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IDFR's Inaugural Cultural Appreciation Day



In line with IDFR's aim of promoting cultural diplomacy, the Institute organised its first ever Cultural Appreciation Day on 28 July 2016. The event was held in collaboration with the participants of the three programmes taking place at the Institute then; the *Diploma in Diplomacy (DiD)*, the *Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP): Strategic Analysis Course* and the *Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP): Intercultural Awareness and Diplomacy Course*.

The event was graced by Dato' Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Yaakob, the Deputy Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Others in attendance were several Heads of Department of the Ministry and members of the diplomatic corps of the MTCP participating countries.

The two MTCP programmes comprised participants from Bangladesh, Brunei, Bhutan, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Palestine, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Zambia, and each country was given a booth to decorate with items and paraphernalia from their home country. The participants donned beautiful traditional/national costumes and took turns to present about their culture during a walkabout session. The DiD participants, made up of officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, showcased their command of foreign languages that they are learning at IDFR – Arabic, French, Mandarin or Spanish – through a food demonstration. Among the food served were *baklava*, *dim*

sum, *tacos* and *salade niçoise*.

This was followed by performances by participants from the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Malaysia, which, among others, featured a mock Malay wedding ceremony. The Ambassador of the Republic of Tajikistan, H.E. Dr. Muzaffar Muhammadi, then took to the stage for an impromptu performance on the *dutar*, a traditional long-necked two-string lute.

Since it was still the month of *Syawal*, the Institute took the opportunity to also organise a small Eid celebration lunch. The afternoon allowed everyone present to learn and appreciate the culture of other countries, besides getting to know each other better and enjoying good food.

Tan Sri Dato' Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak

Secretary General of the World Islamic Economic Forum Foundation and
Former Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia

1. You retired from the civil service in 2006 after having served as a diplomat for 34 years. Can you share your thoughts on the progress Malaysia has made in the international arena?

Answer

I believe Malaysia's contribution since independence as a responsible member of the international community in debates on major global issues including Apartheid, Environment, Antarctica, Law of the Sea, Climate Change, Disarmament, Non proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Sustainable Development and, in the recent years, in respect of the Global Movement of the Moderates are well documented. Similarly various initiatives including the push for the membership of the ASEAN Ten, the establishment of the ASEAN Charter plus an ASEAN Human Rights Body, the Declaration on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, the East Asia Summit and the establishment of regional Growth Triangles as well as the Langkawi International Dialogue all bear the imprint of Malaysia's unmistakable and well-recognised contributions in the international arena. As we look forward to the years ahead amidst various geo-political, security and economic challenges, it is important that the principle of equity and justice guided by international law continue to be the basis in the formulation of Malaysia's foreign policy in the pursuit of the country's national interest. I believe that economic diplomacy pertaining to the growth of Islamic Finance and Banking could be an important dimension of Malaysia's foreign policy initiative

that we can play a proactive role both regionally and globally.

2. As one who had a very successful diplomatic career and had served as the Secretary General of the Ministry for more than four years prior to your retirement, can you share some ideas on how our diplomats can further enhance their skills and become top-notch diplomats like yourself and many other illustrious Malaysian diplomats?



Answer

It goes without saying that acquisition of diplomatic skills and knowledge is a continuous affair and should not stop upon graduation of relevant degrees, courses or training programmes. With easy access to vast and varied information available now at the click of a finger, continuous self-learning to broaden one's knowledge on diplomacy and related disciplines should be part and parcel of a diplomat's daily life. All these are vital ingredients to making

Malaysian diplomats competitive and at par with, if not better than their foreign counterparts. However, awareness of all these alone is not enough without dedicated commitment by our own diplomats to continuously improve the quality of their performance. Wisma Putra itself can be instrumental, of course, in ensuring the recruitment of diplomats of the right calibre and aptitude and the provision of logistical support, diplomatic tools and resources necessary to enable our diplomats to perform their level best at the regional and international level to the satisfaction and pride of the nation.

3. You have been the Secretary General of the World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF) Foundation since 2008. WIEF is in a position to play an important role in economic diplomacy. Can you tell us more about the progress the Forum has made in fostering business relationships among OIC member countries and bolstering their economic performance?

Answer

I consider it a great privilege to be associated with the WIEF, an offshoot of the 2003 OIC Business Forum, from the beginning and to be directly involved in its progress in various capacities since its establishment in 2005, first as a member of the International Advisory Panel, then as a member of the Board of Trustee and finally Secretary General. The Forum is now a globally recognised business and economic platform with a wide geographical reach



that goes beyond the membership of the OIC to encompass both the Muslim and the non-Muslim world. The focus given by the Forum to business and economic related issues whilst eschewing political, security and religious issues, has made it more acceptable worldwide and contributed significantly to its current success. Headquartered in Kuala Lumpur as a Malaysian initiative under the patronage of the Prime Minister and supported by the relevant Agencies including Wisma Putra and MITI together with the private sector, the independently run annual WIEF is fast emerging as Malaysia's contribution to promoting global business collaboration as it moves from Kuala Lumpur to Islamabad, Kuwait, Jakarta, Astana, London and Dubai over the last 11 years. Jakarta was again the host of the Forum in 2016 to be followed by the Republic of Korea in 2017. The ever increasing popularity of the Forum is testament to the significant benefits enjoyed by the participants, including women and youth, from the wide ranging and multi-faceted programmes offered by the WIEF.

4. You were IDFR's third Director General, having served from 1997 to 1998. As IDFR celebrates its 25th anniversary this year, how do you see the progress IDFR has made thus far and how do you think it can improve its role to meet the ever changing challenges in the diplomatic world?

Answer

Serving as DG of IDFR was a diversion of sort for me personally when I had to switch my career from being a practitioner to a trainer. Formulating and conducting diplomatic training programmes can be challenging when set against the ever-increasing demands and complexity of the diplomatic service.

It is always difficult to measure the direct outcome of training programmes offered to the quality of diplomats produced. I believe much progress has been achieved by IDFR since its establishment in 1991, not only physically with a much better and bigger complex but in terms of the structure, content and diversity of the courses and programmes offered at the Institute. I noted the review of IDFR's programmes and the transformation initiated recently with a view to making them more relevant in keeping with the needs of our time. The successive DGs have all made their own contributions. For me personally, I am happy to see the logo of IDFR and the Masters Programme with UKM introduced during my time being currently retained. Our ultimate objective should be to transform IDFR into a globally recognised, prestigious and world class Diplomatic Institute comparable to the best there is.

5. You are also a former President of the Association of Former Malaysian Ambassadors (AFMA). In your opinion, what can the association do to contribute towards Malaysia's diplomacy and foreign relations and also to assist IDFR in enhancing its core business?

Answer

It is interesting to note that the number of Malaysian ex-ambassadors has now reached 195 and that many are still healthy and active. Most members would be happy to see AFMA focusing on the improvement of their welfare and wellbeing through get-together programmes that would benefit them directly as retired ambassadors. This should continue to be an important role of AFMA. But we see many countries like the US, China and India taking advantage of their retired ambassadors to continue

to serve the nation. I believe we should do the same. This is where AFMA can play a meaningful role in creating the necessary framework with Wisma Putra's support to allow for advisory services on diplomacy and foreign relations to be provided in a more systematic and professional manner by the relevant ex-ambassadors. Failure in our previous attempts to do so should not necessarily discourage a revisit of such a proposal for the ultimate good of the nation.

6. What would your advice be to our junior diplomats, especially those who have just joined the Ministry?

Answer

Rightfully, a career in the diplomatic service should be a preferred choice of the officers concerned rather than something that happened to be available. They need to have the right inclination, aptitude, disposition and mindset, accompanied by the knowledge, skills, competence and dedication to give their level best to the foreign service. They should be consciously aware of their role and responsibility in preserving Malaysia's good name, reputation and national interest through their conduct and performance at the regional and international level. In short, they should continuously strive to be a good diplomat. And being a good diplomat means being prepared and confident enough to be benchmarked against the best of their foreign counterparts in the Diplomatic Service.

Tan Sri Dato' Ahmad Fuzi Abdul Razak joined the Administrative and Diplomatic Service in 1972 and his career included postings to Moscow, the Hague, Canberra, Washington, Dhaka and as Director General of IDFR. He was the Secretary General of the Ministry from 4 July 2001 to 7 January 2006. Upon retirement, he was appointed the Ministry's Ambassador at Large. In 2008, he was appointed Secretary General of the World Islamic Economic Forum Foundation, a post he holds until today.

The South China Sea: Award of 12 July 2016 and Beyond

By Professor Dr. Vivian Louis Forbes*

THE AWARD OF 12 JULY 2016

In the words of Guo Weimin, Vice-Minister of China's State Council Information Office, the South China Sea was China's "ancestors' sea", where arbitration "could not make a wave".¹ The 'arbitration' that he referred to was the unanimous Award handed down, at The Hague, The Netherlands, on 12 July 2016, by a Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).² The arbitration was instituted by the Republic of the Philippines against the People's Republic of China. The latter was, and still is, adamant that it will not accept the ruling of the PCA for a myriad of reasons and that it will pursue a peaceful path, however defined, in resolving the disputes through avenues of diplomacy and negotiation. The Government of China did not participate in the arbitration which it believed was unilaterally initiated by the Government of the Philippines on 22 January 2013 and that action was contrary to good faith demonstrated, by the Parties, in the ASEAN-China *Declaration on the Code of Conduct* of 2002 which, incidentally, is a political and not a legal document.³

The arbitration focused on the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the semi-enclosed South China Sea; the status of certain marine features – namely, sand cays, islands, reefs, rocks and shoals – that are capable of generating maritime jurisdiction limits. Attention was also given to the lawfulness of certain actions and activities undertaken by officials in China, that were alleged by the Philippines, to violate the provisions contained in the 1982 *UN Law*

of the Sea Convention (the 1982 Convention). Indeed, the Tribunal was constituted under Annexe VII of the 1982 Convention.⁴

The Government of China had made it abundantly clear, in its Position Paper of 7 December 2014⁵ and in many other official oral and written statements that in its view, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction on this matter. The Tribunal had taken a number of steps to fulfil its duty as to whether it had jurisdiction and whether the Philippines' claims were well founded and it treated China's informal communications as equivalent to an objection to jurisdiction.

The Award addressed the issues of jurisdiction not decided in the Award of Jurisdiction and Admissibility and the merits of the Philippines' claims over which the Tribunal had jurisdiction.⁶ The Award is final and binding, as set out in the 1982 Convention's Article 296 and Article 11 of Annex VII.⁷

The then (2013) Government of the Philippines made 15 submissions in the proceedings. It requested the Tribunal to find in addition to China's historical and legal rights to the waters and resources of the South China Sea, the status of the marine features in the context of marine entitlements, and to insist that China respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines under the 1982 Convention. It further requested China to comply with its duties under the said Convention, including those relevant to the protection and preservation of the marine environment in this semi-enclosed sea and that it

exercises its rights and freedoms in this sea with due regard to those of the Philippines.

MAJOR ISSUES ADDRESSED

Five major issues, summarised below, were addressed by the Tribunal in order to compile the Award contained in 501 pages.

1. Historic Rights and the 'Nine-Dash Line' Map

The Tribunal concluded that whereas China had historic rights to resources within the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished to the extent that they were incompatible with the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) provided for in the 1982 Convention.⁸ Furthermore, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters and marine features or their resources, although the Tribunal acknowledged the fact that Chinese fishers and navigators, as well as those of other States – from near and afar – had historically made use of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. The Tribunal did not specify as to whether the 'Nine-dash line' map was legal.

2. Status of the Marine Features

The Tribunal undertook an extensive evaluation of whether certain reefs claimed by China (and by implication those claimed by other littoral States) are above water at High Tide and noted that many of the reefs have been heavily modified (geographically/physically transformed) by land reclamation and construction. The Tribunal noted that the

1982 Convention classifies marine features on their natural condition, and relied on historical hydrographical surveys and charts and other documents in evaluating all the features in the context of the present dispute. The Tribunal also considered whether any of the features in the Spratly Group claimed by China could generate maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles (M). According to the provisions of the 1982 Convention, in particular Article 121, islands generate an EEZ of 200M and a continental shelf jurisdiction; however, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own are NOT entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf.⁹

The following were deemed by the Tribunal to be High Tide features: Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef (North), Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef and Scarborough Shoal. Another group, namely, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef were classified as being submerged at High Tide in their natural condition.

The Tribunal concluded that the provisions noted in Article 121 were dependent upon the **objective capacity of a feature**, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature.¹⁰ It also observed that the current presence of official personnel on many of the features is dependent on external support and NOT reflective of the capacity of the features. Furthermore, the Tribunal concluded that transient

use – referring to small groups of fishers and several fishing and guano mining enterprises undertaken by Japanese in the past – did not constitute inhabitation by a stable community and that all of the historical economic activity had been of an extractive context.

In its conclusion, specifically on the status of the marine features, the Tribunal argued that NONE of the Spratly Group are capable of generating extended maritime zones and that the Spratly Group cannot generate maritime zones collectively as a unit. This included the feature known as Ita Abu (or Taiping Island). It also stipulated that none of the features claimed by China were capable of generating an EEZ and that the Tribunal could – without delimiting a maritime boundary – declare that certain areas are within the EEZ of the Philippines, because those areas are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China.

3. *Lawfulness of Chinese Actions*

The Tribunal found that China had violated the Philippines' EEZ sovereign rights by:

- Interfering with Philippine fishing and hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation operations
- Constructing artificial islands
- Failing to prevent Chinese fishers from fishing in Philippines' EEZ

The Tribunal also acknowledged that fishers from the Philippines and China possessed traditional fishing rights at Scarborough Shoal and that China had interfered with these traditional rights in restricting access. It noted that Chinese law

enforcement vessels had unlawfully created a serious risk of collision when they physically obstructed Philippine ships and boats.

4. *Harm to the Marine Environment*

Having considered the effect on the marine environment of China's large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial features in the Spratly Group since 2013, and perhaps even earlier, and deduced from independent sources and reports, which it vigorously examined, that such activities had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and thereby violated China's obligations to preserve and protect the fragile ecosystems and habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the Chinese authorities were aware that the Chinese fishers had harvested endangered sea turtles, coral and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China Sea – allegedly using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment – and had not fulfilled their obligation to stop such activities.

5. *Aggravation of the Dispute*

On this subject matter, the Tribunal considered whether China's actions since the commencement of the arbitration (January 2013) had aggravated the dispute between the Parties. It found that China's recent (particularly since mid-2014) large-scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands was, indeed, incompatible with the obligations on a State during dispute resolution proceedings,

insofar as the authorities in China had inflicted irreparable harm to the marine environment, constructed a large artificial island in the Philippines' EEZ, and destroyed evidence of the natural condition of features in the South China Sea that constituted part of the Parties' dispute.

The Tribunal acknowledged that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the implications of the stand-off between Chinese naval and law enforcement (*maritime militia*) and Philippines' marines at Second Thomas Shoal, noting that this dispute involved military activities and was therefore excluded from compulsory settlement.

REPORTED ACTIONS AND COMMENTS: 12 to 17 July 2016

The ruling, which enhances the 1982 Convention standing in international law, is binding to both China and the Philippines. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang reiterated China's policy and hinted that ASEAN had put forward a dual-track proposal. However, ASEAN had prepared a draft text but there was no agreement to release a joint statement. There is concern that China is allegedly trying to cause a rift in ASEAN through its allies (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar) on the South China Sea dispute.¹¹

The Government of China inaugurated two airports on 14 July 2016 that it built on the *Meiji* (Mischief) and *Zhubi* (Subi) Reefs that are part of the disputed Spratly Group in the South China Sea and unveiled another airport on *Yongshu* (Fiery Cross) Reef in January 2016. The *Meiji* and *Zhubi* Reefs are also contested by Taiwan and Vietnam, although controlled by China.¹² China also indicated that it could set up an air defence zone over the South China Sea; that it may build mobile nuclear plants on its artificial islands; and commence oil exploration.¹³ Since mid-2015 China has constructed five lighthouses (four are operational) to enhance safety to navigation.

The Government of Vietnam lauded the ruling of the Tribunal whilst the Government of Taiwan rejected the decision especially as it is Taiwan's sole possession in the disputed zone. The Governments of Indonesia, as with that of Malaysia, has urged all parties involved in the dispute to exercise self-restraint and respect applicable international law. Within days of the Award being in the public domain, the Government of China issued its White Paper and a brochure on the dispute. The Government of the Philippines hardened its stance whilst stating that it would send former President Fidel Ramos to China for discussions. The Award has

generated many political ripples in this semi-enclosed sea.

REFERENCES

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- ¹*The Star Online*, 15 July 2016. This daily and the *New Straits Times* have devoted extensive coverage of the ongoing saga that is the South China Sea dispute.
- ²PCA's Press Release and Award – The South China Sea Arbitration of 12 July 2016.
- ³ASEAN-China's *Declaration on Code of Conduct* in the South China Sea, of 2002.
- ⁴The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, entered into force in November 1994. China and the Philippines ratified this internationally accepted document.
- ⁵China's Position Paper of 7 December 2014 listed some points stating its objections to the 'unilateral' action undertaken by the Philippines.
- ⁶Article 288 of the 1982 Convention provides that: "In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal".
- ⁷See the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention's Article 296 and Annex VII.
- ⁸Refer to the Articles on the EEZ and Continental Shelf contained in the 1982 Convention.
- ⁹Refer to Article 121 of the 1982 Convention.
- ¹⁰Independent experts were appointed by the Tribunal to report on technical matters and to obtain historical records and hydrographical survey data from Archives in England and France.
- ¹¹'ASEAN Keeps mum on issue', *New Straits Times*, Friday 15 July 2016, p.24.
- ¹²The official Chinese daily *Global Times* announced on Twitter on Thursday 14 July 2016.
- ¹³'Air defence zone an option'; 'Beijing mulls nuke plants in Spratly', *The Star*, 15 & 16 July 2016, respectively.

The Turkish Cauldron

By Syed Nizamuddin Sayed Khassim

Kissinger and Huntington often reflect on the historical narratives of nations and civilizations to pre-empt the moves of political actors on the global stage. "History," Kissinger said, "is the memory of the States".

History too is often reflected on the architectural landscape it embraced, leaving clues and details on what one can expect from the future.

One can say that the intricacies

of Turkish politics is a mirror of its Leviathan metropolises. From the bowels of Istanbul's hidden cisterns to the intersecting Metro tunnels of Ankara, one is hard-pressed to find the beginning or the end of the

complexities. Lights and shadows danced in the amniotic silence of Istanbul's hidden labyrinths, blurring the lines between right and wrong. Formed by centuries of palace coups, rebellions, assassinations and putsches – dark scars on the Turkish political history were immortalised unto the granites of history, sadly inherited by the new generation.

The recent putsch attempt in Turkey has brought Turkish politics into the fore of global discussion once again. However, instead of featuring the nuances of Turkish politics – the media, particularly those from the West, simplified the different factions of Turkish politics into that of 'Erdogan vs anti-Erdogan' factions. Also guilty in their reductionist portrayal of events were the hardcore Erdogan sympathisers, who see no harm and sin could be committed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Between these two reduction-esque portrayals of events, the reality of Turkish politics remains concealed from global scrutiny. Questions on the legitimacy of the State, its apparatus, contrasting factions within the government machinery and the civil society became the volatile and divisive nature of the foundation of Turkish politics. Indeed, most of the terms used in the Western media and local commentaries lack the proper depth and nuance.

Often, if not always – the arguments will be simplified as a mere clash between the 'secularists' and 'Islamists'. The problem with such argument is that Erdogan is now scapegoating the 'other' Islamist faction in Turkey, the Gulenists for the recent coup attempt. As Mustafa Akyol, a journalist, recently pointed

out, the recent clash sending Turkey to the brink of regime change is not so much between the secularists and Islamists, but rather – a clash between two factions of Turkish Islamist ideal: Gulenists vs Erdoganists. This write-up does not pose to uncover the power players behind the recent failed putsch, but it will attempt to introduce the main ingredients broiling within Turkish political cauldron.

'The Deep State (Derin Devlet)'

Embedded in Turkish politics since the times of the Ottoman is the existence of the 'Deep State', which refers to an institution or internal organ, as well as a cabal of powerful people who control the apparatus of the State and does not respond to the civilian rule. The 'Deep State' system controls Ottoman Turkey during the First World War, manifested in the form of the 'Three Pashas' who govern with the Sultan's name.

An idealist might expect that the new form of governance introduced by Kemal Ataturk will remove the catharsis within the Ottoman system that is the 'Deep State' – but the system continues, and with much gusto during the Cold War. Much like how the Deep State system controlled the Sultan, the ultra-nationalist and secularist Special Warfare Department (Özel Harp Dairesi, or ÖHD) keeps its hands around the neck of civilian-elected Presidents during the Cold War. The Deep State – heavily centralised within the military was responsible for the coups that kicked various democratically-elected Presidents out from the office.

It was not until 1974 that the structure of the Deep State was revealed officially to the public by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit' – although many suspected of its

existence long before. However, an acknowledgement is different from an elimination. Ever since, from President Demirel to President Erdogan: the threat from within, known as the Deep State, has always been acknowledged.

Erdogan too shared a fair amount of threat from the Deep State, manifested in the form of Ergenekon – a clandestine ultra-nationalist secularist faction that works not unlike the ÖHD during the time of Ecevit. Over 500 people were arrested and more than 300 were officially charged.

While Erdogan did candidly highlight the problem of the Deep State and tried to expunge them during the Ergenekon purge, the blame for the recent failed coup was heaved on another clandestine structure – the Parallel State.

'The Gulenists, the Parallel State and the Imamin Ordu'

Long before the recent coup attempt, Erdogan has repeatedly claimed that the Parallel State is undermining his rule in Turkey. But what exactly is the Parallel State? To understand this – one needs to understand the forced implementation of secularism in Turkey.

On 5 February 1937, laïcité or secularism was explicitly stated in the second article of the then Turkish Constitution. Unlike the passive form of secularism practised within the Anglo-American sphere, secularism in Turkey tailors the French aggressive model of secularism. In Turkey, this is officially known as the 'active neutrality' of the country with regard to religious matters. As such, the heavily secularised State machinery will act upon political parties that tried to 'redefine the secular nature of the republic'. The forgone conclusion is the closure

of several political parties with religious leaning, including the Virtue Party, a progenitor of the ruling AKP.

In an environment hostile to religious expression, the teachings of Said Nursi gained currency. Nursi's teachings were highly spiritual and complemented the spiritual needs of Muslims during the rule of Kemal Ataturk. Seeing the removal of Islam from the state machinery, he saw it as a chance to truly understand the teachings of Islam sans the tinted glass of politics. Highly principled in his abhorrence towards politics, he rejected an offer by Kemal Ataturk himself to be one of the religious officials within the newly-minted 'Ministry of Religious Affairs'. This led to his tumultuous relationship with the government.

Nursi's teachings could be simplified into two main tenets: the 'mânevî jihad' or 'jihad through words', and positive action, as well as the promotion of interfaith dialogues. Despite his emphasis on non-violence, the nascent State became highly weary of his popularity².

After his death, another scholar by the name of Fethullah Gulen came to the fore. Heavily influenced by Nursi, the movement shied away from direct political engagement. While Erdogan's "National View" (Millî Görüş) tradition of political Islam is combative, Gulenists are focused more on universal issues pertaining to morality and spirituality. Nonetheless, there was a concerted effort by the Gulenists to transform the hostile secular state – by gradually joining the ranks of the state machinery. While this is highly speculated, no clear evidence could pinpoint towards the infiltration agenda. This was seen as the beginning of the 'parallel state' that serves to counterbalance

the secularists within Turkey's government machinery³. The closeted Gulenists or sympathisers to the Gulen movement were given the moniker the Imam's Army or Imamin Ordusu by the weary secularists within the society.

Mustafa Akyol succinctly pointed out that while Gulenists and Erdoganists hold different Islamic world view, they found comfort within each other's presence during AKP's early years in power – glued together by the threat of hostile secular segment within the government machinery – particularly the military.

However, things started to turn downhill after the 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey – where many people who were connected to the AKP were apprehended by the state machinery under the charges of corruption. With the high number of Gulenists within the government machinery – the AKP turned against its ally-turn-enemy. The ruling government wasted no time in declaring the Gulenists as saboteurs and branded them as the 'Parallel State', or a state within a state that runs parallel with the democratically elected government. It is now seen as a religiously-inclined version of the secularist Deep State.

Attempted Coup d'état of 2016

On 15 July 2016, an attempt to stage a coup d'état was made by a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces. While the coup failed to materialise, Erdogan was quick to turn against Gulenists – or the 'Parallel State' as he called them. Little evidence has surfaced or brought to light, but the purge continues like clockwork – not unlike the purge against the Deep State during the Ergenekon trial. In response, Fethullah Gulen who is now in exile, accused the Turkish President of staging the

coup – a false flag operation in order to cement his grip over the State's machinery. In essence, Erdogan might have created his own 'alternate state' to complete his hold over the Turkish government machinery.

As always, trying to figure out the truth in such a highly-political situation is akin to finding a single grain within the chasm of Bosphorus. Much like the labyrinth embedded within the bowels of Istanbul that never ceases to bedazzle, charm and snare travellers abroad – so is that of Turkish politics. Like its metropolises that harbour layers of cisterns, caverns and tunnels that used to breathe of power, richness and mere survival – so is the dynamics of Turkish politics.

Former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel used to say that "humour is like a punch, you can't know who it will hit or when." One cannot help but wonder if Turkish politics is a dark divine comedy.

ENDNOTES

¹It was only revealed much later that an attempted assassination against Ecevit in 1977 was orchestrated by the Deep State (at that time centralised in the Counter-Guerilla branch of the military) – due to political differences.

²Indeed, so weary was the extreme secularist faction within military of his influence that they desecrated his grave after a military coup d'état in 1960 – hiding his body away from his venerated.

³In 2011, a Turkish investigative journalist by the name of Ahmed Sik was named as one of the conspirators of the Ergenekon plot. Prior to his arrest, he was a few steps away from 'exposing the evidences' of Gulenists' infiltration within the State system. The title of his expose is the Imamin Ordusu (the Imam's Army).

Syed Nizamuddin Sayed Khassim is an officer with the Multilateral Economics and Environment Division, Department of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Discourse on Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

By Norhidayah Md Raziap and Sarah Zahirah Ruhama

On 28 April 2016, IDFR and the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS) of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) hosted a round table discussion under the Economic Diplomacy Series on *Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement* (TPPA) at IDFR. The panellists were Datuk J. Jayasiri, Deputy Secretary General (Strategy and Monitoring), Ministry of International Trade and Industry and Malaysia's Chief Negotiator to the TPPA; Dr. Zulkipli Omar, Senior Research Fellow at the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research; and H.E. Carlos Isauro Felix Corona, Ambassador of Mexico to Malaysia. The round table discussion seeks to bring about greater understanding and knowledge on the much-debated free trade agreement that was signed in February this year.

According to Datuk J. Jayasiri, the TPPA presents new areas for Malaysia such as government procurement, labour, environment and state-owned enterprises excluded from Malaysia's past free trade agreements (FTAs). Under the TPPA, Malaysia will be undertaking a few key commitments for the first time. Comprehensive liberalisation of goods and services will eliminate pockets of sectoral or product exclusions often found in Malaysia's past FTAs. The threshold for liberalisation is also higher under the TPPA.

Another big move for Malaysia is the opening up of the government procurement market. This is a major concession and departure from Malaysia's policy to keep its government procurement market closed. Malaysia is also expected to amend ten of its labour chapters and



agreements in compliance with the International Labour Organisation Declaration 1998. Three multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) made enforceable by the TPPA mark another departure for Malaysia.

What does Malaysia stand to gain from the TPPA? Four new preferential access to markets in the US, Canada, Mexico and Peru will now be open to Malaysia. By assuming the obligations under the investment chapter, Malaysia has a reasonable chance to attract more foreign direct investments (FDIs) and to ensure the current investors in the country stay and expand their operations. With new rules now outlined for 21st century issues such as e-commerce, the TPPA is a game-changer as it creates a platform for digital trade which can be leveraged by developing countries like Malaysia.

Datuk J. Jayasiri also emphasised the need for capacity building for small and medium enterprises as well as Bumiputera enterprises, and highlighted the need for civil servants to be equipped with basic facts and obligations of the agreement as they will be its future implementers.

Dr. Zulkipli then shared his analysis of Malaysia's trade and export. Malaysia's export to its top trading partners, namely, Singapore, the US, Japan and China is highly concentrated on selected commodities such as electrical and electronic goods as well as machinery and furniture. Manufacturing of electrical and electronic goods involves regional production networks and global value chain as Malaysia requires a lot of intermediary inputs to produce the exported final products. Dr. Zulkipli said that it is best for Malaysia to lessen its dependency on intermediary input in order to gain more value.

Dr. Zulkipli also drew attention to the need to review the economic structure to better link trade and industrial policies synchronously. He strongly believed that Malaysia can benefit from the TPPA's non-tariff measures such as reforms in labour, commodity, operation and efficiency.

According to H.E. Felix Corona, the final panellist, Mexico is certainly not new to FTAs. In 1991, Mexico joined the US and Canada to form the NAFTA. To Mexico, the TPPA

is a natural extension to its existing network of FTAs as it seeks bigger presence in Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Vietnam. H.E. Corona drew attention to the fact that through the TPPA, Malaysia will also have access to the other 45 countries that Mexico already has a free trade agreement with and can leverage on Mexico's connection with North America and Latin America, specifically its trade bloc, the Pacific Alliance.

H.E. Corona also highlighted a few

Malaysian products that can benefit under the TPPA, which include automotive products, machinery equipment and rubber products.

Sharing some of the lessons Mexico gained from the NAFTA, H.E. Corona emphasised the need to prepare different sectors to compete in a globalized economy. It is crucial for businesses to be prepared to leave their comfort zone and adopt a new mentality of doing business. There is also a vital need to invest in human capital, technology and innovation so that

the country can better reap the benefits that such an agreement offers. He also pointed to structural reforms as crucial to provide the conditions for companies to compete better.

The round table discussion attracted the participation of government officials, members of the diplomatic corps, officials from business chambers and academicians interested in the topic.

ASEAN Ambassador Lecture Series: Vietnam

By Norhidayah Md Raziap



On 28 May 2016, IDFR organised a lecture under its ASEAN Ambassador Lecture Series. The lecture titled *Vietnam's Economic Security* was presented by H.E. Pham Cao Phong, the Ambassador of Vietnam to Malaysia. The Lecture Series is one of IDFR's flagship discourses which aim to strengthen ties with fellow ASEAN countries and discuss recent issues in the region.

The steady and vibrant economic growth in Vietnam at more than 6 per cent per annum has placed the country as one of the fastest

growing economies in Southeast Asia. This was achieved despite the recent challenges and instability in the global economy. How does this then translate to Vietnam's economic security and what are the issues and challenges for Vietnam in relation to this?

H.E. Pham began by enlightening the audience on the two schools of thought in economic security; one, emphasizing the internal or human dimension, and the other, on the external dimension. The internal or human dimension is the ability to satisfy people's needs and

wants, and focuses more on the welfare of the people. The external dimension, on the other hand, emphasizes on the external threats or factors affecting a country. It is the state's ability to protect against attack on its sovereign affairs and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. The two parameters commonly used to measure economic security are trade and investment. With the increased engagement of developing countries with the global economy, this has become a salient dimension to be addressed. Vietnam considers both dimensions as important and applicable to them, and tries to develop a new concept of economic security that includes both.

When it comes to issues and challenges in economic security, H.E. Pham mentioned several issues. The first one is poverty and hunger. In 2015, about 5 per cent of the Vietnamese households are still considered poor. They are mainly from the ethnic minorities living in remote areas. Due to

their remote location, the ethnic minorities have poor access to public and welfare services such as healthcare and education. Poverty arises from various factors such as low income, traditional custom, low levels of educational attainment, as well as ecological damage to poor agricultural management. The result of poverty eradication effort is not good enough and important income gaps still remain.

The second issue is economic integration with the world economy. H.E. Pham acknowledged this as a controversial issue as it involves the country's sovereignty but at the same time, it is to be balanced with commitments made with other countries. Given the current world situation, it is vital for Vietnam to integrate as it is not only pertinent to the external dimension of economic security but can also be one of the measures to solve

issues from the internal dimension like poverty and hunger. However, there are challenges in integration with the world economy: one is securing foreign direct investments; two is securing domestic markets; and three is the threat of the foreign direct investments itself. Nevertheless, these three challenges will not hinder Vietnam from joining the economic bloc as competition and cooperation are mutually reinforcing.

H.E. Pham further explained that various consistent efforts have been taken by the government to ensure economic security in Vietnam. The country aims to reduce the number of poor households at a rate of 1 to 1.5 per cent per year under two programmes; *Programme for Quick and Sustainable Eradication of Poverty in 61 Poor Districts* and *Programme on National Targets*

on *Sustainable Eradication of Poverty 2016-2020*. To ensure economic security from the external dimension, Vietnam with the newly-elected National Assembly will start the ratification process of TPPA at the Assembly's first session. Vietnam has also actively participated in bilateral and regional free trade agreements such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

H.E. Pham concluded the lecture with the view that remaining underdeveloped is the greatest threat to Vietnam's national security. Therefore, economic security becomes an important factor in the country's comprehensive plan. It is also important as it creates conditions favourable for enhancing national defence and its military capacity.

Public Lecture on *The United States and China in an Era of Uncertainty*

By Siti Farsha Murni Izami

IDFR, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and Universiti Malaya jointly organised a public lecture titled *The United States and China in an Era of Uncertainty* on 28 June 2016. The guest speaker was Professor Dr. David M. Lampton, Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, who also served as Dean of Faculty from 2004 to 2012. The session was attended by former Malaysian diplomats, representatives from various ministries, students from local universities, and several politicians.

In his deliberation, Professor Lampton highlighted the current



situation and context in US-China relations and how the dynamic of the relations has changed over the years. The changes have been from the economic, political, and diplomatic aspects. This is related as well to the leaderships in both countries throughout time.

Along with the changes are also issues interconnected to power and security. There was a good exchange of views and interaction between the speaker and the guests, and Professor Lampton was forthright in responding to the comments and questions.

MTCP: Crisis Management Course for International Participants 2016

By Sarah Zahirah Ruhama



As an integral part of international relations, crisis management is the ability of individuals and states to respond to challenges with strategies and policy choices that would enable them to overcome present threats and dangers, and turn them around for future betterment. Therefore, it is important for diplomats to acquire the techniques and skills required to assess and manage a crisis situation as well as to prevent the recurrence of similar crisis in the future.

In line with this, IDFR organised a Crisis Management Course for International Participants 2016 course from 11 to 24 May 2016. The course, funded by the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP), is designed to provide insights on theories, strategies, elements and issues related to international crisis management as well as to enhance knowledge and skills in the various approaches and techniques in managing crisis. The course is the third MTCP programme held at IDFR this year, following a diplomatic training course for junior diplomats held in March and a special workshop on ASEAN for Lao PDR officials in April.

Eighteen participants from 16 countries underwent 14 days of training covering various issues including national and international security, international humanitarian issues and challenges, scenario planning and future studies, environment and energy crisis, maritime diplomacy, counter-terrorism and crisis negotiations. The participants were from Bhutan, Cambodia, Egypt, the Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malawi, Malaysia, Palestine, the Philippines, Seychelles, Swaziland, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.

Designed to be practical with talks, discussions and simulation exercises, the course encouraged active participation and exchange of information between the participants. Throughout the course, the participants gained a glimpse of Malaysia's experience in managing its foreign policy, economy and development matters, and were exposed to various crisis management skills such as scenario planning, strategic thinking, crisis negotiations, and public diplomacy.

Under the introduction to state-level governance module, the

participants visited Malacca to discover the unique blend of cultures in Malaysia.

A Closing and Certificate Presentation Ceremony was held on 24 May 2016. Datuk Salman Ahmad, IDFR's Director General, delivered the Closing Remarks and presented the certificate of attendance to the participants. The class representative, Ms. Maria Kristina Bernadette C. Mojica of the Philippines delivered their vote of thanks. Also in attendance at the ceremony were H.E. Alpha Diallo, Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea to Malaysia; H.E. Dato' Dr. Anwar H. Al Agha, Ambassador of the State of Palestine to Malaysia; H.E. Başak Türkoğlu, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Malaysia; Mr. Beh Ching Chye, Principal Assistant Secretary of the International Cooperation and Development Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; as well as Minister Counsellors and Embassy Representatives of the participating countries.

FEEDBACK

The course covered a wide range of issues including financial crisis, environmental crisis and aviation crisis. The visits to different institutions opened our eyes to what Malaysia has to offer to the world. Due to the diverse background of the participants, we also learned from each other.

I would like to thank IDFR for organising the course and in particular, for inviting Bhutan to participate. The learning from this course will be very useful for me personally and the country if we are faced with crisis situations.

Mr. Pema Tobgay
Desk Officer, Department of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Bhutan

Diploma in Diplomacy 2016: Activities from May to July 2016

By Imran Ariff Muhammad Amin

By the end of July, the participants had completed five months or approximately 450 learning hours of the programme. The programme's modules transitioned from the administrative and service matters to substantive areas related to diplomacy, economy, law, media and diplomacy, public diplomacy, culture, soft skills, crisis management, security, and negotiation skills. English and Foreign Language classes were also progressing smoothly during the last three months.

The participants also successfully completed five group projects, namely, three panel discussions on economy, celebrity diplomacy and security respectively; a corporate and social responsibility programme with the Prison Department of Malaysia; and a state level governance visit to the Selangor State government office.

The panel discussion on economy with the title *Petroleum in the World Economy* was held on 17 May 2016. The panellists were Encik Abd Rahim Mahmood, Head of Strategic Research, Corporate Strategy, Petroliaam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS); YM Tengku Muhammad Taufik, Executive Director, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Capital Sdn Bhd; and Dr. Mohd Yusof Saari, Head of Quantitative Methods for Policy Analysis, Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia. The session was moderated by Ms. Nurul Syaza Azlisha, one of the DiD participants. In attendance were representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Planning Unit, Ministry of International



Trade and Industry, Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water, Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Malaysian Investment Development Authority and Malaysian Productivity Corporation. The session discussed the development of the petroleum industry, including its contribution to Malaysia's economic development and global growth. The session further deliberated on the strategic measures in addressing various challenges faced by the petroleum industry such as its existing operations and coping with the high costs in the current economic situation. The discussion also looked into the alternative use of renewable energy which could possibly replace petroleum in the future.

The second panel discussion titled *Celebrity Diplomacy: Innovations in Diplomatic Practices* was held on 31 May 2016. It was deliberated by four panellists: Ms. Astanah Abdul Aziz, Deputy Director General, ASEAN-Malaysia National Secretariat; Che Puan Sarimah Ibrahim, TV host;

Ms. Deborah Henry, Miss Universe Malaysia 2011; and Mr. Suhaimi Sulaiman, a seasoned journalist. The session was moderated by another DiD participant, Azri Hazwani Abdul Aziz. In attendance were representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development; Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Universiti Malaya; Faculty of Administrative Science and Policy Studies, Universiti Teknologi MARA; Department of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences, Taylor's University; and the New Straits Times Press. The panel discussion deliberated on celebrities' roles in promoting Malaysia's image and interests internationally and discussed the credible use of celebrity forms of activism in international political affairs. The panellists examined the meaning of celebrity diplomacy and whether it is relevant to Malaysia. The session also focused on the possible role of Malaysia's celebrities and explored possible practices.

Another highlight of the programme was the corporate and social responsibility programme with the Prison Department of Malaysia on 30 June 2016. The one-day programme at Penjara Wanita Kajang started with the participants cooking *bubur lambuk* (rice porridge normally consumed during fasting month) with the help of prison staff. The activity was also attended by parolees as part of their intervention programme before reintegrating into the society. This was followed by a briefing on aspects related to transfer of prisoners to and from our country. The programme concluded after the participants distributed the *bubur lambuk*.

Concluding the activities in July was the study visit to the Selangor State Government Office, which is part of the programme's State Level Governance Module. The visit enabled the participants to understand the function of

the state government office in state administration, stimulating the state's economic growth, infrastructure development and delivery of services to the public. The participants had the opportunity to pay a courtesy call to Dato' Seri Mohamed Azmin Ali, the Selangor Chief Minister. Dato' Seri then shared his insights into the current challenges in Malaysia's foreign policy and advised the participants to enhance their knowledge and skills in promoting Malaysia's image abroad. He elaborated on the various programmes carried out by the state government as well as the need to empower civil servants to help generate greater growth for Selangor and Malaysia. The participants were later briefed by Mr. Mohd Yazid Sairi from the State Economic Planning Unit on *Smart Selangor Programme*, which highlights various initiatives such as *Smart Governance*, *Smart Development*, *Smart Digital*

Infrastructure and *Smart Waste Management*. The visit to the State Government Office ended at the Selangor State Legislative Assembly where the participants had a session with the State Legislative Assembly Speaker, Ms. Hannah Yeoh. Ms. Yeoh elaborated on the functions of the State Legislative Assembly of Selangor and the reforms that were introduced by the government, which put the state's interests first and promote healthy debates between different political representatives. In the afternoon before heading back to IDFR, the participants visited Galeri Diraja Sultan Abdul Aziz in Klang where the participants were exposed to the life of the late Sultan Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah.

May, June, and July were hectic months for the participants. The DiD programme will end on 9 September 2016 and the graduation ceremony will be held on 15 September 2016.

Upcoming Programmes *

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| IDFR Lecture Series 2/2016: <i>South China Sea Dispute: Post Arbitration and Beyond</i> by Professor Dr. Vivian Louis Forbes | 18 August 2016 |
| Master of Social Science in Strategy and Diplomacy 2016/2017 | 5 September 2016-30 September 2017 |
| Arabic Level I | 20 September-29 November 2016 |
| Effective Presentation Skills 2/2016 | 26-29 September 2016 |
| Effective Writing Skills 2/2016 | 10-13 October 2016 |
| Pre-Posting Orientation Course for Home-Based Staff and Spouses under SPKM Series 5/2016 | 10-21 October 2016 |
| International Negotiation Workshop Series 1/2016 | 14-16 November 2016 |
| Workshop on Intercultural Communication | 15-17 November 2016 |
| Palestinian Solidarity Day | 29 November 2016 |
| Human Rights Day 2016 | 8 December 2016 |

*Subject to change. Please refer to www.idfr.gov.my for any changes.



