by Tun Mahathir during his first stint as the Prime Minister, given the similarities in motivation (to replicate the Japanese economic model), scope (education, technology, and investments), and leadership. Although this replication of the special bilateral relationship of the yesteryears has already shown swift policy outcomes, lessons learnt from the Look East Policy imply that more must be done within the context of Malaysia-Japan relations. More specifically, considering how Tun Mahathir aspires to make Malaysia a high-income country by 2025, the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’ should then reflect the complex challenges faced by the global economic structure in the 21st century and beyond. In other words, Putrajaya should ensure that the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’ is not limited to investment promotions and educational exchanges, but rather sophisticated and permanent technology transfers.

Look East Policy as the cornerstone of Malaysia-Japan

First introduced by Tun Mahathir on 8 February 1982 at the 5th Joint Annual Conference of the Malaysia-Japan Economic Association in Kuala Lumpur, the Look East Policy reflected Malaysia’s shifting development model, away from the laissez-faire capitalism propagated by the West to the developmental state policy adopted by Japan and South Korea. That is, the complementary state-business relationship in Japan had inspired him to replicate such an idea in Malaysia, in which the state can direct and facilitate private sector investments to promote socioeconomic growth, especially given his belief that the unrestrained Western capitalism would fail to alleviate the economic gap between the Malays and non-Malays.³ Essentially, this form of state intervention relies on the establishment of state-owned enterprises to invest in strategic sectors with the profits being reinvested into public domain. However, pursuing the Asian development model posed a challenge to Malaysia as it lacked intensive physical, capital, and human resources to promote an export-oriented, heavy-industry manufacturing. Thus, the Look East Policy was introduced with these two main pillars at its core: 1) replicating Oriental virtues and values, work ethics, and management style through educational and training exchanges and 2) attracting Japanese investments and technology transfers to cover such constraints.⁴

Lessons from Look East Policy

After over three decades of its implementation, the Look East Policy can be evaluated with varying degrees of success. With an uninterrupted period of rapid economic growth averaging almost 8% annually between mid-1980s and prior to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, which was mostly aided by extensive foreign direct investments (FDI) from East Asia, the

attempt to replicate the export-oriented manufacturing model can be deemed successful. In addition, the Japanese government also allocated USD400 million in loans and grants in 1998 and 1999 for educational scholarships, with almost 2,000 Malaysian students of science and engineering backgrounds in Japanese universities benefitting from the scheme.⁵ However, further analysis of the Look East Policy has highlighted policy inefficiencies that should serve as key lessons for future bilateral cooperation:

i. Creating Conducive Economic Incentives

Given the borderless nature of capital movements, attracting constant flows of FDI relies on a conducive and competitive economic environment that provides comparable returns to investment. While Japan has always been the largest source of manufacturing FDI in Malaysia since 1980 – totalling at RM88.5 billion as of 2016⁶ – this flow only accelerated after the 1985 Plaza Accord, in which the depreciation of USD against the yen incentivised Japanese firms to scour for investment opportunities abroad due to currency advantages. In fact, there exists a significant disparity in Japanese FDI pre- and post-1985 – the values ranged from RM32.6 million to RM308.7 million between 1970 and 1984 and RM116.3 million to RM4.2 billion between 1985 and 1991.⁷ Thus, Malaysia must realise that bilateral economic cooperation is not based solely on altruism or political goodwill, but also encompasses sound and valid domestic macroeconomic principles.

ii. Balancing Idiosyncratic Motivations and Tangible Outcomes

However, the Look East Policy was not limited to Tun Mahathir’s economic

vision of Malaysia. His deep admiration of the Japanese culture, work ethics, and successes in a Western-dominated world – amplified by his Global South activism and nationalist stances – has illustrated the extent of idiosyncrasy in Malaysian foreign relations. For instance, the Look East Policy was considered an integral part of the two-pillared Malaysian foreign policy in the 1980s, with the other being the ‘Buy British Last’. Introduced by Tun Mahathir in 1981 merely months after entering office, the ‘Buy British Last’ signified the deteriorating relations between the UK and Malaysia that were mostly attributed to the exorbitant tuition hike for Malaysian students at British universities and the hostile reception from the London Metal Exchange to an attempted takeover of Guthrie, a then British company – although other factors such as economic nationalism, perceived lack of reciprocity, and domestic grievances were also identified.⁸ Consequently, this approach resulted in rather inefficient outcomes, notably in the procurement process for a sugar company when a Japanese tractor was preferred over that of the British despite the latter being 20% cheaper.⁹ While the extent of leaders imprinting their personal influences in policies can often be overstated as the former are usually constrained by global and domestic political-economic norms – including that of Tun Mahathir, whose foreign policies are a manifestation of his personality traits and the need to promote national development, national integration, and regime maintenance¹⁰ – Malaysia must then ensure that future bilateral partnerships are planned to minimise the disparity between idiosyncratic motivations and tangible political-economic outcomes.

Samurai Bond: A Stimulant to the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’

The growing internationalisation of bond markets, i.e., the ability to issue foreign-denominated bond by non-residents, has prompted governments to seek for alternative, and often affordable, financing options abroad. For example, Malaysia has requested for yen credit from Japan given how most indicators

on the Japanese interest rates – from the overnight Central Bank Rates to the 10-year long-term Government bond yield – have remained below 0.5%, or even negative, since the economic crash in 2008.¹¹ That is, low interest rates can encourage public and private investments as the cost of borrowing is essentially at its lowest today and would only increase in future (barring the unlikely mainstreaming of negative rates). Therefore, issuing a Samurai bond offers an avenue for Malaysia to not only finance its domestic development at a lower cost, but also free up funds to dispose higher-rated loans issued by the previous administration, such as the RM5 billion, 30-year, government-guaranteed 1MDB bond issued at 5.75% annual rate.¹²

The continuous effort to strengthen bilateral relations was promptly recognised by Japan, in which Malaysia was granted access to the Japanese capital markets to issue its first Samurai bond after a thirty-year absence in March 2019. The 10-year bond that is guaranteed by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) at 0.63% per annum was approximately oversubscribed by 1.6 times at the value of JP¥324.7 billion against the initial offering of JP¥200 billion – with the conditions being much more advantageous relative to those of its ASEAN peers, e.g., Indonesia with JP¥100 billion at 1.27% per annum and Philippines with JP¥40.8 billion at 0.99% per annum.¹³ Although economic fundamentals and market confidence have greater weightage in determining the terms of foreign-guaranteed debts, in which Malaysia arguably outperforms most of its neighbours, close diplomatic relations may offer additional reassurance on economic agreements.

‘Look East Policy 2.0’: Status Quo or a Collaborative Breakthrough?

The issuance of the Samurai bond and the commitment by University of Tsukuba to establish the first ever Japanese university branch abroad in Malaysia¹⁴ – imply that initial outcomes of the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’ have been rather

encouraging, especially in the scope of supporting Malaysia’s aspirations of being a high-income nation by 2025. However, given the rapid disruption of conventional economic structures that is upon us – with the breakthrough emergence of Industry 4.0, big data, artificial intelligence, Internet-of-Things, and similar technological-driven changes – the Government should further elevate and expand its idea of bilateral economic relations to ensure that it is not left behind in the digital epoch. Since Japan is listed as the ninth most innovative economy in the world while South Korea retained its first spot for the sixth year running based on the 2019 Bloomberg Innovation Index – an index that measures countries’ innovativeness based on their research and development intensity, patent activity, tertiary education efficiency, productivity, value-added manufacturing, high-tech public company density, and researcher density¹⁵ – the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’ should not then be reduced to mere carbon copies of the first Look East Policy. Despite its prior benefits, Malaysia must be bold to ensure that the approach under the ‘Look East Policy 2.0’ will be distinct, as to facilitate advanced and sophisticated technological exchanges that are conducive to the invention and development of productive heavy industries. In this context, Malaysia can emulate other advanced nation approach towards innovation and technology transfers: establishing tri-sectoral research sectors (industrial, academic, and government) with specific yet complementary purposes to extract multiplier effects of foreign ventures and minimising the development gap between foreign-based academic knowledge and domestic-based industrial outcomes through institutional collaboration in the commercialisation process.¹⁶

Conclusion

The prompt financial relief through the issuance of Samurai bond inherently signals the positive reaffirmation of Malaysia-Japan relations under Tun Mahathir’s second stint as the Prime

Minister, which is arguably reminiscent of the first Look East Policy. The efforts to resurrect the highs of the special partnership of the past have been evidently expressed by the Malaysian government today. While it might be tempted to replicate the approaches of the Look East Policy – given how it has benefitted from Japanese investments, academic exchanges, and production outsourcing – Malaysia must acknowledge that almost 40 years have elapsed since then. The subsequent drastic changes in global structures of political economy and the practical application of economic conventional wisdoms, mostly attributed to the emergence of disruptive and transformative technologies, have inherently put Malaysia at a crossroads: Putrajaya could maintain the status quo in pursuing its ties with Tokyo – just like Tun Mahathir’s first stint in office – or it could be bold by recognising, and hence, incorporating responses to, these complex challenges of the 21st century and beyond. Regardless of the path it chooses, its implications must be carefully dissected to ensure that Malaysia is not blindsided by historical ties to explore other – or even more – beneficial partnerships, or even worse, to avoid falling into lopsided and/or unfair deals.

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Japan’s Holistic Human Security

Mohd Ikbal Mohd Huda
Abzarul Azlin Syamsiah Abdullah

Introduction

The human security approach by the global 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was the initiation point. This new security approach broadens the scope of traditional security analysis that deals with conventional issues ranging from territorial security, violence, and destructions to the non-traditional analysis which deals with non-conventional issues

such as environmental injustice, underdevelopment, poverty, and terrorism.

Human Security argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to people-centred rather than territorial and state-centric. People or individuals should be the main actor in the international relation affairs. However, the concept remains indefinable due to its characteristics that are vast, vague, and ambiguous. The interpretation might be different depends on how one wants

to fulfil the ‘national interest’. Because of that, scholars had split Human Security into two major schools of thought i.e. protective Human Security (freedom from fear) and development Human Security (freedom from want).

Since the announcement by UNDP, Japan was among the first country acknowledging and advocating for human security in the international community. Hitherto, Japanese government made this concept as a pillar of its own diplomacy and has

adopted it as the guiding paradigm in formulating its foreign policy and implementing development projects be it domestically or externally (Toshiyuki, 2017). This concept has been given special place in the Japanese Diplomatic Bluebook each year.

However, Japan's definition of Human Security was placed in the middle between the two categories of school of thought. Therefore, this article will explain the Japanese concept of Human Security and scrutinise the reasons behind why Japan adopts its own 'Human Security concept' apart from the other two.

Japanese Holistic Human Security (HHS)

Japanese version of Human Security was an act of balancing tools between the two schools of thought of Human Security. This holistic approach of Human Security is flexible and argued that both schools are equally important and interdependence. It is flexible in order to narrow down the gap between the two schools. Nevertheless, that flexibility applicable to those development and security makes it a concept that can be accepted by a wide array of international actors and is adaptable as the guiding principle behind policy making. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi was the person who put so much efforts in instilling human security into Japanese foreign policy. In an international conference in 1988 in Hanoi, Obuchi announced that Japan would donate 500 million yen (USD4.2 million) for the establishment of Human Security Fund (Toshiyuki, 2017). This marked the origin of HHS in Japan's foreign policy.

Buzan, in his book *People, States and Fear*, outlined that the theory on human security is rooted on the cause of the security itself, by addressing the cause of threats then the formulation of remedies will project the best solution (Stone, 2009). This newly proposed framework introduced by Barry Buzan was relatable to the HHS concerns. HHS would favour adapting to the situation on the root in order to yield sustainable

economics and politics in the long run.

This concept agreed on the importance of connecting between security and development and as a means to peacebuilding efforts in conflict region (Toshiyuki, 2017). It stresses that development and security are inseparably connected. Security promotes peace and peace is necessary for development to take place. It stresses long-term solutions to threats and prevention rather than short-term protection as proposed by the other schools of thought.

The most prominent success case of HHS championed by Japan was through the Official Development Assistance (ODA). As the top ODA donor in the world, the Japanese cemented its approach on HHS in the name of development assistance. While meeting the importance of addressing the underdevelopment, it also stresses the importance of safeguarding the constitutional security and sovereignty. As a result, the concept of Human Security and the subsequent approach to development and security has spread in the Asia Pacific Region (Feigenblatt, 2009). This also allows Japan to continue to operate in rogue places such as Myanmar that would otherwise be impossible to any international humanitarian organisations to infiltrate.

Reasons for Japan Adapting to Holistic Human Security

i. Relevance with the Alliance Entrapment

The signing of the Japan-US Security Treaty (JUSST) in 1952 has deprived Japan of its right to exercise a normal statehood (Dower, 1997) and had continued even after gaining independence from the United States in 1952 (Takashi, 2003) where Japan had since been hampered unilateral benefits for its ally. Subsequently, Japan was unable to dislodge US influences while formulating its foreign policies. This had affected the policy makers in manoeuvring Japan's foreign policy in

order to ensure the perseverance of national interest.

Kiichi Miyazawa, former Minister of International Trade and Industry, said in 1971 that "highly depending on US nuclear umbrella (JUSST) is basically incompatible with Japan's national sovereignty. Coming generation, in order to satisfy their desire to be the master of their own land, will determine to build their own umbrella instead of relying on their neighbours". This statement becomes the foundation for the next generation of policy makers in formulating and executing Japan's foreign policies.

Furthermore, a study done by the Asia Competitiveness Institute, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy over the past four decades had awakened the Japanese. This study clarified that Japan was 3.2 times more important as a growth engine than China to the Southeast Asia during the 1980-1989 period; but it falls to 1.4 times from 1990 to 1999. Therefore, unless a strategic shift is made, it is projected that Japan's significance as a growth engine in the region will be reduced further in future (Giap & Yi, 2019).

Therefore, the announcement by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to infuse HHC into Japan's foreign policy had been taken as an opportunity for Japan to exploit its Achilles' heels into opportunities.

ii. Psychological War – Disseminating Soft Power

Hence, due to the pressure mentioned in para 3.1, in 1980 under the administration of Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, the concept of 'comprehensive national security' was introduced where it blends both military and non-military countermeasures (Md Akhir, Govindasamy & Mustafa, 2009). However, prior to that and accentuated with the Fukuda doctrine, Japan had already approached other states through comprehensive security which was similar to the HHC concepts that are strongly oriented in expanding

financial aid and economic cooperation, sustainable growth, security, and community-building in the region (Tanaka, 2009). For instance, in 1970, half of Japan's Official Development Assistance globally had been wired to Southeast Asia (SEA) based on its strategic geographical location and historical value (Mohd Huda, 2010)

Memories of Japanese aggression in the World War II coupled with the question of Japan's legitimacy under the JUSST had somehow undermined Japan's credibility and efforts to widen its influence. The American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 had created the 'power vacuum' in the SEA region. Post Plaza Accord in 1985 and accentuated by the bursting of the 'bubble economy' in 1986, which worsened Japan's state of affairs, had somehow affected Japan's strategy to approach others (Drifte, 1996).

This situation had forced Japan to reconsider its strategy to reach out to external domination and in the pursuit of improving its image, so that the perception of Japanese as "samurai in business suits" weakened (Garby & Bullock, 1994). During the implementation of the Fukuda Doctrine from 1976, Japan's role as the only non-Western country member of the Group of Seven (G7) alleviated its status as an Asian power and suitable trading partner for SEA neighbours (Bobowski, 2014). Thus, for years, Japan has been using its economic power, ODA, and Humanitarian Assistance (elements of HHC) as a way to disseminate its soft power and diplomacy in the region.

Way Forward

Japan's foreign policy is parallel with Sustainable Development Growth (SDG) which objectives are prominently consistent with Human Security concerns. SDG or known as Global Goals are a worldwide call to respond and act to end poverty, protect the planet from environmental injustice, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity (UNDP, 2016). Hence, SDG is a step forward, comprehensive,

inclusive and just, and leave no one behind, rooted strongly in human rights principles and standards.

In 2019's symposium that took place at the UN quarters, Japan had managed to assure other member to place 'human security' as the centre topic for discussion (Japan Times, 2019). It was also agreed that the power of human security stays acute and is relevant up to today because of its comprehensive and integrated mechanism identical to SDGs in tackling complex issues considered as the stumbling block for development and sustainability as well as security for all.

Japan is also proactively supporting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (the 2030 Agenda) adopted during the UN Summit in September 2015, as it also reflects the core of HHS principles which is 'people-centred'. Therefore, it is not absurd to say that Japan will continue to support and promote Human Security in future as its principles affinity with Japan's strategy in preserving its national interest (Japan MOFA, 2019).

Conclusion

Strategies that are rooted in Human Security can strengthen the state-society relations and empower communities as active agents for change (UN News, 2014). Hence, Human Security should be incorporated with economic development assistance because it forms an important part of people's well-being and is therefore an objective for economic development. Lack of human security has hostile effects on economic growth, and vice versa. Imbalanced use and exploitation of natural resources for development result in socio-political instability, long-term destruction of the environment, pollution, and famine. Therefore, governments or states should collectively recognise the vital roles played by Holistic Human Security practised by Japan in addressing issues of security from the grass roots and remedy it for a sustainable economics and politics in the long run. Thus, the injection of soft power played by

Japan's Holistic Human Security proved that it suits countries with the absence of military power but still want to expand its influence politically and economically without being traced.

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The End of a Regime

Istaq Nadzril Abd Kader

“To see a country's future, look to the sky. To understand a country's past, look to your feet – the floor, the path, the soil – where history has walked before you.”

Anje R.

My term of service in Sudan was nearing but the momentum of the protest that started in mid-December 2018 seemed to intensify. The last time such a protest erupted was in 2013, but it was short-lived and quickly dismissed by the ruling government's security apparatus, the feared National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). The composition of the demonstrators was mostly from the younger generation. The feared Arab Spring in Sudan was muted but not wiped out entirely.

This time around, the demonstration which started in Atbara Province on 19 December 2018, quickly gained momentum and spread throughout like wildfire in major states such as Gedareif, Sennar, Port Sudan, Wad Madani, and Khartoum. These cities are synonym to such uprisings or Intifadas, particularly Atbara. Historically, the first Intifada was in 1965 and the following was in 1985. Both resulted in the overthrow of the ruling government of the day. Learning from the past, al-Bashir systematically purged the trade unions, the core architects for uprisings and created an enterprise union at all levels of society. These unions were subservient not only to him but also the National Congress Party (NCP).

Understanding the role of the military, after coming to power through a coup in 1989, al-Bashir created a counterbalance by strengthening the NISS and subsequently the creation of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) was an additional insurance in the equation. He as well as the other stalwart supporters of the regime understood that the unions and military were instrumental in bringing down previous governments and were aware of the possibility that history may repeat itself.

Yet with all the precautions and strategy, the economic asphyxiation

due to the secession of South Sudan in 2011 which impacted the country's revenue through the production and sale of oil by 70 percent, economic sanctions, and being listed on the state sponsored terrorist list by the United States finally led to the collapse of al-Bashir's regime. Within two weeks, Sudan Professional Association (SPA), an umbrella for 17 trade and workers union appeared, leading, organising, and orchestrating the demonstrations movement across the country. SPA was the same organisation that stoked the initial protest in 2013 and went incognito post 2013. Yet, since 2016, they were covertly organising programmes undermining al-Bashir's regime through civil disobedience calls including garnering support from the youth as well as the Sudanese diaspora.

One day, I sat and discussed the current situation of Sudan with two colleagues, Ms Asmahan El Sheikh and Ms Omnia Adil. Both were young women professionals at a private entity in Khartoum. The only president and government they knew since childhood was of President Omar al-Bashir and a cycle of old politicians such as Sadiq al-Mahdi the late Turabi and a number of others. “Nothing has changed and things have become worse,” both of them lucidly commented while I poured hot Sudanese coffee from the Jebena into three small glasses. Omnia, a PETRONAS scholarship awardee, earned her degree in Electronic and Electrical Degree from University Technology Petronas, while Asmahan completed her tertiary education at Omdurman Ahlia University in Business studies. At present, Sudan has a high number of graduates who are unemployed and not all of those who have graduated are lucky to secure stable employment. The number of women graduates outnumbers men. But, with the inability to secure stable

employment, an exodus of Sudanese leaving the country since 1989 has starved the country of talent.

The three years I have known both of them, never once have they exhibited interest in the country's political situation, except the occasional dissatisfaction with the way the government is running the country, depraving it further into economic chaos. Since the protest erupted, the mood had changed. Their solidarity and support for the demonstrators, led by the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), were outstanding. Every call for a boycott or passive action was taken seriously and abided since end of December 2018. Even their respective family members, men and women, old to young were staunch supporters. Both of them highlighted that a number of their elderly family members were part of the 1965 and 1985 Intifada as well. Hence, it was no surprise to see three generations of men and women of different age groups taking to the streets under the hot sweltering summer heat, to show their support and solidarity with the demonstrators against al-Bashir's regime. The backing was overwhelming, from Sudanese diaspora, students, academics, housewives, street traders to women supporting the Intifada frontlines, chanting *Huriya* (Freedom).

The Factors

Sudan was under US economic sanctions and on the state sponsored terrorist list since 1996 and 1997 respectively. Internal conflicts in the Darfur region as well as armed rebellion in South Kordofan and Blue Nile state also placed pressure on the country. To many Sudanese, the predicaments were due to the doings of al-Bashir and his proxy, namely al-Turabi. The secession of South Sudan in 2011 inflicted further damage to the economy i.e. the loss of

control over the oil fields located in the south, which constitutes 75 percent of Sudan's main export revenue. All the factors combined compounded the country's economy.

Despite its status, Sudan's commitment against terrorism is observed when it signed all the 12 international conventions for combating terrorism. Cooperation with the US was intensified, particularly in the areas of information sharing, preventive and counter terrorism activities in the region under al-Bashir's administration. This was used as a leverage to propel rounds of negotiations with the US under the Obama administration on the lifting of the economic sanctions imposed. The US agreed to lift economic sanctions imposed on Sudan for approximately two decades on 17 October 2017, and subsequently on 29 June 2018, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control announced that Sudanese sanctions regulations had been removed from the Code of Federal Regulations. However, the lifting did not usher in the positive economic revival as expected by the regime. Blinded by their jubilant success, the regime was hoodwinked by the fact that Sudan was still on the state sponsored terrorist list. In comparison, the severity of being on the list was higher than being sanctioned. Following this, Sudan was still starved of financial accessibility, denied accesses to financial aid or assistance from bodies such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and others. This included the appeal to be clustered under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.

Due to mismanagement and corruption of the proceeds earned during the 'good times' when Sudan was one country and the departure from agriculture which was the main driving economic force previously, this is one of the main attributes to the state of the country's economy. In addition, the state through shell companies were heavily involved in a number of economic activities, such as commodities, basic necessities, and others. The purpose of this was to keep prices of consumer goods artificially low

through monopoly as well as restricted competition. This in turn led to the cause of shortages of basic necessities, flour, and fuel or what economics would terms as deadweight or in simpler terms - market failure. What made things worst in times of shortages was that priority access was allocated to the military, security apparatus, NCP elites, and party members.

Naturally, this situation transcended its impacts whereby the inflation rate increased dramatically, resulting in the skyrocketing prices of goods due to high transportation costs. Several industries including big conglomerates began to scale down their operations and increased prices of their products, while medium and small businesses have either limited their operating hours or cease operations. Shortages of products and erratic exchange rate have made it difficult to conduct day-to-day business operations including the paying of wages. These conditions further contributed to the high unemployment rate among the youth, which is likely to be above the official data.

The Question

Bearing in mind the country's economy and sipping on the hot coffee infused with ginger, I posed the question to both of them, "why did you come back to Sudan Omnia? You had the opportunity to work at Petronas Malaysia and Asmahan you have the prospect to work in Qatar". I was astounded to hear the answer but it deserved respect, "We know Sudan has nothing much to offer, but Sudan is our country and we are the future of the country. Others may leave, and if all leave, the country will disintegrate. Who will be there to take over if things change and this time around, we are sure the regime will fall and a new political sphere will take form. We want to be part of the history and contribute where we can do so, small or big, that should not be questioned". Similar sentiment was shared by other young and older professionals when asked.

Omnia continued, "The spectre



Picture : An exchange of views on the latest development of the demonstration

of Sudan's socio-cultural space is characterised through underlying layers of meanings, a plurality of signification and, in many instances, ambiguity. At the same time, this has given the country a distinctly unique cultural contour, taste, and flavour, setting it apart from other Arab and African cities. The coming of this regime, created an opaqueness. That is why this revolution is important, to allow the Sudanese to return to something concrete".

The April 2019 Protest

What al-Bashir and his regime did not understand was that this third Intifada was different, and the mood was led by a younger generation. On 6 April 2019, which coincided with the anniversary of the coup that brought down President Jaafar Muhammad an-Nimeiry (1969-1985), a sit in was organised and the turnout of protestors was overwhelming. They converged at the grounds outside of the military headquarters which also housed President Bashir's residence and placed at the centre of Khartoum.

The summer heat did not deter the protestors to disperse and neither the military nor security forces succeeded in forcing them out of the occupied area. Unprecedented, whereby in the past demonstrators were immediately broken up and wrestled with force by the security apparatus. Though there were some reported incidents of scuffles and four casualties, the military were seen to be protecting the protestors when some rogue security forces were sent to disperse the sit in. This led to calls for the military to join hands and dispose

al-Bashir regime resonate further.

The military were maintaining the stance it took when the Chief of the Military publicly announced on 11 January 2019 that it supported President Bashir and that any change of government would be through the ballot boxes. However, the army who was in a dilemma, given the events that unfolded after President Bouteflika was forced out by the Algerian army as demanded by the protestors to save the establishment, are now facing renewed demands for total eradication of those who were part of the system, including the army.

The reluctance of the security apparatus to take actions against the demonstrators was a signal, a split between the ruling elite, security apparatus, and military concerning the status of al-Bashir and his regime. Secondly, such feat only signalled that the military felt that the time was ripe to intervene and undertake their traditional role of organising a coup. History seems to repeat itself in Sudan as the current situation would remind many Sudanese of the coup by General Abdel Rahman Mohammed Hassan Swareddahab, the then Minister of Defence, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and a close friend against President Gaafar al-Nimeiry in 1985. On the other hand, without the unions and people taking to the streets, the coup would have been impossible.

Post al-Bashir

The takeover of the country's leadership was led by General Awad Ibn Auf, Vice President and Minister of Defence, and leader of the Transitional Military Council (TMC). But this did not sit well with the protestors and Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC). Within 48 hours, he was replaced by Al-Burhan, who

was appointed as al-Bashir's chief of staff and head of the ground forces in February 2019.

After a number of rounds scuffles, stalemates, and negotiations, the TMC and FFC were able to sign a preliminary deal on a power-sharing arrangement brokered by the African Union on 17 August 2019. The said provisions of the agreements reached was for the TMC and FFC to form a transitional government with the following structures:

- i. a 39-month transitional period to be followed by elections in 2023;
- ii. a Sovereign Council with 11 members (5 from the TMC, 5 from the FFC, and a civilian selected jointly), led for 21 months by a TMC member and then for 18 months by a civilian member;
- iii. Council of Ministers led by a prime minister, who would be selected by the FFC and who would appoint ministers from an FFC nomination list, with the exception of the ministers of defence and interior, whom the TMC would select;
- iv. a Legislative Council, to be formed within 90 days of the establishment of the Sovereign Council.

The Civilian Government

Abdalla Hamdok was sworn in as the Prime Minister of the transitional government on 21 August 2019 and for the first time in the history of the country, a lady foreign minister by the name Asma Mohamed Abdalla was nominated to the post. Notable, but to address the country's socio-economic fundamentals and access to financial aid requires Sudan to be delisted from the state sponsored terrorist list, of which

the US has yet to respond positively. Nonetheless, constructive engagement on the matter is ongoing since Mr Hamdok and Ms. Asma took office.

Realising that it may take time, Mr. Hamdok is aware that to save the civilian government as well as avoiding political chaos, positive political steps are required. The initial move was to place al-Bashir on a trial for corruption and followed by disbanding al-Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) and affiliates as well as confiscation of property and assets of former NCP party members. The second wave was to repeal the draconian laws against treatment of women and other institutional changes are required. Nonetheless, issues pertaining to institutional development from good governance, education, laws, and other areas require equal attention.

As an interim measure, such moves may momentarily satisfy, but economic revival is the cornerstone. Not only for the daily wage earners and laymen, but for the diaspora and investors to return as well. Retrospectively, the tendency for Sudan to witness another cocktail of fireworks with the various Islamic political parties playing leading role is likely if there is no positive movement away from the status quo. As it is, alterations to the previous laws and system seem to brew sentiments. Notwithstanding there is the fear of a likely potential threat i.e. General Mohamed Hamdan (Hemetti), deputy of the TMC as well as commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to postulate himself into power if Mr. Hamdok and his nascent government are unable to deliver his

Istaq Nadzril Abd Kader has experience working in Sudan. He served at the Embassy of Malaysia, Sudan.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the Forum section are entirely the authors' own and not those of the Institute.

Leadership Course for Mid-Level Diplomats 2020


Leadership can be defined as the art of motivating a group of people to act towards achieving a common goal. A leader is expected to establish a clear organisational vision, provide the information, guidance, and methods to materialise the vision, and coordinate the interests of all members and stakeholders within the organisation. A leader should also be resourceful, acts as the-point-of-reference, steps up in critical times, and is able to think and decide creative solutions during difficult times.

From this perspective, IDFR organised the *Leadership Course for Mid-Level Diplomats 2020* from 10 to 12 March 2020. This course was specially designed for the mid-level Diplomatic Officers from grade 44 to 52 to develop their leadership, administrative, and organisational management skills. A total of 14 officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Ministry of Education Malaysia, and Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation participated in this programme

coordinated by Mr. Brian Cracknell. This course covered several curriculum and group activities such as *Intention and Perception on Leadership, the "I" Specialist, International Leadership @ Work, and Future Leaders @ Work*. Mr. Cracknell as the instructor also put forward the five main working principles related to diplomacy such as Interdependence, Principle, Pragmatism, Safeguarding the National Interest and Sovereignty, as well as Contribution towards a just and equitable community of nations. Selected reading materials on leadership and

role-play activities were also included in the training and these provided some exposure to all the participants to strengthen their understanding and comprehension about the real leadership game in the 21st century.

The three-day programme was concluded and certificates were presented by Dato' Mohd Zamruni Khalid, Director General of IDFR, to the participants. Also present was Mr. Hamizan Hashim, Director of the Centre for Leadership, Negotiation and Public Diplomacy.



Ambassador Lecture Series 1/2020

Thursday, 27 February saw IDFR organising its first of two Ambassador Lecture Series for the year. Held under the purview of the Centre for Political Studies and Economic Diplomacy, the lecture titled *Viet Nam's ASEAN Chairmanship 2020: Key Deliverables* was delivered by H.E. Le Quy Quynh, the Ambassador of Viet Nam to Malaysia.

H.E. Le explained among the key priorities/deliverables set for this year are strengthening the organisation's unity and solidarity; reinforcing its centrality and promoting its active contribution to regional peace and stability; intensifying its economic integration and connectivity; and increasing its institutional capacity and effectiveness. The key forwards include strengthening the habit of dialogue and co-operation while promoting confidence building;

consolidating the existing political and security instruments and mechanisms; intensifying co-operation to address emerging challenges such as the COVID-19 epidemic; promoting intra-regional economic integration; strengthening regional connectivity; and developing high-quality human capital to meet the demands of the digital economy, social work, and services for vulnerable groups.



H.E. Le also expanded on the role of Viet Nam as the ASEAN Chair in the global and regional context in which it is currently operating, among others, with the escalation of traditional security issues; the increase of non-traditional security threats, and the strategic competition between major powers.

The lecture was attended by more than 80 participants, including senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Defence; ambassadors from South Korea and the European Union, and representatives from, among others, Embassies and High Commissions of Australia, Thailand, Singapore and Philippines; as well as students from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and IDFR's Diploma in Diplomacy programme.

Diploma in Diplomacy 2020: Opening Ceremony



having fun while learning and savouring their time at IDFR despite giving their full attention and focus to the programme. He also reiterated and amplified the importance of essential values like integrity, humility, and courtesy, as he quoted Benjamin Franklin as saying, “To be humble to superiors is duty, to equals - courtesy, to inferiors - nobleness”.

Having said that, Dato’ Mohd Zamruni expressed his expectation and vision for the DiD 2020 participants, which is to see all of them coming out as diplomats with reputable attitude who will not just uphold the good image of our country, but also bring the dynamism in them to promote and protect Malaysia’s foreign policy agenda, wherever they are stationed at. Upon completion of his speech, a representative from the DiD participants came forward to lead the recital of participants’ oath followed by the signing of the oath which was witnessed by the Director General himself. The ceremony ended after a light refreshment at the dining area. Later in the afternoon, the secretariat took over to conduct a detailed briefing session on the DiD 2020 programme followed by a familiarisation tour around IDFR and photography session for participants’ profile.

At the end of the event, the participants seemed hopeful with renewed spirit and energy to embark on this six-month-journey. IDFR wishes the DiD 2020 participants an enjoyable programme and successful future as diplomats.

On 10 February 2020, IDFR held the opening ceremony of the Diploma in Diplomacy (DiD) 2020 Programme. The institute welcomed 22 Administrative and Diplomatic Officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Department to a new promising and exciting intake of DiD Programme. The event commenced with the registration of participants at the IDFR Treaty Room followed by the actual opening ceremony that was graced by Dato’ Mohd Zamruni Khalid, Director General of IDFR along with the heads of various centres in IDFR. Also present were the DiD 2020 Secretariat, in-house language instructors as well as foreign language consultants from selected institutes.

At the outset, Dato’ Mohd Zamruni gave a brief introduction to IDFR as the training

arm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DiD as the flagship programme of IDFR. He further added that the essence of DiD programme is to fortify the participants’ skills and knowledge in the field of diplomacy and international relations and inculcate the right attitude, mindset as well as values in them to become highly competent diplomats. He also reminded the participants on the main challenge facing diplomats in the current era, which is to quickly adapt to the dynamics of Foreign Service and remain competent and relevant.

In his opening remarks, Dato’ Mohd Zamruni outlined the comprehensive programme that has been designed for the participants, which consists of various elements that are fun and interesting. He further emphasised the importance of

Reflecting the Past: The Rio Earth Summit 1992... Stories behind the Scene

On 21 February 2020, in collaboration with the Human Resource Management Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, IDFR organised its second Tacit Knowledge programme titled *Reflecting the Past: The Rio Earth Summit 1992... Stories behind*

the Scene. The sharing session was moderated by Ms Haznah Md Hashim, Undersecretary of Multilateral Economic and Environment Division.

The guest speaker was Dato’ Ting Wen Lian, former High Commissioner to Fiji

and Ambassador to Italy and former Malaysia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization based in Rome, Italy. She had served for 27 years in the diplomatic career at Wisma Putra



and had been posted to several missions such as in Washington, USA; Paris, France; as well as Tunisia and Algeria.

During the session, Dato' Ting shared her previous experience in dealing with global environmental concerns and food issues. As the representative of the Government of Malaysia, she voiced out our commitment and readiness to the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 with the issues

of water scarcity, the consumption of toxic and chemical components, and finding other alternatives for sources of energy to replace the fossil fuels which are linked to global climate change.

The original name of the Rio Summit 1992 was the United Nations' Conference on Environment and Development and it was started in 1989 with four preparatory meetings. Dato' Ting compared the environmental issues nowadays with the situation 27 years ago, i.e. on the Penan people in Sarawak and the palm oil industry, although these are two very different issues yet there are similar commonness. Dato' Ting also emphasised that our national sovereignty was the main concern above all, as she argued that the advanced nations were the ones that contributed

towards the environmental issues. Yet, they were the ones that should decrease the pollution and deforestation, but then they created laws and regulations to be implied on the rest of the global community including Malaysia.

The session was also attended by Datuk Rahimi Harun, Deputy Secretary General of Management Services and Dato' Mohd Zamruni Khalid, Director General of IDFR. They also participated actively in the Question and Answer session with Dato' Ting.



Diploma in Diplomacy: Lunch Talks

Lunch Talk with Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan

As part of the Diplomatic Skills module of the Diploma in Diplomacy (DiD) 2020 programme, series of lunch talks was organised by the Centre for Competency Enhancement. Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar Hassan, Senior Advisor of the Asia Europe Institute was invited to give a lunch talk on *Applied Critical Thinking in International Relations*, held on 24 February 2020. Apart from the DiD participants, the lunch talk was also attended by Dato' Mohd Zamruni Khalid, Director General of IDFR, officers as well as staff of IDFR.

Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar shared three ways to tackle the topic of Applied Critical Thinking in International Relations. First, is to identify the hindrances or factors that inhibit critical thinking. Some of the hindrances include the influence of culture and education whereby in some societies, critical thinking is not encouraged. Another block is being naïve or gullible, therefore losing the ability to ascertain fake and real news. He also admitted the high amount of workloads

assigned to junior Wisma Putra officers leaves less time for the officers to spend in critical thinking. Other reasons might include lack of knowledge, having own prejudice or biasness, and inclination to certain race and religious ideologies.

Tan Sri Jawhar added that these reasons, however, should not become hindrance for officers in Wisma Putra to develop critical thinking skills. He further explained that there are some qualities that could be adopted to help officers to think critically. Quoting the example of Socrates, Tan Sri Jawhar stressed the importance of having an enquiring mind while discussing international issues. He also added that apart from taking extra effort to gain knowledge, one should also practise thinking analytically on the issues of interest to the nation. Nonetheless, he reiterated that these skills could not be achieved if one does not have good work ethics. According to him, having good work ethics would help officers to think objectively and be inquisitive in handling issues at desk all the time.

Finally, Tan Sri Jawhar also added that

there are a few areas of interest that could be used to apply critical thinking. Some of the international issues include the United States' military expenditure, terrorism, traditional and non-traditional security or comprehensive security, the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, state security versus human security, Democratic People' Republic of Korea, Iran, nuclear non-proliferation, economic sanctions, and national interest.

Overall, the Lunch Talk has provided the participants an overview of how to apply critical thinking in international relations.



Lunch Talk with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Haji Abdul Razak

The participants of Diploma in Diplomacy (DiD) 2020 had the privilege to attend a lunch talk with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi Haji Abdul Razak, who served as Secretary General of Wisma Putra spanning from 2001 to 2006. The lunch talk was organised by IDFR on 26 February 2020 to give exposure to the junior diplomats-to-be on the topic of *Applied Leadership in Foreign Service*.

During the lunch talk, Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi shared that excellent leadership in the Foreign Service is intended and needed to provide inspiration, guidance, and direction to junior officers and do our level best in pursuit of our national interest. In addition, leadership is also about motivating every member in an organisation to achieve a common goal. While many are born great leaders, leadership can also be honed through learning and practice. It was



indeed an insightful session with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi as the knowledge imparted provides us a foundation to contemplate the style of leadership that would be the most appropriate for us to apply in future in order to deliver the desired outcome that is expected by Wisma Putra in safeguarding Malaysia's interest at the international fora.

Notwithstanding the things that we have learnt from the lunch talk with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi, it is still incumbent upon us to explore the suitable style of leadership that would benefit the Ministry throughout the time of our service.

Youth Ambassador

IDFR successfully organised *Youth Ambassador* from 3 to 5 February 2020. Held under the purview of the Centre for Leadership, Negotiation and Public Diplomacy (LNPD), the three-day module is part of the Malaysia Future Leaders School (MFLS) Programme 2020 conducted in collaboration with *Institut Pembangunan dan Kecemerlangan Kepimpinan (iLEAD)*, Ministry of Youth and Sport. The module was attended by 240 participants nationwide, who were mostly post-*Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM)* students.

On the first day, the participants had sessions on *Introduction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Roles and Functions of Malaysian Missions Abroad, and Protocol and Consular Services*. All the activities were held at the International Youth Centre (IYC), Cheras.

The participants had a trip to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Putrajaya

on the second day and listened to series of briefings, namely *Introduction to the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, Cross Cultural Awareness, Public Diplomacy and Media Relations*, as well as *Introduction to ASEAN Regional Grouping*. They also had the opportunity to visit the Wisma Putra Gallery and were briefed on the services made available for the public, such as the Consular Counter.



On the last day, the participants had a short briefing at the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation and

later visited the Malaysian Export Exhibition Centre and Business Information Centre. During the tour, they had the chance to see the wide-range of local products exported abroad. Later, the participants had a Fine Dining and Etiquette lesson conducted at the Dorsett Grand Hotel Subang, where the participants were taught about table manners and proper grooming while attending formal function.

Throughout the three-day programme, IDFR believed that all participants had gained sufficient information, knowledge, and skills as part of their preparation before representing Malaysia in the upcoming educational trip abroad. The closing session was held at IYC Cheras and the closing remarks was delivered by Mr. Hamizan Hashim, Acting Director of LNPD.

Diploma in Diplomacy: The Group Dynamics Programme



Participants of the Diploma in Diplomacy (DiD) 2020 had recently undergone a Group Dynamics programme at Dusun Bonda, Batang Kali, Selangor from 12 to 14 February 2020. The programme was organised by IDFR in collaboration with Muna Event & Entertainment. It served as a precursor

to the six months long DiD course currently conducted by the Institute.

Throughout the programme, the participants were exposed to various outdoor activities aimed at determining attitude and behavioural patterns of the group. These include leadership games and team building activities focusing on problem-solving, teamwork, and innovation. The physical resilience and discipline of the participants were also tested via high-endurance activities such as hiking and water activities.

At the tranquil retreat, the participants were given a safe space to venture into the often forgotten component of mental health. They were encouraged to take risks, voice opinions, and ask judgement-free questions outside the confines of the office through activities such as the reflection session that marked the

importance of maintaining psychological well-being in the diplomatic career.

Cultural competency was emphasised during the programme through group performances conducted on the last night of the programme. The participants successfully exhibited the importance of United Nations Sustainable Development Goals through the lens of 'orang kampung' via songs, dances, and theatres.

The programme was successful in determining the attitude and behavioural pattern of the group. At the end of the programme, the participants were assigned to five permanent groupings which will last until the completion of the course. It is hoped that these groupings will enhance the positive group dynamics, and enable the participants of the DiD 2020 to reach their full potential.

continued from page 1

The implementation of KM at the Ministerial level could be seen as a two-pronged strategy. Firstly, it aims to promote knowledge sharing and acquisition among the officers in Wisma Putra. Secondly, it will encourage the sharing of tacit and explicit knowledge by the senior officers of the Ministry and former Malaysian diplomats with the currently serving officers. IDFR, as the training arm of the Ministry, has been assigned to lead the KM's initiative of the Ministry. The Institute is planning to set up a KM repository, where various documents, articles, pictorial, and audio-video recordings on diplomacy and foreign affairs will be collected and preserved for future references.

Besides the launch of KM, Dato' Mohd

Zamruni Khalid, the Director General of IDFR exchanged the copies of the signed MOUs between IDFR and UM, UNIMAS, and UMS, with the Vice Chancellors or representatives of the respective universities during the event. In his speech, Dato' Mohd Zamruni lauded the efforts put through the KM platform to enhance the skills and efficiency of Wisma Putra officers. He believes that on-the-job experiences and knowledge gained from former Malaysian diplomats through KM would go a long way in benefitting Wisma Putra officers. KM could become part of the norm and culture amongst Wisma Putra officers in carrying out their duties. He also emphasised the importance of concerted effort of all parties involved, especially the collaborations with

institutions of higher learning to ensure the success of the implementation of KM.

In that light, the collaborations between IDFR and the three public universities: UM, UNIMAS, and UMS among others, would give the opportunity to expand the scope of knowledge sharing in the field of diplomacy and foreign relations. It is hoped that through the active exchanges and sharing of information with the universities, the Institute could perform the task of implementing KM in the Ministry efficiently and at the same time stimulate the culture of knowledge sharing in Wisma Putra.

News Contributors

Amirul Khairi Mustafa Bakri, Noraini Awang Nong, Nidyakala Manian, Sanjiya Narayanan Pamusamy, Jason Low Tze Hian, Wan Maisarah Idrus Mohamed



Reflecting the Past: The Rio Earth Summit 1992, 21 February



One of the Activities at IDFR 2020 Retreat, Avillion Admiral Cove, Port Dickson, 17 January



Courtesy Call by H.E. Imanbayev Bolat, Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Malaysia, 31 January



DID Participants' Fine Dining, Reception and Official Entertaining Session, 3 March



DID Participants' Group Dynamics, Batang Kali, Selangor, 12-14 February



Say it Right: A Course on Pronunciation Series 1, 11-13 February



Courtesy Call by Major General Dato' Mohd Yusof Aziz, Commandant of the National Resilience College, 24 February



Lunch Talk with Tan Sri Mohamed Jawhar, 24 February



Courtesy Call by Her Excellency Julia G. Bentley, High Commissioner of Canada, 6 February



Group Photography, IDFR 2020 Retreat, 16 January



The Knowledge Management Launching Ceremony, 14 February



Lunch Talk with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi, 26 February



Courtesy Call by H.E. Mauricio Gonzalez Lopez, Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia, 30 January



Courtesy Call by H.E. Major General (Rtd) Lineo Bernard Pooa, High Commissioner of the Kingdom of Lesotho to Malaysia, 27 February